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Artificial Intelligence and

Spiritual Life 1
PAULC. VITZ

Angels, whether one believes in them or not, are defined as rational beings
without bodies. By contrast, we humans are known to be rational beings with
bodies. In a standard Judea-Christian framework, humans are not only rational beings that happen to have bodies, they are embodied rational beings.
That is, human mental life and human bodily life are theologically conceptualized as inextricably interwoven. The Greeks and their modern idealistic heirs,
on the other hand, see the human mind as only accidentally connected to the
body. For those taking this approach, we humans are rational beings who just
happen lo have bodies--but our bodies are only a necessary accident of having
a physical existence and are not intrinsic to who and what we are. For these
theorists, there is no necessary link between the nature of our body and the
nature of our mind.
I still remember, about 1960, as a graduate student in psychology, when I
was first introduced to the concept of a computer program. My professors
emphasized that the beauty and power of a program lay in its independence of
the particular physical material in which it might exist. A program, like a
statement in formal logic, could be written in chalk on a blackboard, it could
exist as a sequence of ones and zeros as written in machine language, it could
be punched as holes in a deck of IBM cards, it could be a magnetic pattern on
tape, or it could be a sequence of electronic states in the computer itself where
the program could be stored and then retrieved and run. These examples
should make it clear that a computer program, in its very nature, is remarkably free from any particular physical stuff. A program can be embodied in
almost any material so long as the material in question allows one to fix the
symbols expressing the program. And a program can be run in a computer
that uses widely different basic electronic elements. The elements must allow
for a rapid and reliable binary representation--e.g., on or off. However, vacuum tubes or silicon chips or who knows what in the future can serve this
function. In short, the program with its structure exists independent of any
particular physical medium. Strange as it may sound, a computer program is
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somewhat closer to an angel, that is to a rational intelligence without a body,
than it is to the mind of a human being--at least that is the claim being made
here.
In fact, this fundamental difference between a computer program and the
human mind has long been established empirically in the biological sciences.
And in the past few decades research in neurophysiology has very thoroughly
elaborated and deepened the evidence that the human mind is dependent on
the different particular materials of the brain. The research is well known,
though apparently the implication--that computer programs are quite different
from the human mind--is not commonly appreciated. Over 150 years ago, the
great German physiologist Johannes Muller first clearly articulated what is
known as the "law of specific nerve energies." Put simply, what this means is
that a given nerve gives rise to a sense quality that depends on the specific
character of the nerve. Stimulation of a visual nerve gives rise to visual
experience; stimulation of an auditory nerve gives rise to the experience of
sound, and so on. For example, in hearing there are specific nerve fibers in
the cochlea for almost every specific sound frequency. Thus, the hair cells on
the organ of Corti at the bottom of the cochlea respond to high frequencies,
while those at the top respond to low frequency sound. Now this principle is
far more general than the qualitative experience of the five senses for it
characterizes the central nervous system--e.g., the cortex--as well as the
peripheral senses. For example, recent research shows that this kind of
qualitative specificity is present in the auditory cortex where it is known as a
tonotopic map.2 That is, the frequencies to which the hair cells in the cochlea
are sensitive are mapped into columns of cortical cells--with each column of
cells responding only to a particular and very narrow band of tone frequencies.
The columns of cells are laid out in a spatial pattern that reproduces the
spatial structure in the cochlea. In short, the particular neurons in the
auditory cortex are not interchangeable, general-purpose neurons like silicon
chips; rather they are highly specific and qualitatively different.
This same principle characterizes the visual system--indeed here the degree
of specificity is, if anything, even greater than in the case of audition.3 In the
retina it has long been known that there are three different kinds of colorsensitive receptors (cones) plus light-sensitive receptors (rods). However,
research starting three decades ago has demonstrated that retinal ganglion
cells are also specialized for certain elementary kinds of light stimulation as
well as for retinal Jocation--the best identified types of ganglion cells are
known as X,Y and W cells; in the lateral geniculate nucleus (part of the brain)
visual neurons are specialized for one of four colors, for location on the retina,
and so on. In the visual cortex the specialized complexity expands even
further. Here we find groups of visual neurons specialized for straight lines of
different orientations ranging from vertical to horizontal (or spatial frequency
analyzers); cortical visual neurons appear to exist that respond only to
binocular disparity, while other groups of cortical neurons deal only with color
processing, still separate systems appear to specialize in form and movement
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perception. In short, throughout the structure of visual cortex there are
qualitatively distinct channels analyzing or responding to elementary visual
properties. Typically these channels process the various qualitatively different
kinds of visual info rmation in parallel, that is, at the same time.
Since the mid-nineteenth century it has been known that elsewhere in the
cortex there are special systems both for understanding speech (Wernicke's
area) and for producing speech (Broca's area). The motor cortex is another
major area of specialized neurons. Indeed the cortex is now known to consist
of a very large number of interconnected sub-systems of neurons, each with
specialized qualitatively different sensitivities. One major consequence of this
now-established understanding of the cortex is that to simulate the human
mind it will be necessary to simulate the human body.
This extension of the law of specific nerve energies from the peripheral
sensory system to the cortex clearly shows that the human brain operates on a
principle that is the opposite of a digital computer. That is, digital computers
are made of identical and interchangeable electronic elements. The possibility
that certain chips, for example, could only process one kind of information
(e.g., a payroll but not a mathematical equation or a business letter), would
destroy the utility, the very raison d'etre of the modern digital computer.
This is not to imply that all cortical neurons are qualitatively different from
each other.
Certainly within a cortical neural system there is some
redundancy. Thus, a whole column of cells in the visual cortex may be
sensitive to the same line orientation (or spatial frequency orientation); but
this local redundancy should not be allowed to keep us from understanding
that many different cortical areas are involved in qualitatively different kinds
of processing and experience.
In other words, the understanding of the cortex today is that it consists of a
complex, interconnected group of sub-systems. Each of the many sub-systems
represents a specialized and qualitatively different kind of processing; often
these sub-systems are also associated with qualitatively different conscious
experience. All th is means that the basic neural elements--or the "chips"--in
each sub-system would have to be highly specific and different from those in
each other sub-system; the same is also probably true for the large number of
interconnecting neural structures.
A different but closely related fundamental biological fact is that the
nervous system and the human body are intimately linked with properties of
the external physical world. As just one example, consider the range of light
waves that the human eye is sensitive to. This range, known as the visible
spectrum, is from about 380 nm (violet) to 760 nm (red). Now the potential
spectrum of light (electro-magnetic energy) is enormously greater and ranges
from extremely short waves (gamma rays) to very long radio waves and AC
circuits. The visible spectrum is thus a very small slice of this potential
spectrum. However, it is reasonable to assume that the human eye is only
concerned with the light available on the surface of the earth. To be able to
see waves that onJv exist elsewhere in the cosmos would he a wa!\te of
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biological energy and tissue. The human eye is, however, responsive to almost
all of the spectrum that actually reaches the surface of the earth with any
significant amount of energy. Only the relatively small ultra-violet and infrared parts of the spectrum are not part of our sensitivity. That is, the hum an
visible spectrum is close to the available spectrum on the surface of the earth.
Over and over again scient ists find evidence of this type showing how the body
is adaptcd--cven fine-tuned--to its environment.
There arc two well-known major theoretical understandings of the complex
and intimate connection between the human body and the external physical
world. 4 Among scientists today the most common is the atheistic or agnostic
theory of evolution. This familiar intellectual fram ework assumes that life
originated by chance and then evolved or developed over many millions of
years. For those who hold this view, life forms are understood to be a
marvelously complex, long-term, natural response or adaptation to the
surrounding physical and biological reality.
My own vicw--which can be called theistic evolution--accepts much of the
previous position; but, like many others, I assume that the physical and
biological world was created by God. In this framework the origin and
evolution of life over time is a God-governed phenomenon. However, the
nat ure of how the changes took place is a scientific question that can be
investigated without reference lo the Divinity. In spite of theoretical conOicl
about origins, both the at heistic and theistic versions of evolution accept
almost all of the same scientific findings. That is, they both assum e that life in
all its form s is closely connected to the outside environment in which life has
developed and to which it is adapted. Thus, both kinds of scientists assume an
animal's nervous system can't be understood when separated from its body
and neither the nervous system nor the body can be understood when
separated from the animal's environment, since the three constitute a mutually
interacting system.
The major point that mi nd is embodied is, of course, not a new one. For
example, recently it has been emphasized in the writings of the information
theorist Donald MacKay5 and in the discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AT)
by the philosopher Dreyfus, who sums his position by a quote from the poet
Yeats: "Man can embody the truth, but he cannot know it."6
I am aware that some of the difficulties that arise from ignori ng the body
arc beginning lo receive serious attention in Al and related areas. Neural
nets, now fairly common, are a small step toward a more neurological or
" body-like" model of the mind. Nevertheless, very serious difficulties remain
before even a modest simulation of the biological basis of mind appears
possible. One expression of the difficulties involved in the simulation of the
human brain is represented by the terms "hardware" and "software."
Hardware refers to the fixed physical and electronic components in a
computer or robot. However, there is no real hardware analogy to the human
body where even muscle and bone tissue arc, at best, a kind of "software." A
computer program is called softwa re, but there is no evidence that the
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program level actually exists for humans. The body exists and conscious
experience exisls, bul lhere is no evidence lhal a level analogous to a
computer program exists as a functioning part o f lhe brain/ mind. The
difficulties involved derive from the fact that computers and robots are based
o n silicon while animal life is primarily carbon based. Computers are not, in
principle, restricted to silicon systems, but they are all based on silicon
(including neural nets) fo r what appear to be practical rcasons--namely silicon
is cheap and allows very reliable binary representatio n. As such, silicon
systems are devoted to dryness, so Lo speak, while carbon systems are devoted
to wetness. Water quickly destroys or " kills" a computer, while too much
dryness quickly kills humans and other animals. T he brain is very much a wel
system and simulating il will have lo involve simulating th is very fundamental
property which is so different from computers. In brief, the human brain
consists o f d ifferent kinds of what might be called "wetware" and hardware
and software are irrelevant o r misleading terms. In any case my fundamental
point here is th at a true simulation of the human mind would require a
simulation of the human brain and body. Whether lhis is possible remains to
be seen.
In fact the intellectual world of the digital computer and of research on Al
is often far removed from lhc body and the world within which the body lives.
As previously no ted, the advocates of digital compuler programs as models of
mind reject, or al least commonly ignore, the connections between th e mind
and body. They lend to present a very abstracted or idealized view of reason
and of mental activity in general. With this as background and context, it is
now time to focus on o ur central topic--nameiy, artifi cial intelligence and the
spiritual life.
First, I wish to emphasize that the prior point o n the interrelatio nship of
the mind and body is proposed as an analogy to a similar interrelationship
between mind and spirit. Just as our mind is inextricably bound up with the
body and physica l reality, so it is likewise bound up with God and spiritual
reality. Thus, I starl wilh the assumption that there is a lransccndent spiritual
realm, and that the human mind is conslanlly interacting with this realm.
Now, I am fully aware of the fact lhal it is precisely this assumption that is
rejected by many scientists, especially those in the world of art ificial
intelligence. I wi ll examine the basis of this rejection and present a case for
the existence of spiritual reality. Obviously, this realm must first be accepted
as existing before one can accept its relevance for an understanding of mind.
Therefore, the subseq uent remarks are primarily addressed to the skeptical or
atheistic scientist.
Throughoul human history and its varied cult ures, three great external
realms of reality commonly have been assumed to exist. These are lhe
external physical world, lhe world of other minds and the transcendent
spiritual world (for example, of God or the gods). An interesting feature that
these lhrce presumed realities share is that we cannot prove the existence of
any of them. Indeed, some years ago the prominent philosopher Alvin
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Pla ntinga published a very important proof on the subjcct.7 Bric ny, wha t
Pla ntinga was able to prove was that the degree of rati onal a nd e mpirical
un ce rtainty about the existence of other minds and about the existence of God
is exactly the same. Tha t is, the ra tional grounds for accepting the existe nce o f
both of these realms has the same structure, and involves the same
assumptions--assumptions Plantinga shows are ofte n question-begging in both
cases. For example, we never directly experience other min ds and our
assumption that they exist is based on a n analogy with our own me ntal life.
Pla ntinga's proof itself is sophisticated a nd cannot b e summarized easily, but
its gene ral structure is not hard to outline. Plantinga first systematically shows
that neithe r natural theology nor natural "atheology'' offc rs a satisfying
solution to the proble m of a rational justification o f belief in G od 's existence
or o f God's non-existence. He th en tries another approach to th e justification
of belief in God by exploring its analogies and connections with a simila r
question--the " problem of othe r minds"; that is, how do you justify the
existe nce of other people's minds. Plantinga goes on to "defend the an alogical
argum ent fo r othe r minds against current criticism and argue th at it is as good
an answer as we have to the question of other minds. But it turns out that the
analogical a rgum e nt finally succumbs to a malady exactly resembling the one
afnicting th e teleological argume nt [for God's existence]." H e concludes tha t
" belief in o the r minds a nd belief in God arc in the same episte mological boat;
hence if eithe r is rational, so is th e othe r. But obviously the form er is rational;
so, th erefore, is the lattc r." 8 His formal proof for this conclusion has stood
without a successful challe nge for over 20 years.
Elsewhere Plantinga shows that just as we can't prove the existe nce of
other minds, it is also impossible to prove the existence of external physica l
reality, or even to prove the existe nce of the past.9 Again, he shows that the
failure in each proof is ide ntical to the failure in th e teleological argum e nt for
God's existe nce. One obvious implication of Plantinga's work is that if
scientists, for example, tend to assume the existence of physical reality and of
other minds but to reject that of God, then this is done on no n-ra ti onal
grounds. Before turning to some of the non-rational reasons be hind the
rejection o f the spiritual realm, it will be useful to discuss how it is tha t the
existence of the exte rnal world is commonly accepted. First, the proble m of
proving the existence of extern al reality arises once one accepts the fact that
our knowledge of external reality is always mediated by th e nervo us syste m.
All we a rc directly aware of is our own stat es of mind. We must--we can
only--infc r an extern al reality existing behind and act ing as a ca use of o ur
se nsa tions a nd perception. The validity of this infcre ncc is what ca nnot be
proved. We may accept Plant inga's reasoning in this ma tter o r we may be
convinced o n other grounds th at proving the existence of the physical wo rld is
not possible. The re is, of course, a lo ng line of skeptics on this issue in
Weste rn philosophy (including David Hume, Bishop Berkcly and Thomas
Reid), whose writings certainly support Plan tinga's conclusion.
Nevert heless, almost no one has eve r doubted physical reality to the point
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of trying seriously to live by such a position. If a person lived o n the basis of

such doubl il is nol clear why one would eat food, avoid walking into walls, or
even bother to get dressed. A few idealist philosophers in the last two
hundred years or so seem to be the intellectual representatives of a positio n
that de nies or comes close to denying the physical wo rld.
The overwhelming majority of scientists, and of average citizens of the
world, have always accepted the existence of an external physical reality.
Scientific theories are, after all, about something outside of us. The ground
for this acceptance seems to be that we are so made that sensory and
perceptual experience carries with it the overwhelmingly convincing notio n
that it is external reality that is experienced. Put somewhat diffcrently, our
normal interaction with what appears to be physical reality naturally creates a
firm convictio n of its existence.
Of course, in some rare instance one's perception of external reality may
be faulty. There are such things as illusions and hallucinations. But to believe
that the whole realm of physical reality doesn't exist, or that most, or even
much, of o ur perceptual experience is witho ut an exte rn al source, would be
considere d--wo uld be--bizarre indeed.
Except fo r certain kinds of
philosophers, such as the just-mentioned idealists (who arc given a kind of
philosophers' license to suspend common sense), anyone who fai led to believe
in the external wo rld would be judged as suffering from a mental path ology.
Likewise, o ur belief in the existence of other minds comes from interactio n
with o ther people. Sensory contact with a person plus interaction involving
language and symbols appears adequate for us to reliably assume the existence
of o the r minds. The tendency to interpret other minds as existing is so strong
that often it reaches the point of projecting mind onto something which is not
mind at all. Children project human minds o nto many animals; even trees or
inanimate objects, especially at night, are often understood by children as
having minds. Anthropologists commonly note that in so-called primitive
cultures certain special objects, such as a mask o r talisman, sometimes are
This
s upers titio usly und ers tood as possessing mind a nd spi rit.
anthropomorphism is o ne tendency scientists have traditio nally guarded
against. However, some of those in Al seem especially susceptible to this
error of projecting mind onto objects. For example, one prominent Al
scientist attributes beliefs to therm ostats. 10 Apparently therm ostats have three
beliefs: it is too hot, it is too cold, it is just right. That a therm ostat has beliefs
seems to me to be a rather crude, if updated, example of anthropo morphic
thinking.
Although even Al scientists may sometimes see in, or project mind onto
things o r places where it doesn't exist, few serio usly propose that o ther minds
do n't exist. Even if mind is assumed to be an expression of matter, few doubt
that o ther people's integrated consciousness--that is, thoughts, feelings and
purposes--actually exists. For all practical purposes everyone assumes both
the existence of other minds and also of physical reality.
It is import ant to note that a crucial issue with respect to initiating and
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maintaining contact with external physical or mental reality is whether the
person has the will or desire to initiate the interaction with the presumed
reality. For example, suppose you find a man who is on an artificial respirator
in a darkened room and who claims there is no external reality. After some
investigation yo u discover that he has not walked, or used his eyes or cars for
some time. His last tape-recorded utterance is a comme nt to the effect that
there is no external physical world. You desire to cure him of this intellectual
ailmcnt--one obviously supported by his markedly reduced physical and
perceptual activity. A reasonable strategy would be to strengthen his muscles,
get him to open his eyes, unstop his cars and lo talk with him often. Jn time,
you, his guide, would ask him lo walk and later to come out of his room and,
enter the outside world. Therapy for his pathological intellectual position is
thus to immerse him in the direct intcractional experience of the reality that
he denies. In this case there is every reason to believe that such a program
would convince him of the realist position. But such a procedure depends
upon his willingness to cooperate with you and, as for proof, that would

remain, as always, impossible.
Suppose you find someone who not only denies that other mi nds exist--but
lives as though other minds don't exist. (Such a position, of course, seems to
be quite rare.) Let us also suppose, as would be likely, that our subject's
condition is strongly supported by his social isolation. He lives alone and has
for years. He never speaks lo anyone. As a result, his lack of belief in other
minds is hardly surprising. He remembers interacting with people when he
was you ng, but these experiences he attributes to a childish and immature
understanding of things al the time. Again, this man's condition is
fundamentally a mental pathology and correction would involve the slow
introduction of interpersonal communication into his life. In time he would
discover fri ends, and enemies; perhaps even love. Years later, if he were to be
reminded by an old friend of his form er belief that othe r minds didn't exist,
the only answer, and a likely one, would be Lo look at his fri end and laugh. In
short, interaction with other minds is necessary in order to accept their
existence, indeed in most cases it is sufficient.
Let me suggest that the situation with respect to belief in the transcendent
spiritual realm is similar. First note that most of the people who deny not only
the existence of God but also the entire spiritual realm constitute a relatively
small group that seems to have come into existence in Western Europe about
250 years ago. They live in rather peculiar environments, and most of them
have been trained in science or other rationalistic and int ellectual disciplines.
They tend to work in laboratories and universities which arc highly specialized
and peculiar places. They tend to socialize mostly with those having similar
skeptical outlooks. What they mean by " real thi nking" is the mental
manipulation of abstract written symbols, often numbers, or other very digital
cle ments. To such people a proper belief system or world view is something
constructed by correct sequencing of these symbols with occasional checks on
whether some kind of observa tion backs it up. Thal is, their world view is
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something that exists in a digital code and they seem to assume that digital
codes are adequate for representing any kind of question, problem or
knowledge. The very notion of a belief system based o n an oral traditio n of
knowledge, or on analog information coded in the body and often unavailable
to conscious verbal expression, or on a world view based primarily on direct
personal experience, doesn't occur to them.
Also "strange" is the fact that these people never, or almost never, go to
church o r to a synagogue o r read relig ious writings. But, most peculiar of all
is that they appear never to pray, to meditate o r to engage in other spiritual
exercises. That is, they rarely, if ever, use the well-known procedures for
getting and staying in contact with the spiritual realm.
Again, the answer to this patho logy is not some vain att empt to prove the
existence of God or of spiritual reality. As in the other cases this is impossible
anyway. The answer is to try to convince such a person to pray, that is to talk
with G od, or listen for God's voice, or to engage in oth er spiritual activities. If
such a person refuses to interact with the transcendent and is determined to
remain in his spiritual isolation, there is little else one can do.
This requirement that one engage in prayer and meditation is a serious
one. For example, if someone doubted some astronomical claim (such as the
existence of moons around Jupiter) or the reality of a whole level of physical
existence (such as sub-atomic particles), an honest search for an answer would
require a number of things. First, the person, if ignorant of astronomy o r
physics, would need a guide--a trained scientist--and would have to become at
least something of an amateur scientist. It would take considerable time and
commitment from the seeker. After all, observations are often ambiguous;
and, in any case, observations don't reliably interpret themselves.
In almost all religious and spiritual traditions, a kn owledgeable person--a
g uide, if you will--is needed. And, prayer and meditation are the primary
instruments, the " telescopes," for co ntacting o r interacting with spiritual
reality. No scientist who refuses to seek religious experience has the
intellectual right to say that spiritual reality doesn't exist or th at the mind
cannot be affected by that reality. A person who has had no religious
experience is simply unqualified to comment on the existence, much less the
nature, of most spiritual phenomena. Please note, I am no t saying that the
person must have a particular interpretation o r understand ing of his religious
or spiritual experience--only that he must have had a reasonable amo unt of
such experience. P erhaps, after various religious experiences the person will
conclude it was all an illusion or something other than what it first appeared to
be. Fine. Scientific observations, too, can be mistaken; they can be artifacts,
and so can particular spiritual experiences. Or perhaps even all such
experience is illusory. However, a scientist without systematic empirical
understanding of a phenomenon is not in a position to give informed criticism .
And a scientist who was ignorant of and refused to get involved with the
experim ental methodo logy used to demonstrate that a major phenomenon
existed would be considered irrelevant to evaluating the claim. If he actively
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persisted in rejecting the phenomenon on a priori grounds, his colleagues
would rightfully dismiss his claims as unqualified--even should subsequent
research prove his position to be right.
I trust the argument is clear. Religion for most people is supported by
religious or spiritual experience in which people claim a relationship o r
interaction with a spiritual realm. This may mean interaction with God, or
Jesus, or with a dead person, or even with evil spirits. To evaluate the validity
of these extremely important claims r equires that an investigator seek contact
with spiritual reality. There are various ways people do this--but first they
must have the will to actively seek. The desire to seek, of course, is something
rooted in psychological factors and has relatively little to do with what is
usually called by such terms as "reason" or "evidence." Given the will to seek,
then the most common instruments or techniques for contact with spiritual
reality are prayer and meditation; they are, the telescopes of the religious
person. No true scientist should be afraid to seek new knowledge or be afraid
to look through any kind of telescope.
The primary reason for presenting the preceding case for belief in the
transcendent realm is because of its bearing on the intellectual problem of
artificial intelligence. Al is involved in simulation of intelligence--often this
means simulating the human mind. The possible existence of mental
interaction with spiritual reality, in particular with God, relates to this task.
For example, if God exists and if some people, some of the ti me, are do ing
God's will and not their own will--then the problem of simulating human
mental life takes on serious difficulties, to put it mildly. On the other hand, if
God and other spiritual "persons" or forces are purely psychological
phenomena, projected into " heaven" so to speak, then such co ncepts may add
complexity to simulating the mind, but no dramatic new o r impossible
challenge is involved.
A secondary reason, however, for introducing the topic of spiritual reality is
to provide a framework for comment o n the moral implications of state ments
and attitudes sometimes found in the world of Al. In my own contact with
scientists in Al, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, sometimes I have
encountered an attitude toward humans that I find extremely disturbing. A
small but significant number of these scientists have a hard, hostile attitude
toward any appreciation of humanity that implies human specialness.
Apparently, the very no tion of special human characteristics such as our free
will o r having a transcendent spiritual meaning is viewed as a threat to an
intellectual desire to demonstrate we humans are nothing but matter, or
nothing but a complex computer. Let me quote from one prominent Al
professor. He said that the next generation of computers will be so intelligent
that we will " be lucky if they are willing to keep us around as household
pets." 11 The attitude of hostility and even contempt expressed toward humans
in such a statement is obvious. That humans will soon be the slaves to a
master race of machines is, however, fundamentally a totalitarian goal. Why
should anyone support such a purpose? If the proposed o utcome is possible,
then it is certainly morally rational for people to refuse to fund such scientists
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and their research. If the goal is not possible, then the attitude expressed by
such remarks does much to harm the good name of science. Scientists today
are rightfully worried about the growth of an anti-scientific mentality in the
non-scientific community. This growth is quite real, both on the political right
and especially on the political left. However, subtle or gleeful comments
about humans having no free will and soon being replaced by powerful,
complex computers or bio-computer systems does little to endear science or
scientists to the non-scientific world. Instead such fundamentally nonscientific and often irrational statements by scientists create a morally justified
fear of science on the part of those outside the scientific community.
The very power, size and complexity of contemporary science suggests that
it should be especially interested in avoiding the dangerous attitudes that
power, size and complexity so often create. The contemporary scientific
environment is very different from that of even 50 years ago. Today in science
the effects of personal ambition, ideology, unscrupulous empire building,
obvious financial rewards and power are especially noticeable. Interest group
pressures, moral anarchy and lack of mutual cooperation also are not
uncommon in the contemporary scientific community. Unless scientists work
conscientiously to counter anti-scientific attitudes within AI, as elsewhere,
there is real danger that growing external criticism of science will cause the
scientific baby to be thrown out with its dirty bath water. In fighting such
external criticism, science, which is (or should be) a bulwark of sanity should
not allow itself to be poisoned from within by the anti-human and other biased
attitudes of a small group of its present practitioners.
Now, I am convinced that AI, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology all
have major positive contributions to make to the human condition. I am
equally convinced that this field needs to recover more of an attitude of
humility as it studies the mind. Let me suggest that if scientists recover an
awareness of God and of our spiritual destiny it may be a great facilitator of
such an attitudinal change. An attitude of humility and wonder before the
natural world has been an essential quality of the great scientists from
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton to Einstein. Histo rically this attitude has
been rooted in the belief in God. u
In any case, although there is much to learn about both artificial and
natural mind, to reject in advance a spiritual perspective on human mind
because it implies limits to scientific understanding is an irrational bias.
Science has learned to live with uncertainty principles, Godel's proof and
similar knowledge about intellectual limits. Science has also learned to live
with the mind/body problem. It can also learn to live with (and even to
benefit from) a mind/spirit problem.
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From Pluralism towards
Catholicity?
The United Methodist Church after the
General Conference of 1988
GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT

The United Methodist Church is the most widespread Protestant
denomination in the United States.
It is also perhaps the most
accommodating. Statistically, it is in decline, both in absolute membership
figures and as a proportion of the population. While the flexibility of
Methodism helped it to grow, overstretching appears to have led to such a loss
of contour that there no longer exists a sufficiently coherent identity to attract
and retain many new adherents. In recent decades, "inclusivism" and
"pluralism" have become formal ideological substitutes for a true catholicity
which is always both substantive and qualitative. At the General Conference
of 1988, there were a few signs--no bigger maybe than a man's hand--that the
Church is coming to that awareness of its own predicament which is the
human precondition for acceptance of a divine renewal.
It is a matter of the faith, which comes to expression in the teaching of a
church and its worship. The two most important documents before the
General Conference in St. Louis were therefore the Report of the Hymnal
Revision Committee and the Report from the Committee on our Theological
Task on "Doctrinal Standards and our Theological Task." That the proposal
of a new hymnbook should have aroused popular interest is no surprise, for
the Christian people has always maintained at least a lingering sense that the
liturgy is the place where the faith is signified. Less expected, given the
reputation and modern self-understanding of Methodism, was the attention
shown before and at the Conference to the revision of the statement on
doctrine and theology in the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist
Church. In both matters, this represented, not only formally but (as we shall
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see) substantially, something of a return to Methodist ongms. The early
Methodist Conferences of Mr. Wesley with his preachers were much occupied
with "what to teach." And Methodism "was born in song": John Wesley
consider ed that his definitive Collection of Hymn s for the Use of the People
called Methodists of 1780 contained "all the important truths of our most holy
religion, whether speculative or practical,. .. a distinct and full account of
Scriptural Christianity." We need perhaps to see what happened in the
intervening years in order to make a recovery of identity desirable.
Liberal Methodists like to cite Wesley's dictum that "we think and let
think." They forget that this magnanimity was confined to "opinions which do
not strike at the root of Christianity." 1 Wesby distinguished between opinions
and doctrines. The doctrines essential to Christianity included "the Three-One
God," the deity and redeeming work of Christ, original sin, repentance,
justification by faith and sanctification. When, in his Letter to a Roman
Catholic of 1749, Wesley set out "the faith of a true Protestant," he followed
th e Nicene Creed for its content ("the faith which is believed"), and he
showed the attitude and act of faith ("the faith which believes") to consist in
trust and obedience towards the God who is so confessed. In his generous
serm on on The Catholic Spirit--"If thy heart is right with my heart, give me thy
hand"--Wesley made clear, as in other writings, that Deists, Arians and
Socinia ns did r.ol meet the conditions.
Wesley explicitly rejected
" latitudinarianism," whether of a doctrinal o r a practical kind. H ow, then, did
Methodism fall into the indifferentism which has increasingly marked its later
history?
Robert E. Chiles offered a perceptive interpretation in Theological
Transition in American Methodism 1790-1935.2 He traced a shift "from
revelation to reason," "from sinful man to moral man," and "from free grace
to free will." I would put it briefly this way: What had been secondary poles in
a Wesleyan ellipse--"reason," "the moral character," and "free will"--took
over from the primary poles, in subordinate relation to which alone they find
their proper place in a Christian understanding of the human condition and
divine salvation--"revelation," " the sinful condition," and " free grace."
Methodism thus both helped lo shape and, even more important, allowed
itself to be shaped by an American culture that was already subject to the
strong humanistic influences of an--at best deistic--Enlightenment. The
distinctive Christian message was being lost.
Constitutionally, Meth odism retained as its "doctrinal standards" the first
fou r volumes of Wesley's Sennons, his Explanatory Notes upon the New
Testament and the Twenty-Five Articles of Religion adapted from the
Anglican Thirty-Nine. At the unio n of the Methodist Episcopal Church and
the Evangelical United Brethren in 1968, the Confession of Faith of the latter
and the Wesleyan standards were judged "congruent" within the new U nited
Methodist Church. Methodist academic and bureaucratic theology, however,
had come to bear a more and more tenuous relation to the official standards.
Prompted in part by the self-examination that the 1968 union had made
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necessary, the Church undertook to clarify the continuing status and function
of its doctrinal standards as well as what was to be expected of theology.
Following the work of the Study Commission on Doctrine and Doctrinal
Standards, the result is seen in paragraphs 68-70 of the 1972 Book of
Discipline. First, the "historical background" of the official standards is
described, with an admission of "the fading force of doctrinal discipline": " By
the end of the nineteenth century, and thereafter increasingly in the twentieth,
Methodist theology had become decidedly eclectic, with less and less specific
attention paid Lo its Wesleyan sources as such." 3 Then the "landmark
documents" were laid out. Finally, "our theological task" was set forth. It was
this third section which became, in the 1980s, the object of most controversy.
The 1972 text spoke of "four main sources and guidelines for Christian
theology: Scripture, tradition, experience, reason." Although the term is not
used there, these four became known (fleetingly, one hopes) as the
" Methodist" or "Wesleyan Quadrilateral." Scripture is said to be "primary,"
and the functions of the four are differentiated: there is a " living core" of
"Christian truth" which--the 1972 text apparently wishes to affirm in continuity
with the United Methodist "pioneers"--"stands revealed in Scripture,
illumined by tradition, vivified in personal experience, and confirmed by
reason."
But there is such a stress on the "interdependence" and
" interaction" of the four that--as the popular image of the quadrilateral both
expresses and encourages--they have been perceived as placed by the 1972 text
all four on an equal footing. There arose from the "evangelicals," but not
from them alone, a call for clearer recognition of the normativity of Scriptu re.
Thus the fifty pastors--by no means all conservatives but rather most of them
traditional Methodists--who in December 1987 issued the Houston
Declaration, spoke of " the confusion and conflict resulting from the ambiguity
of the present doctrinal statement" and reaffirmed " the Wesleyan principle of
the primacy of Scripture." The "primacy of Scripture" is doubtless to be
understood analogously to Wesley's designation of himself as "a man of one
book": his being homo unius libri makes Scripture not so much the "boundary
of his reading" as "the center of gravity in his thinking."4
Meanwhile, the Committee on our Theological Task, appointed from the
General Conference of 1984, was hard at work in preparation for the
(quadrennial) General Conference of 1988. Its report made a structural move
to emphasize the special place of Scripture: a section on "The Primacy of
Scripture" was followed by one which took "Tradition, Experience, and
Reason" all together, without dignifying each by a heading that might appear
to rank them severally with the Scriptures. A strong direct statement was
made on the Scriptures as norm and nourishment of the Church:
United Methodists share with other Christians the conviction that
Scripture is the primary source and criterion for authentic Christian
truth and witness. The Bible bears authoritative testimony to God's
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self-disclosure in the pilgrimage of Israel, in the life, death, and
resurrectio n of Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit's constant activity
in human history, especially in the mission of early Christianity. As
we open our minds and hearts lo the Word of God thro ugh the words
of human beings inspired by the Holy Spirit, faith is born and
nourished, our understanding is deepened, and the possibilities for
transforming the world become apparent to us. The Bible is sacred
canon for Christian people, formall y acknowledged as such by historic
ecumenical councils of the church .... Our standards affirm the Bible as
the source of all that is "necessary and sufficient unto salvation"
(Articles of R eligion) and "the true rule and guide for faith and
practice" (Confession of Faith). We properly read Scri pture within
the believing co mmunity, informed by the traditio n of th at
community. We interpret individual texts in light of their place in the
Bible as a whole ....
With o nly a little retouching, that text was to stand in the version finally
adopted by the General Confe rence. The most no table change was the
insertion, after the first sentence, of this:
Through Scripture the livi ng Christ meets us in the experience of
redeeming grace. We are
that Jesus Christ is the living
Word of God in o ur midst who m we trust in life and death. The
biblical authors, illumined by the Holy Spirit, bear witness that in
Christ the world is reconciled to G od.
As successive drafts of the Report of the Committee on our Theological
Task had become available, there was some attempt in the press to align the
cont roversy with that among Southern Baptists on the inerrancy of Scripture;
but it is clear that that was not al all the issue for United Methodists. Much
more im portant was the fea r expressed by some that the new statement would
place unnecessary and unacceptable constraints upon theological work. Thus
John Cobb of the Claremont School of Theology, in an article for The Circuit
Rider of May 1987, wanted lo "keep the quadrilateral"; and the faculties of the
Wesley Theological Seminary in Washingto n, D.C., and of the Iliff School of
T heology in Denver signed like memoranda.
At the General Confe rence, treatment of the repo rt was entrusted to the
Legislative Committee on Faith and Missio n, under the chai rmanship of Dr.
Thomas Langford of Duke University. As we have seen, the strong statement
on the normativity of Scripture is maintained; but sensitivity is also shown to
the concerns expressed by those theologians who were most anxious that
fixity5 be avoided:
In [the theological] task Scripture, as the constitutive witn ess to the

From Pluralism towards Catholicity?

21

wellsprings of our faith, occupies a place of primary authority among

these theological sources. In practice, theological reflection may also
find its point of departure in tradition, experience, or rational
analysis.
The last sentence quoted there was in fact reintroduced from the 1972 text.
Further, the description of the differences allowed by the "catholic spirit" of
Wesley and Methodism was extended to read "forms of worship, structures of
church government, modes of baptism, or theological explorations" (though the
Wesleyan distinction as to "all opinions which do not strike at the root of
Christianity" is retained).
Apart from one or two Promethean touches about creativity, the final text
"constructive" and "contextual" nature of
has managed to state the
theology in a way that acknowledges the properly active human role in
redemption without on the whole falling into the Pelagian temptation which
perpetually besets Methodists:
Our theological task is both critical and constructive. It is critical in
that we test various expressions of faith by asking, Are they true?
Appropriate? Clear? Cogent? Credible? Are they based on love?
Do they provide the church and its members with a witness that is
faithful to the gospel as reOected in our living heritage and that is
authentic and convincing in the light of human experience and the
present state of human knowledge?
Our theological task is
constrnctive in that every generation must appropriate creatively the
wisdom of the past and seek God in their midst in order to think
afresh about God, revelation, sin, redemption, worship, the church,
freedom, justice, moral responsibility, and other significant
theological concerns. Our summons is to understand and receive the
gospel promises in our troubled and uncertain times ....
Our theological task is contextual and incamational. It is grounded
upon God's supreme mode of self-revelation--the incarnation in Jesus
Christ. God's eternal Word comes6 to us in Oesh and blood in a given
time and place, and in full identification with humanity. Therefore,
theological reflection is energized by our incarnational involvement in
the daily life of the church and the world, as we participate in God's
liberating and saving action.
Tradition, experience and reason are each given their own heading in the
final text. Tradition is viewed in a preponderantly positive way, though with a
recognition that "the history of Christianity includes a mixture of ignorance,
misguided zeal, and sin. Scripture remains the norm by which all traditions
are judged." Experience is given a largely confirmatory role: the authors
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claim that we should be following Wesley in looking for confirmations of the
biblical witness in human experience, especially the experiences of
regeneration and sanctification, but also in the "common sense knowledge of
everyday experience." My own greatest worry concerns the uncritical
confidence which, after a nod towards the mystery of grace, the text places in
"reason":
By reason we read and interpret Scripture. By reason we determine
whether our Christian witness is clear. By reason we ask questions of
faith and seek to understand God's action and will. By reason we
organize the understandings that compose our witness and render
them internally coherent. By reason we test the congruence of our
witness to the biblical testimony and to the traditions which mediate
that testimony to us. By reason we relate our witness to the full range
of human knowledge, experience, and service.
There follows a further brief concession, this time to " the limits and
distortions characteristic of human knowledge." But I cannot help recalling
how much the modern sociology of knowledge has shown us to be governed by
our " interests" --and remembering the insistence of the Christian tradition
upon the human will as the perpetrator and victim of our fall.
Although the 1988 text recognizes that "all Christians are called to
theological reflection," it clearly sets the individual effort within the churchly
community. Gone, certainly, is the glorification of "pluralism" in which the
1972 text indulged itself. Gone, too, is the most unfortunate confusion made
by the 1972 text between doctrine and theology. The new document makes
abundantly clear that the theological endeavors of individuals and schools are
to take place upon the solid base, and within the stable framework, of "our
doctrines." The constitutionally protected texts are no longer labelled mere
" landmarks" as they had been since the Discipline of 1972. Whereas
" pluralism" risks having no center and no edges, true catholicity has a firm
substantive center which makes the edges both rather easier, and yet perhaps
also slightly less important, to define.7
One major doctrine that had appeared under threat in the Report of the
Committee on our Theological Task as it came to the General Conference
was that of the Trinity. (This is not the place to establish systematically how
utterly vital the doctrine and reality of the Trinity is to Christian faith. That
was already done by the councils of the fourth century and the theological
labors of Athanasius and Hilary and the Cappadocians. H ere there is, in
principle, ecumenical agreement.
Wesley shared in it, amid all the
questionings and debates of the eighteenth century.) In what may have been a
concession to the liberals or progressives in return for a stronger emphasis on
the primacy of Scripture, the report nowhere used the (allegedly sexist)
trinitarian name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (The advocates of pluralism
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usually follow the axiom familiar in liberal and progressive politics: pas

a

d'ennemis gauche! For their part, orthodox trinjtarians cannot treat the
doctrine as merely optional.) The cited "Standards of D octrine" did, of
course, use the trinitarian name, dating as they did from earlier times; but as
to what the committee itself wrote, it would almost have been possible to read it
in a Sabellian sense. That is the inadequacy of the "Creator, Redeemer,
Sustainer" formula, which an early draft had seemed to countenance. When
the Houston Declaration stated that "God's richly personal being cannot be
defined merely in functional terms," it was echoing the perception of John
Wesley that "the quaint device of styling them three offices rather than
persons gives up the whole doctrine."8 In what may prove to have been its
most significant single gesture, the Legislative Committee on Faith and
Mission reintroduced the scriptural and traditional Name: "With Christians of
o ther communions we confess belief in the triune God--Fatlzer, Son, and Holy
Spirit." The formulation found the approval of the General Conference. This
leaves room for the document to make proper use of the verbs of creating,
redeeming and sanctifying, without their exclusive appropriation to particular
trinitarian persons. In a similar move, the General Conference has now m ade
the Discipline specify that candidates for ordination "are ordained by the
bishop, who will use the historic language of the Holy Trinity: Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit" (paragraph 432). (In a related area, the General Conference
rejected a proposal to reword the Preamble to the "Social Principles" in the
Discipline--"We, the people called U nited Methodists, affirm our faith in God
our Father, in Jesus Christ our Savior, and in the Holy Spirit, our Guide and
Guard"--so as to read "Creator." It was no do ubt the progressive reluctance
to call God "our Father" which, perhaps subliminally, caused the Committee
on our Theological Task to downplay, when stating "distinctive Wesleyan
emphases," the category of adoption, which is a major soteriological figure for
Wesley. In strictly trinitarian terms [where the Father is the Father of the
Son], the substitute formula favored by some--"Creator, Christ, and Spirit"-has neo-Arian implications. As the H ouston Declaration succinctly points o ut,
"Christ and the Spirit are not mere creatures.")
With that, we have moved into the liturgical realm, and it becomes
appropriate now to move on to the Report of the Hymnal Revision
Committee to the 1988 General Conference of the United Methodist Church.
It is first to be noted that the baptismal services there all use the Apostles'
Creed, address the prayer over the water in full trinitarian form, and give the
sacramental formula " I bapti2.e you in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
and of the Holy Spirit." Similarly, in the services of Word and Table, all the
complete forms of the great thanksgiving over the bread and wine are fully
trinitarian in address.
P opular attention was most focused, in characteristic Methodist fashio n, on
the hymns which constitute the great bulk of the proposed new Hymnal. Some
cynics said that in giving way to the outcry against the proposed omission of
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" Onward, Christian soldiers," the Hymnal Revision Committee was ensuring
it had a free hand to make other, less provocative but more significant,
decisions in a liberal or progressive direction. In point of fact, the committee
has proceeded with wide consultation and considerable expertise, and the
results are, on the whole, admirable. The new hymnal will be more Wesleyan
and more catholic than at least its two predecessors. Again, a little history is
in order.
Throughout the nineteenth century the official hymnals of Methodism
remained strong repositories of the Wesleyan tradition, containing hundreds
of hymns composed and edited by the Wesley brothers--even while competing
in practice with the products of the camp meeting. With the twentieth
century, however, liberal opinions took over the official hymnody. The nadir
was reached with the hymnal of 1935, which, of course, then served the
Methodist Church over the middle third of our century. This hymnal reduced
the Wesleyan hymns to about sixty and characteristically contained the

infamous bowdlerization of "Hark, the herald angels sing" from:
Late in time, behold him come,
Offspring of a virgin's womb
to:
Long desired, behold him come,
Finding here his humble home.
The 1964 hymnal marked the beginnings of an improvement, but it has taken
until now, with the publication expected in 1989, to raise the Wesleyan texts
back to eighty.
An important potential for the 1989 hymnal resides in the order it has
established for the hymns. The body of hymns is set out according to a
creedal pattern, which thereby corresponds also to the history of red emption,
the Heilsgeschichte. There are five main sections:

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

The Glory of the Triune God
The Grace of J esus Christ
The Power of the Holy Spirit
The Community of Faith
A New Heaven and a New Earth

Under the " third article" the hymns are then arranged according to the ordo
salutis, the way in which we are enabled to appropriate God's saving work and
gifts: prevenient grace, justifying grace, sanctifying and perfecting grace. This
subdivision is true to the principles of Wesley's classic Collection of Hymn s for
the Use of the People called Methodists. The overall schema is fai thful to
Wesley's recognition that the ordo salutis is governed by the nature and works
of God as these are rehearsed in the Scriptures, liturgies and creeds of the
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Church--and for which the Wesley brothers provided in their hymns for the
great dogmas and festivals. The general pattern, and the adequate number of
boldly trinitarian hymns it contains, sets the interpretative context for all
individual items.
Happily, the 1989 hymnal makes great and proper efforts towards a
cultural catholicity, drawing on and respecting Hispanic, Afro-American,
Asian-American and Native American Christians, as well as turning to " the
global Church" by way of the Cantate Domino of the World Council of
Churches and the input of " missionaries and ethnic musicologists." The
hymnal also contains modern hymns, some of which will not last, and some
oddities, such as an alternate version of "The Church's one foundation" which
manages to excise entirely the sustaining image of the Church as the bride of
Christ--presumably on account of the anthropological "subordinationism" (as
it is seen) of Eph 5:22-33; but the minor changes that were made throughout
the hymnody in favor of "inclusive language" were not nearly so bad as they
might have been. These are small prices to pay for a much improved hymnal.
Another report that came to the General Conference of 1988 was entitled
" Grace upon Grace: God's Mission and Ours." H ere evangelism 1s
consistently expounde d before service. Albeit under the slogan of
"inclusiveness," one aspect of catholicity is well captured in paragraph 51:
As a gracious community, a church in mission embraces those whose
appearance, behavior, mental or physical conditions mark them as
different. People who represent race, ethnic, class, age, and gender
differences become one in the Body of Christ. The reach of grace is
unlimited, the binding of grace is firm.
This is wedded to the qualitative aspect of catholicity by being placed under a
rubric that structures the report: "As United Methodists, we envision lives
changed by grace, a church formed by grace, and a world transformed by
grace." The substantive content of catholicity is stated epigrammatically:
"J esus Christ defines grace: Immanuel, God with us as a person." On two
occasions, the report cites the great commission of Matt 28:18f in its full
trinitarian form.
Two other matters may be mentioned as possibly signaling a more general
change within United Methodism. First, to the declaration in the "Social
Principles" of the Discipline that " in continuity with past Christian teaching,
we recognize tragic conflicts of life with life that may justify abortion, and in
such cases support the legal option of abortion under proper medical
procedures," there was now added the further sentence: "We cannot affirm
abortion as an acceptable means of birth control, and we unconditionally
reject it as a means of gender selection." Official Methodist monies had been
going to the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights--an organization whose
name includes, it might be argued, a double oxymoron. Second, in the context
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of qualifications for the ordained ministry, the General Conference retained
the phrase concerning "fidelity in marriage and celibacy in singleness," and,
echoing the declaration of the "Social Principles" that " the practice of
homosexuality is incompatible with Christian teaching," once more stipulated
that "self-avowed practicing ho mosexuals are not to be accepted as
candidates, o rdained as ministers, or appointed to serve in The United
Methodist Church." A footnote on candidacy for ordination comments: "The
General Conference, in respo nse to expressions throughout the Church
regarding ho mosexuality and o rdinatio n, reaffirms the present language of the
Discipline regarding the character and commitment of persons seeking
ordination, and affi rms its high standards."
Now what are we to conclude about this General Conference overall? A t
the o utset I suggested that the signs in favor of a return to catholicity were no
bigger than a human hand. Some pluralists have expressed the view that the
perceptible shift in U nited Methodism may simply be the following of a
conservative mood in the country at large--a mood which they expect will
change. What is there to stop the General Conference of 1988 from turn ing
out to be yet one more example of Methodist accommodationism--this time,
fo r once, in a conservative direction? The answer must reside in the signs of
qualit ative a nd substantial re newal th rougho ut " the connectio n" (as
Methodists like to designate their for m of church life). We may look, for
example, to the growth of "covenant discipleship groups" and to the very
modest revival in sacramental observance.
Bishop Richard B. Wilke gave a fresh twist to the Wesleyan hymn by which
Methodist Confe rences traditionally begin, "And are we yet alive?" Will
Willimon and R obert Wilson spoke of " rekindl ing the fl ame."9 The 1984
General Confe rence had set the implausible target of doubling the Church's
membership to 20 million by the year 1992. It is not at all certain that such a
growth of United Methodism in its present for m is desirable. My argument
woul d be that significant growth and renewal are impossible, or at least
undes irable, without a prior or concomitant recovery of substantive
catholicity--a reentry into that scriptural and creedal Christianity which
undergirded and motivated the Wesleys' evangelism and social action. Sound
doctrine is not a sufficient condition fo r the revitalizatio n of a church, but it is
a necessary o ne. The General Conference of 1988 will have made a lasting
contribution, if it has promoted that cause in the seminaries, the bureaucracy,
the pastorate and the episcopate--so that through preaching, teaching a nd
singing the Methodist people may be shaped througho ut its whole life of
worshi p, witness and service fo r the glory of God and the salvation of the
world. We shall see what emerges from the mandated study of the revised
statement o n " Doctrinal Standards and our Theological Task" and from the
reception given to the new hymnal.
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1. So in The Character of a Methodist (in Works, ed. T . Jackson [1872], vol. 8, p. 340).
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1983).
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Thomas A . Langford, Practical Divinity: Theology in the Wesleyan Tradition (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1983). The distinction between official doctrine and the more
individual but still ecclesial task of theology was unfortunately lost in the linguistic
usage of the 1972 text. It has been respected in the 1988 text that we shall be
presenting, and I have tried to observe it throughout this article.
4. A dictum of George Croft Cell, quoted in Oden, Doctrinal Standards, p. 82.

5. In his sermon on "The Catholic Spirit" Wesley says thal "a man of truly catholic
spirit is fixed as the sun in his judgment concerning the main branches of Christian
doctrine" (Works, ed. Jackson, vol. 5, pp. 492-504).
6. A printer's proof read "come" rather than the "comes" of the final version in the
Discipline. It would have been equally possible to retain "come" and replace the
previous period by a comma. I have reason to believe that would have corresponded
better to the thought of the Committee. It would probably make better theology.
7. For insistence on the distinction between doctrine and theology, and the
norrnativity of the former, credit goes to Jerry L. Walls, The Problem of Pluralism:
Recovering United Methodist Identity (Wilmore, KY: Good News Books, 1986; updated
1988).
8. Letter of August 3, 1771, to Ms. Marsh.
9. Richard B. Wilke, And Are We Yet Alive? The Future of the United Methodist
Church (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986); William H . Willimon and Robert L. Wilson,
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The World Will End in 1919
Daniel Among the Victorians
STANLEY D. WALTERS
This paper is about a man who believed that the world would end in 1919,
basing his announcement on the book of Daniel. He was Henry Grattan
Guinness, Irish-born evangelist and missionary, and he died without knowing
that he was wrong.
Born in 1835, he was educated privately and went to sea at the age of
seventeen. Returning home a year later, he experienced a religious conversion
and was soon ordained and began evangelistic work. He was said to rival
Spurgeon as a preacher. He established the East London Institute for Home
and Foreign Missions (1873), and The Regions Beyond Missionary Union
(1899), and traveled widely in all parts of the world. 1 In 1889, he received a
D.D. from Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.2 He died in 1910.
His family appears to be collateral to the Guinness ale family, and he is said to
have pronounced his name Guin-NESS to distinguish the two lines.
Grattan Guinness is interesting as the last great popularizer of the most
common method of interpreting Daniel which the church has ever known.
Now that we are living in the last days of the dispensational-futurist mode of
interpreting Daniel, it may be worthwhile to look at the last days of that much
more durable mode, the historicist. In the process we will learn something
both about the book of Daniel aild about the history of its interpretation.
DANIEL'S TIME PERIODS
The terms "historicist" and "futurist" refer to broad ways of interpreting
biblical apocalyptic materials, especially Daniel and Revelation. The futurist
sees the events which the text refers to as belonging to our future; they have
yet to take place. This is the method of all popular apocalyptic writers at the
present time, although it is not a method much used by the scholarly
community. The historicist, on the other hand, sees the events which the text
refers to as events which have, for the most part, already taken place; they
belong to our history. It was the method used in the church for many
centuries, since well before the Reformation, rising to a special prominence in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and falling into decline as the
nineteenth century progressed.
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And this brings us to the book of Daniel. It has always exercised an
almost-occult attractio n over many readers because of curious time peri ods
mentio ned in it which must elapse before the "end" and the coming of G od's
kingly rule. When Daniel's " end" is understood to be the "end of the world," 3
these time periods appear to o ffer a means of kn owing precisely when t hat
event will occur. We begin by considering them.
1. "A time, times, and half a time" = three-and-one-half years (7:25,
12:7).
2. "2,300 evenings and mornings" = 1,150 days = three years, two months,
ten days4 (8:14).
3. 1,290 days (12:11) = three years, seven mo nths.
4. 1,335 days (12:11) = three years, eight-and-one-half months.
5. "Seventy weeks" (9:24), divided into seven, sixty-two, and o ne, with the
" one" subdivided into two halves (9:25-27). Assuming th at each " week"
means seven years, the total period would be 490 years, divided into fo rtynine, 434 and seven, with the final subdivision into two three-and-one-halfyear periods.
We have here several short periods and one long per iod. The sho rt
periods, altho ugh variable, are more or less the same length, and seem to
correspo nd to the last segment of the long period.
This period is described throughout the second half of Daniel as a period
of oppression lo religious believers which would be followed by the fall of the
o ppressor and the arrival of God's kingly rule. It is probably to be associated
with a H ellenistic ruler in Palestine, Antiochus IV E piphanes, whose rule
included the sixties of the second century n.c. (174-163). This earliest known
o utburst o f a nti-Semiti sm e nded with th e fall of th e o ppressor
(commemorated by the J ewish festival o f Hanukkah), and gave way lo a
period of Jewish political independence which lasted about a century.
The basic figure o f three-and-one-half years arose o ut of that persecution,
perhaps as the actual length of time between the beginning of Jewish armed
resistance to Epiphancs, led by th e Maccahce family, and its end in th e
rededication of the temple (June 167-December 164 D.C.).5 I am disposed to
see the variations among no. 1 - no. 4 above as having their rise in differing
ways o f calculating the o nset and end of the resistance. In any case, the
connection is with the o ppression described in Daniel 7-12, and th e numbers
are calendaric in the sense that they correspond lo actual lengths of time.
The book of Daniel entered the canon long after the Maccabean period, at
a time when it would have been clear that not all its hopes for th e future had
been realized.6 There had been a period of independence under priestly rule,
but the Kingdom of God had not arrived. The book continued lo be
esteemed, thercfore, not for historical reasons, but fo r typological reasons.
That is, the Maccabean crisis came to stand for any oppression o f fait hful
believers and for God's intent to support them and eventually to intervene on
their behalf. The book was taken up by Christians as well as Jews in this
sense. Even the time periods were understood symbolically, as their reuse in
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the book of Revelat ion shows.7
But as histo ry prolonged itself and the divine kingdo m tarried, this
unde rsta nding failed and was replaced by a more literal reading. The book
was unde rstood lo speak of the "end of the wo rld" (and not ambiguously of
the e nd o f the pe rsecution and the coming of God's kingly rule), and the time
pe riods we re aga in given a calendaric inte rpret a tion. These numbe rs, which
had once referred lo a concrete situation in the second century 13.C., and had
then been read symbolically in the first century AD., came once more to be
take n literally, but with refere nce lo other histo rical circumstances. This was
an epochal herme ne utic move. When the tim e pe riods had b een linked lo
actu al events in the second century n.c., they "fit." Whe n th ey were used
typologically or symbolically they did no t need to " fit." But whe n they began
to be a pplied lo othe r histo rical circumstan ces, they could never match up in
the same way.
H e rein lay the difficulty. The Kingdom of God wo uld a rrive, in D a niel's
hope, at the e nd of cert ai n brief periods of time. Since the divine rule had not
yet come, its future a rrival should still lie at the e nd o f such pe riods of time-But
lite ral o r figura tive--and the faithful s hould wait acco rdingly.
inte rpretat io n did not wait. Since the starting point for these periods seemed
to lie in Daniel's own time,8 the inte rpre te r in the early centuries of our era
had to cope with the passage of centuries o f time. And so the days in D aniel's
tim e periods we re ta ken instead as years, long e pochs stre tching across the
Middle Ages into the nine teenth and twentie th centuries.
This is the " historicist" method of inte rpreting D aniel a nd Revelation, and
it domin ated the church's reading of these books fro m the Middle Ages well
into the nine teenth century. Grattan Guinness stands at the very e nd of that
trad itio n. The present article is based on his book 171e Approaching End of the
Age.9 All refe re nces are to the first edition (1878) unless specified.
THE YEAR-DAY SYSTEM
At the ba is of this syste m is the substitution of years for days. Since our
texts plainly speak of days, Guinness advanced the following a rgum e nts to
show that such a substitution should be made. 10
1. Since D aniel 7-12 obviously d eals with symbols--grotesque composite
a nim als which have neve r existed and which have horns that visibly sprout,
grow a nd even talk-- the "days" o f D a niel should also be symbolic. And since
the animals symbolize some thing vastly large r than the mselves--an e mpire, for
example--the day sho uld symbolize something vastly la rge r than a n actual
twe nty-four-ho ur day. Wha t else should it be but a year? 11
2. The re a re two passages in th e Old T esta me nt which explicitly make this
substitutio n. In Num 14:34 the Israelites were punished by being ke pt in the
wilde rness fo r for ty years, a year for each day of the abortive spy mission.
Herc a year explicitly corresponds lo a day. And in Ezek 4:1 -9, the prophet
was comma nded to pe rform the symbolic act o f lying on his left side for 390
days and on his right for forty days, a day for each year of the sins of the
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kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Here a day explicitly corresponds to a year.12
3. It was claimed by some that even Daniel 9 testifies to this symbolic
equivalence, for it describes the 490-year period as "seventy weeks of years"
(KJV); seventy weeks would be 490 days. Since, in all views of Daniel, this 490
yea rs had already elapsed, the book itself could be thought to offer positive
proof that this is the way its numbers should be understood. 13
4. It was also pointed out that if Daniel's numbers referred to the ordinary
passage of time, they are given in a peculiar form. Why would not the angelic
guide speak of "three years and six months," as the Bible docs elsewhere (e.g.,
Luke 4:25, Jas 5:17), instead of " time, times, and half a tim e"? And why arc
there multiple expressions for the same period of time, such as forty-two
months, and 1,260 days? The unusual form s of expression point to a nonliteral meaning.
5. A saying of Jesus is said to support the year-day theory. In Luke 13:33
he spoke of continuing his ministry for "Today, tomorrow and the day
following," which could be understood as referring to the three yea rs of his
ad ult ministry. Jn this case, Jesus himself spoke of a day when he actually
meant a year.
6. Finally, someone might ask, Why didn't God say plainly what he meant?
How could anyone in Daniel's time know that a long period of time was
intended? Here the historicist interpreter boldly grasped the nettle and
claimed that God did not intend the ancient readers of Scripture to
understand this. No, if they had thought the time would be so long, they
would have grown lax in their hope and life, and would have grown weary of
waiting for the Kingdom of God lo come in. God wished the prophecies not
to "be understood too early, when they would have interfered with the
earnestness of continual expectat ion" (p. 312).
It was only much later, when the events spoken of in Daniel had begun to
take place, th at people realized that God had actually used a symbol and that
the end would come some twenty-five centuries from Daniel's time. God "did
not intend it [the book of Daniel] to be understood for ce11t11ries" (p. 82,
emphasis his). This view was defended as the "doctrine of progressive
interpretation," in which later biblical writers understood things better than
earlier ones did, and later interpreters understood the Bible better than earlier
interpreters did (at least, with reference to these calculations). 14
On the basis of such arguments, the three-and-one-half years was
understood to mean 1,260 years. 15 This would be the length of the antichrist's
oppression of God's people, and at its close, Christ would return and the
Kingdom of God come in . The other numbers--2,300, 1,290, 1,335--would also
denote years instead of days. This is why the scheme is called " historicist,"
since the time covered stretches over many centuries of history, alm ost all of
which lay in the interpreter's past.
WHERE DOES THE COUNT BEGIN?
Historicist interpreters worked first of all with the period of 1,260 years,
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and secondly with the 2,300 evenings and mo rnings, which they took as 2,300
rather than as 1,150 days. With these duratio ns in hand, all you really have to
know is when lo begin counting.
Unfo rtun ately, although the texts speak clearly of an arrogant o ppressor of
God's people, they are not specific enough to allow interpreters confidently to
identify a specific event as the starting point for the countdown. For the book
of Daniel in itself, the oppressing power is clearly G recce. 16 But once Rome
had assumed the im perial role in E urope and the Levant, it became the enemy
instead. 17 Rome, in some form o r o ther, especially the H oly Roman Empire,
remained alive until t he Congress o f Vienna (1815), and so for most of
C hristian history, in terpreters of Daniel's calcul atio ns always had some
" Rome" present to serve as the oppressor. Well prior to the Protestant
Reform ation, the oppressive " Rome" was understood as the political papacy,
with th e po pe playing the ro le of the antichrist.
But at what point should the count begin? After the seventh century AD.,
the 1,260 yea rs was already too short to reach back to the Babylonian exile
(587-536 13.C.). The development of classical Ro me into the H oly Roman
Empire took place slowly and its history affords various impo rt ant events that
might have some claim lo be a pivotal transitio n or starting point. The
publication of the Code of Justinian in 533 was sometim es used, but, as the
1,260 years would have run o ut in 1793, 18 this date was not useful in the
nineteenth ce ntury. The date of 800, Pope Leo's coronation o f Charlemagne,
would seem to be logical; one can hardly go further into the Middle Ages than
C harlemagne to find the starting point for the oppressio n which the papacy
was regarded as having inflicted. The 1,260 years wou ld end in the year 2060,
and fo r all we know now, someone in the twenty-first century may reintrod uce
th ese calcul atio ns.
But in the 1870s, the real difficulty was that the in terpreters were living on
borrowed time. The reason is that historicism correlated its interpretation of
D aniel with that of Revelation, and most of the latter book was said to fall
within the 1,260-year perio d. Every detail of it had been identified with
successive events in European history from the tim e of the New T estament
down to that o f the wri ter.
For exa mple, Revelation lists three cycles of disasters: the seven seals (6:18:5), the seven trum pets (8:6:11:19) and the seven bowls (15:1-16:21). The
historicist interpreter held that the seals referred to events which acco mpanied
th e breakup of the old Rom an Empire and had already occurred during the
second, third and fo urth centuries A D. The seven bowls of wrath, latest of the
three cycles, must refer to the last events before the return of Christ.
G uinness followed E. B. E lliott, the last great historicist commentator on
Revelation, who had identified six of the seven bowls with events of and
following th e French revolution (pp. 371-372). 19 Time was obvio usly short,

and a tem1i1111s ad q11e111--a point of ending--in the year 2060 was simply too
remote to be correct.
Thus, even with 1,260 years to play with, histo ry may still overtake a school
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of interpretation, and this is what happened in the nineteenth century. The
French R evolutio n, standing 1,260 years from Justinian's Code, had not
proved to be a final terminus; the 1844 terminus (see below) passed without
event; Elliott played for time by making the events of the French R evolution
penultimate to the end; but by the last third of the century, the entire
approach was threatened.
GUINNESS'S CALCULATIO NS
But, historicists did not give up without a struggle, and that is why Grattan
G uinness is interesting. H e wrote voluminously on histo ricism at a time when
it was alr eady virtually discredited by haV:ng run o ut of time, and when
fu turism had lo ng since appeared and asserted itself.20 He is on the transition

between those two systems.

He is also interesting because he utilized

elaborate astronomical and mathematical calculations to buttress his
calendaric conclusions. It is his specific calculations which point to 1919 as the

end of the age.
My intention is initially to present his scheme favor ably, so as to represent
the impressiveness and weight which it carried in the circles where these
calculations were pursued and encouraged. An analysis and critique will
follow.
1,260 Becom es 2,520
Like his predecessors, Guinness also began working with the 1,260-year
period (above, pg. 30, no. 1). His fi rst problem was to get more time out of
Daniel's calculations. What was really needed was a point beyond the failed
1793 date, but closer than 2060. H e found a clue in the "Seventy Weeks"
passage (above pg. 30, no. 5), where the " half a week" of Dan 9:27 seems to
be three-and-one-half years (1,260 days, which equals 1,260 years). If 1,260
years is half a week, G uinness reasoned, there must be another 1,260 years
somewhere, and he therefore began to work with a period of 2,520 years (pp.
333, 352, 355).
This is an artificial number, nowhere mentioned in the Bible,21 but
G uinness finds support fo r it from the unlikely book of Leviticus. Chapter 26
contains a long list of misfortunes which will befall the Israelites if they are
disobedient to God (vs 14-15), nowadays sometimes spoken of as the
" covenant curses." Among these maledictions, God says three times, " I will
discipline you sevenfold for your sins" (vs 18, 24, 28). T he Hebrew says
simply, " I will strike yo u seven for your sins," which the KJ V rendered, " I will
punish you seven times for your sins."22 G uinness calculates as follows: one
" time" means one year; a year is 360 days; by the year-day theory, this means
360 years; seven times 360 is 2,520. Therefore, the "seven times" of
punishment means 2,520 years of punishment.
This period would be "the times of the Gentiles," an expression used by
Jesus, "Jerusalem will be trodden down by the Gentiles, unt il the times of the
Gentiles are fulfilled" (Luke 21:24). Jerusalem began to be trodden down,
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Guinness said, when Nebuchadnezzar destroyed it and deported Judaean
leaders to Babylon. He dates this event at 602 B.C., and so the 2,520-year
period stretches to 1919 (pp. 360-361, 377, 439).
602 B.C. - --

2,520 years - - --1919

This has the advantage of returning the starting point for the count to the
biblical period, since the Holy Roman Empire never trod Jerusalem down,23
but it does leave the " papal oppression" stranded. Although Guinness has
constructed the 2,520 years out of two 1,260-year periods, he simply ignores
the mid-point. The 1,260 years becomes a floating period within the longer
"times of the Gentiles," and he gives several sets of dates to which the 1,260year oppression could correspond, not as alternates to one another, but all as
satisfying the conditions.
171e 2,300 Years

With this, Guinness had dealt with the three-and-one-half-year period by
doubling it into a "full dispensational week," and could move on to the other
time periods, starting with the 2,300 evenings and mornings. When should it
begin?
The number is in Daniel 8, which speaks of the oppressive actions of the
"little horn," including violence to the temple and to its services. Three times
we hear that the daily morning and evening sacrifice has been suspended (vs
11, 12, 13), and once of the surrender of the sanctuary (v 13). When Daniel
asks how long this oppression wiJI last, the angel replies, "For 2,300 evenings
and mornings; then the sanctuary shall be cleansed" (v 14). Dan 8:14 does not
mention a starting point at all, so Guinness links the 2,300 years to the 490
years of Daniel 9, which begin with "the issuance of the word to restore and
rebuild Jerusalem" (9:25).24 This "word" would be the decree of rebuilding
issued by the Persian king Artaxerxes and mentioned in Neh 2:1. Accordingly,
the 2,300 years run from 457 B.C. to 1844 (p. 430).
457 B.C.

----

2,300 years - ---1844

Since 1844 was already more than thirty years in the past when Guinness
wrote, he cannot very well claim that the end of the age occurred then.25 But
he at least has to explain how the sanctuary was cleansed in that year, since
this is the specific wording of Dan 8:14.
The word "sanctuary'' brings up the fact that in the late nineteenth century,
Jerusalem was still part of the Ottoman (i.e., Turkish) empire, and therefore
under the control of Muslims. Turkish abridgement of the religious rights of
non-Muslims had been a concern of Europe for a long time, and England had
made strenuous representations with the "Sublime Porte" to obtain tolerance
for them. Guinness states that in 1844 the Ottoman empire acknowledged in
writing that it would protect and guarantee these religious rights. 26 That, he
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says, represents the beginning of the end for the Turks, and begins to fulfil the
prediction of Dan 8:14 for the city of J erusalem itself.27

Dealing With Disparity
There are thus two spans of time, each with its own length and with
different termini.
602 B.C. - --

2,520 years - -- - 1919

-

2,300 years - - - - 1844

4578.C.--

This appears to be awkward, since they really ought to end at the same time,
especially since the vision of Daniel 8 is about the end, when the final
cleansing of the sanctuary occurs.
But, there is a way of removing this awkwardness. One of Guinness's
special interests was that the sun and the moon provide different systems of
measuring the passage of time.
The solar year is about 365 1/4 days. There is no lunar year as such (or,
rather, we call the lunar year a "month" ), but twelve lunations cover about 354
1/ 3 days, about eleven days less than in solar reckoning. If you are calculating
the extent of a long period of time--say, 2,520 years--it would make a
difference which system you used, since the " lunar year" is about three
percent shorter. The Jewish cultic calendar was tied to the agricultural year
and was basically lunar, and so Guinness's interest in lunar measurement has a
certain plausibility to it.
What if the 2,520-year period were " lunar" as well as solar?
2,520 lunar years x 354 1/3 = 892,920 days
892,920 day+365 1/4 = 2,445 solar years
If the times of the Gentiles be calculated from 602 B.C. using this figure, it
comes out exactly at 1844, the same date as the end of the 2,300 years.
602 B.C. - - - - 2,520 " lunar years " - -- - 1844
The concurrence of both time periods in ending at 1844 is very striking.
The difference between solar and lunar reckoning of the 2,520-year period
(technically called the "epact" ) is seventy-five years. Guinness then introduces
the two measurements of Dan 12:11, 1,290 and 1,335 days ( = years). If you
assume that these are extensions of 1,260, the additions total seventy-five. He
cannot doubt that 12:11 suggests the epact of the 2,520-year period, and so the
"soli-lunar measures" of the times of the Gentiles, "as now accurately
ascertained by modern science," confirm the Bible (p. 438).
Finally, since part of Guinness's method was to allow for multiple starting
and stopping points for Daniel's time periods, he does the same for the 2,300
years.28 Twenty-three hundred "lunar years" are 2,231 solar years. "The
second starting point" (p. 437) is 312 s.c., the beginning of the " Seleucid era"
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of reckoning time, and the terminus comes out to be 1919.29 Thus both major
time periods--2,520 and 2,300--can be shown to end at the same two
endpoints, 1844 and 1919.
602 B.C.
457 B.C.

2,520 "solar years"
2,300 "solar years"

1919
1844

602 B.C.
312 B.C.

2,520 "lunar years"
2,300 "lunar years"

1844
1919

With this, Guinness has incorporated all of the time references of Daniel 712 into his scheme,30 showing that the times of the Gentiles, which began with
Nebuchadnezzar's capture of Jerusalem, would run out in 1919. " It is a
solemn fact," he says, " that we are now living in the interval between these
two latest termini--in that supplementary seventy-five years which are created
by the inequality of the solar and lunar movements during the lapse of the
whole 'seven times"' (p. 439). " In about forty years from the present time
(1878) the great week of the times of the Gentiles will have run out..." (p.
556).
Elsewhere, he becomes more cautious: although students of prophecy
"know that they are living in the time of the end" (pp. 564-565, emphasis his),
we must allow for multiple points of terminus. The twin periods of 2,520 and
2,300 years "appear to run out first in 1844 and fully in 1919, but whether our
data are accurate, and what the exact nature of the terminal event may be, it is
impossible to ascertain and foolish to surmise" (p. 565, emphasis his).31
Nevertheless, he compares Christians to travelers on a long train journey: the
time needed for the journey has elapsed, and they have already passed the last
station before their destination (p. 566).
SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT
I have drastically simplified Guinness's argument, which fills hundreds of
pages. He goes on to buttress his position with an elaborate array of
mathematical and astronomical calculations, showing that the number seven is
divinely imprinted on the world of nature and in the Bible, and that the
numbers 1,260 and 2,300 also have a special divine character when both solar
and lunar reckonings are considered.

171e Number Seven
Regarding the for mer, he believes that the number " 7," with its multiples
and fractions, has been divinely appointed as a basic unit in the duration of
time, both in ordinary human life and in biblical statements of duration. "The
week reigns supreme" (p. 278). Thus, wherever he can find a period of time
divisible by seven, he regards this as proof that the number has special divine
importance. The occurrence of septiform periods of time in human life is
given as evidence for the importance of the number itself (pp. 265-383). "A
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septiform periodicity has been, by God Himself, impressed upon nature" (p.

277).
So/i-lunar Cycles
The interplay of solar and lunar measurements of time is more complicated. Because of the fractional character of the actual solar and lunar measurements, the year and the month very rarely come out even. It would have
been nice, Guinness remarks, if God had arranged the solar and lunar measurements to coincide with each other. For example, a solar year might have
been exactly twelve thirty-day months (p. 388). But because 365 1/ 4 is not
evenly divisible by 29 1/2, a great many lunations must go by before you get
one whose end coincides exactly with the end of the solar year.
It was already a concern of the Greeks to determine how much time must
elapse before this happens, and the ancient astronomer Meton discovered that

in nineteen years the sun and the moon come out nearly even. Such a period
of time, in which the solar and lunar time reckonings come once more to
agree with each other, is a "soli-lunar cycle," and Guinness holds that any such
elapse of time would be a duration of special significance in the divine order
of things.
He cites the researches of an eighteenth-century astronomer, Loys de Cheseaux, which showed that the periods 1,260 and 2,300 years were such "solilunar cycles" (pp. 395-403, quoting de Cheseaux at length). Since Daniel, living in neo-Babylonian times, could not well have known what only modern astronomy has discovered, Guinness follows de Cheseaux in concluding that
these two durations were divinely revealed to Daniel, and, accordingly, prophetic periods of pivotal significance in the divine plan.
Guinness goes farther still, and tries to show how the biblical time periods
in which he is most interested, including their epacts, can be analyzed into septiform numbers. Thus, he calculates the epact of 490 years at "twice seven
solar years, and seven months," while that of 2,300 years is "seventy lunar
years, and seven months" (p. 443). "The epacts of the prophetic periods of
Scripture form a remarkable septiform series" (p. vi).
The case of 1,260 years is different. Guinness analyzes it as 66 Melonie
cycles of 19 years each, with a remainder of 6 years. This is striking to him,
because the events covered in the biblical writings by this particular time
period (in its various forms) are the persecutions of the arrogant oppressor
(see above, pg. 30, and note 7). In Revelation 13, the second beast, which
Guinness identifies with that oppressor, is associated with the number "666"
(the "mark of the beast"). Guinness finds this number hidden in the 60 plus 6
Melonie cycles and the remainder of 6 years. "God has-- in secret cipher-engraven this stigma, this mark of reprobat ion, on the very brow of the period
of the self-exalting blaspheming, saint-persecuting, power" (p. 419) .
H e brings in these two sets of mathematical dem onstrations--septiform
numbers and soli-lunar cycles--in order to assert that " the periodicity of
nature, and the periodicity of Scripture, are demonstrably two parts of one
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whole" (p. 234). H is intent is apologetic. The study of science is marked by
"a pleasing element of certainty'' (p. 234) ; if he can show that the "Bible times
and seasons harmonise with the system by which the entire universe is
regulated," the divine inspiration of Scripture may be regarded as proven, to
account fo r which "will tax the ingenuity of infidels" (p. 235).
These calculations cannot really figure in Gu inness's historical
computations, because the time periods themselves are given in the Bible. But
the elaborate system of congruences which he works out using them gives the
entire book an aura of scientific accuracy and preciseness. He is not
interested in "speculations about the future," and his book "DEALS NOT wrrn
THEO RIES BlJf wrrn FACT'S" (p. x, emphasis his). Unlike others who have
calculated the times of the Gentiles and the end of the age using only
historical data, Guinness is able to incorporate his projections into a much
larger scheme which seems to be embedded into the very structure of the
cosmos, from the gestation period of the ovum of the wasp (half a week), to
the length of human life (ten septenaries or seventy years), to the coinciding of
the sun and moon after the elapse of 2,300 years.
Historicist biblical interpretation was seriously threatened by futurism, but
no one had ever before shown that the historicist method depended on
scientific observations which linked it with the workings of the solar system.
The effect, especially on uncritical hearers and readers, of his elaborate
presentations of the divine character of septiform numbers and soli-lunar
cycles, was to secure historicism in the very fabric of the cosmos.32
ANALYSIS
When the first edition of The Approaching End of the Age appeared, the
terminus of 1919 was forty years in the future. Guinness died in 1910, before
finding out that he was wrong, although a revised edition of this book
appeared as late as 1918. H e was proved wrong by history, but we must also
ask the question, Where did he go wrong in his calculations? Everything
comes out so neatly. How could such striking agreements be accidental?
The answer is that they are not accidental. They have been arranged that
way by Guinness himself.
H e works with two basic numbers, 2,520 years and 2,300 years, and there is
an oddity in his handling of each which serves as a clue. For the first, he never
tells us how he knows the 2,520 years should be counted from 602 B.C. O f
course, he says that this is the time of Nebuchadnezzar's destruction of
J erusalem and therefore the beginning of the Holy City's treading down by the
Gentiles. But how does he know that year was 602 B.C.?
For the second, he holds to the 1844 terminus for the 2,300 years, even
though it is awkward to do so because it had already passed without the arrival
of the end suggested Daniel 8. Why would he not abandon the 457 B.C.
starting point, and settle for his other date, 312 B.C., which by lunar reckoning
also comes out to 1919?
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The 2,520 Years
To return to the first. The actual date of Jerusalem's fall was 587 B.C., a
date quite clearly fixed by secular sources. Guinness cites no authority for the
date 602 B.C. He simply asserts it.
You might think that Guinness did not know what the twentieth century
has learned; granted. But he should be expected to know what the nineteenth
century had learned, and he does indeed quote authorities for many of his
dates.
He refers several times to the gentleman-scholar H . Fynes Clinton, whose
elaborate chronographic studies of Greece and Ro me were published during
the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Guinness quotes thirteen dates
from Clinton for a series of events from the biblical deluge to Jesus' birth.
The date for Nebuchadnezzar's capture of Jerusalem and the burning of the
temple is given there as Anno Mundi 3552 (or 586 B.C.). 33
In a fold-out chart, Guinness gives "The Scripture Chronology of the
World," taken from the four-volume commentary on Revelation by E . B.
Elliott. It contains fifty dales, from AM. 1 lo 6006, Guinness's own year of
1878. Elliott's date for "the captivity" is AM. 3522 o r 606 B.C.34
And this is not all. Guinness actually knows the correct date of 587 B.C. (p.
557 note).
And so he cites four separate dates for the destruction of Jerusalem. One
is the correct date of 587 B.C., and another is a well-informed, earlynineteenth-century date of 586 B.C. Why does he not use them? How can he
set aside Fynes Clinton, after saying that his dates are "about the nearest
possible approach to truth, and ... probably a very near approach indeed" (p.
300)? Of course, he needs time, and so an early date is preferable. But why
wouldn't he count from 606, for which he could cite Ellio tt's authority?
But, no. The "final fall of the throne of Judah" and the " latest
commencement" of the times of the Gentiles is 602 (pp. 360, 411, etc.). It
remains his key date, and it is precisely the o ne which he does not justify in
any way. Where does this date come from?
The tenacity with which Guinness holds to the 602 date, when by his own
tacit admission it has no justification, tells us that it is a date which is in some
way necessary to his scheme. IL is not that history requires it; his network of
calculations requires it in some way. It is a date which cannot be changed, for
some reason we have yet to discover.

The 2,300 Years
We turn now to the second time period, 2,300 years, running from 457 B.C.
to 1844. Although Dan 8:14 does not give a starting point for this period, the
clock could not begin running on it until the temple was rebuilt, since the
oppressions associated with the period feature the temple and the cult. This
suggests a link with one of the other periods in Daniel, the 490 years, which
starts with " the issuance of the word to restore and rebuild Jerusalem" (Dan
9:25). For Guinness, this is 457 B.C. (see p. 430). The 490 years, then, arc
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coextensive with the first part of the 2,300 years (p. 427, 430). The slender
thematic linkage of the two Daniel passages provides a starting point.
But 1844 was over thirty years in the past, and his claim that Dan 8:14 had
been fulfilled al that time 35 is lamentably weak. Not only that, Guinness
actually plots another span for the 2,300 years which ends where he wants it
to, in 1919. Since Dan 8:14 states no starting point for the count, the thing for
him to have done was to justify 312 B.C. as a starting point and abandon the
1844 date altogether.
Besides that, the date had been used before as the date of Christ's return,
lo the great disappointment of its believers. It was the terminus awaited by
the followers of William Miller, some of whose views were taken up by the
Seventh Day Adventists. 36 As the nineteenth century moved towards its close,
the 1844 date belonged primarily lo fringe Adventist groups such as the
Milleritcs and the Russellites (later Jehovah's Witnesses).
The date is--or should have been--an embarrassment to Guinness. W7iy
does he insist 011 it as a pivotal date in his scheme?
The answer lies in Guinness's linkage of Dan 8:14 to Dan 9:25. He has
done this in order to provide some justifiable starting point for the 2,300 years,
but to do so he has linked the 490 years with the 2,300 years. This linkage has
a fatal entailment, for he cannot now move the 2,300 years without also
moving the 490 years.
And the 490 years was not movable.
Herc is why. In general, interpreters believed the 490 years, or at least the
larger part of it, ran down to the time of Christ. H e was "Messiah the Prince"
of Dan 9:25, who would be " cut ofP' at the end of the sixty-nine weeks. It has
never been easy to gel a calculation which would neatly end at the time of
Christ's crucifixion,37 and Guinness does not try to do so. The period extends,
he says, to "the days of 'Messiah the Prince,"'38 and had therefore long since
been fulfilled. Guinness has taken this interpretation over from many
decades, if not centuries, of calendaric study and speculation, and when we get
to it, we have gotten to the one set of dates which he must accept and work
with.
A different starting point for the 490 years would destroy a fulfillment with
J esus Christ. There was simply no way Guinness could abandon the
interpretation that "Messiah the Prince" was Jesus. No one in the orthodox
interpretive tradition ever doubted this, and it was simply a given for anyone
working on Daniel. But this meant that, as long as he linked the start of the
2,300 years with the start of the 490 years, the 1844 date was also a given for
him, and the other biblical data must be made to conform to it.
Counting Backward
The only problem now is lo fix the tenninus a quo--the beginning poinl--of
the 2,520 years. The Babylonian capture and destruction of Jerusalem is
obviously the correct general period for the beginning of the oppression, and,
since he has locked himself iuto 1844 as an end point, the 2,520 years should
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Alas! Subtracting 2,520 years from 1844 yields 677 B.C., nearly a century
too early. But wait a minute. That is using solar years. What about using the
360-day year? That would be the equivalent of 2,485 years. Oh, dear. Still
too early; the tenninus a quo would have to be 641 B.C. Well, there is one
more possibility. Suppose we use true lunar reckoning in which one year is
twelve lunations or 354.367 years? Counting 2,520 such "lunar years" equals
2,445 solar years ...which reaches back to 602 B.C. Bingo!
In my view, this is how Guinness arrived at the date 602 B.C. for the
beginning of his times of the Gentiles. He gives no justification for it, for he
has reached it artificially, from within an existing scheme of calculations, and
not from history. He holds on to it, even when he is aware of other dates for
Nebuchadnezzar, for he cannot move from it without losing his link to 1844
and to the fulfillment of the 490 years in the coming of Christ.
From this point, it was easy for him to reach the terminus of 1919, by
counting 2,520 solar years forward from the starting point of 602 B.C. (Note
that if he had used 360-day years instead, his terminus would have been 1883,
only five years beyond the publication of his book. I do not know whether he
ever considered this, but it would have been easy to consider that date too
close for comfort.)
There was only one more step necessary: lo find in the Bible the seventyfive year difference between the solar and lunar reckonings of the 2,520 years.
Here the still-mysterious numbers of Dan 12:11 came to his rescue. Assuming
that they are variants of some sort on the number 1,260, there are indeed an
extra seventy-five days (years for Guinness) between them . This discovery
must have been very striking to him; it would be more impressive to us if he
had used both numbers; but 1,290 does not figure, since the seventy-five days
can be gained from 1,335 alone. At one point he says he does not know
whether the seventy-five years should be added to 1844 or 1919 (p. 485). But
if 1883 was too close for him, 1919 plus seventy-five, or 1994, might have
seemed too distant. Besides, it would allow a cushion of seventy-five years in
case the end did not arrive in 1919.
I assune that he reached the 312 B.C. starting point in the same way, by
playing with the 2,300 years until he found a suitable temtinus a quo.
Subtracting 1919 from 2,231 solar years39 (which equals 2,300 "lunar years")
brought him to 312 B.C., which, by coincidence, was the beginning of the
Seleucid era of reckoning. Antiochus IV was one of the Seleucid rulers,
lending a spurious plausibility to this starting point, which cannot otherwise be
defended.
SLIPPAGES IN METHOD
Was Guinness dishonest? One would hate to say so, for we know how
strongly our preliminary conclusions influence our later deliberations. And he
would probably say that the date 1844 was a fixed terminus, and therefore he
was justified in counting backwards to reach a starting point. But his
legerdemain with figures certainly strikes us as slippery, and one thinks that at
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some point, he must have known he was fudging.
There are several features of Guinness's working method which make his
final outcome possible, and which probably served as a cushion against the
cognitive dissonance which we think his methods would surely have caused.
First, he allows for multiple termini for the same time period. He says that
great events never happen in isolation, but always have precursors. For
example, he presents the 1,260-year papal oppression as three different
possible epochs (p. 423), and the 2,520 years as four different epochs (pp. 361,
376-377). And so he could allow several dates which correspond to various
stages in the beginning and ending of the oppression which he calls the times
of the Gentiles. This explains his repeated statement that the year 602 B.C. is
the " latest commencement" of the times of the Gentiles.
Second, he finds a safeguard in being able to disregard minor differences.
The justification for this is:
1. with such long periods, minor differences are really negligible;
2. the ancients may not have observed the solar and lunar movements
accurately; 4{) and
3. God did not wish to be so precise with people that they would know
exactly when the end would come, for then they would become cavalier and
would leave off their spiritual duties.41
Third, he has years of three different lengths available to him: the solar
year of 365 1/4 days, the " lunar year" of 354 1/3 days, and the 360-day year
which he variously calls the "calendar" year or the "Sabbatical" year.
Fourth, Guinness is both careless and highly selective. Careless, in that he
frequently quotes dates differently (usually off by a year), and sometimes
seems simply to have done his calculations wrongly.42
The selectivity applies more to his pseudo-scientific work. He claims that
the number seven and its multiples are deeply imbedded in biblical
chronology; but he ignores important biblical numbers which cannot be
analyzed this way, such as the number twelve and forty.
And he says that the figures of 1,260 and 2,300 years are "soli-lunar cycles"
of very great accuracy. But, in fact, there are periods of time which are more
accurate in the coincidence of sun and moon. One of them is 315 years, with a
discrepancy of not quite three hours.43 Another is 1,040 years, with the very
small discrepancy of just over an hour. Guinness refers to both of these
numbers, but makes no use of them at all, presumably because they are not
mentioned in the Bible. But, one might argue, if God were going to reveal
"soli-lunar cycles" to Daniel, why not reveal those which had the greatest
accuracy?
Now, anyone with three different years to choose from, plus the right to
find multiple starting and stopping points, plus the liberty to disregard small
discrepancies, plus the selectivity to which all humans are subject, can
certainly make any time period come out anywhere he wants it to.
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REFLECTIONS
I have had several reasons for writing this paper.
First, I was drawn into study of Guinness's writings because I fo und
twentieth-century apocalyptic writers quoting him. For example, in 1926,
Oswald J. Smith wrote that Guinness discovered that 1917 [sic] was a
" terminal year in the history of the Jews," and sure enough, in 1917 the
Balfour Declaration was issued, through which the Jews were enabled to think
of a homeland in Palestine.44 I found it ironic that Smith and other futurists
should quote an arch-foe of futurism, and wondered just what Guinness had
said and how he arrived at his conclusions.
Second, Guinness belo ngs to the social and intellectual history of a
particular time and place. Even his eccentric use of septiform numbers and
soli-lunar cycles does not belong entirely to the category of curiosa, but is at
ho me in a preoccupation with chro nology and statistics characteristic of
Victo rian England.45 And the transition from historicism to futurism is a
fascinating chapter in the popular interpretation of biblical apocalyptic. It has
yet to be fully documented, but Guinness's last hurrah for historicism
instantiates the renewed vigor with which any system defends itself against
cognitive dissonance. We see with our own eyes what happens when a whole
system of prediction is overtaken by history.
Third, a major factor, I admit, was my conviction that everyone, histo ricist
or futurist, who claims to determine specific modern dates from the figures of
Daniel can do so only by means of the kind of fudging with the evidence which
we see in Guinness. Careful scrutiny of a writer's work will invariably turn up
misrepresentation or mishandling of the evidence.
For example, Oswald Smith fundamentally misrepresents G uinness. To
start with, Smith has the year wrong; for another thing, G uinness did not say
that 1919 was a terminal year in Jewish history, but that it was the probable
end of the age; and then his entire system of understanding biblical
apocalyptic is at odds with Smith's. I have elsewhere given a brief critique of
the attempt to show that Daniel's 69th week ends o n the very day of Jesus'
triumphal entry.46 Today's most widely read apocalyptic popularist, H al
Lindsey, has done the same thing by loosening the return of Christ fro m the
absolute countdown point of 1948 of his early writings, and substituting a
clutch of multiple starting points (the taking of old Jerusalem in 1967 and the
entry of Greece into the European Economic Community in 1981).47
When we have made every allowance for the very hum an impulse to
protect our own views, with which we all must struggle, we must still call this
what it is.
It is dishonest.
The interests of the system have come to override exegetical integrity. This
is not Bible study, it is indoctrination into a system which can be squared with
Scripture only by misrepresentation and legerdemain . It is wrongly dividing
the Word of Truth, and the Church will allow it to her own very great peril.
In today's world of popular apocalyptic interpretation, the futurist model is
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the only one in use. People who dissent from it are said not really to believe
the Bible. I think it is helpful for us to see that dispensationalist futurism is
only the latest in a series of schemes for interpreting Daniel and Revelation,
and has not yet had even the long life which historicism had.
H ere the history of interpreting Daniel gives us perspective. T oday's
futurism is not a divine system, but one of many human approaches to this
material. My own view is that no calendaric approach to Daniel and
Revelation is a suitable one, but the basic point is that today's Church has the
right to choose a method which is appropriate to the biblical materials, so that
we may listen afresh to what the Spirit of God will say through Scripture.

•

•

•

A Prayer fo r Those who Interpret Scri pture
0 God, the creator of morning and evening,
of cycling seasons and echoed aeons,
of time,
of eternity;
who fo rmed the world with words,
who made us speaking beings,
who appeared in time as Word made flesh:
G rant us the gift of the Advocate,
lo chasten us with divine sharpness,
to cleanse all that blinds us to the truth of Scripture,
the cynicism that disregards,
the reluctance to hear,
the fear of being wrong,
the determination to be right,
the eagerness to impress
and lo recreate us open, alert, and intent;
That we may struggle with words and meanings,
wrestle until they yield their sense,
frame the truth vivid and memorable,
and speak as the Spirit has spoken;
Through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.
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Notes
1. Dictionary of National Biography, Second Supplement, vol. 2 (London: 1912), p.
175-176.
2. This recognition probably came about because of his influence on Rev. A. J.
Gordon, long-time minister of the Clarendon Street Baptist C hu rch in Boston.
Gordon, who was on the board of Brown at the time, had adopted many of G uinness's
views on eschatology, and quotes him frequently in articles written for the paper which
he edited, The Watchword. (I owe this information to Rev. Scott Gibson, whose
researches on Gordon have included compiling an index to The Watchword .) Gordon
was doubtless close to Brown's president, Rev. Ezekiel Gilman R obinson, former
president of Rochester Theological Seminary and of the American Baptist Missionary
Union, who presided at his last commencement in 1889. (I thank Martha L. Mitchell,
Brown University archivist, for this information.)
3. O n the ambiguity of the term "end" in Daniel, see S. D . Walters, ''The End (of
What?) is Al Hand," Toronto Journal of Theology 2(1986):40-43.
4. Earlier interpreters usually held this to mean 2,300 days.
5. An alternative is that the three-and-one-half year figure was symbolic, being half of
seven, a number which has always signified completeness. In this case, the number
would symbolize a fini te period of time: the persecution will have a limited duration.
6. See Brevard Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelp hia:
Fortress Press, 1979), p. 618-621.
7. Time, times and half a time (12:14); as forty-two months (11:2, 13:5); and as 1,260
days {11:3, 12:6). I hold that Revelation, like Daniel, focuses more on the persecution
than on an absolute end to all things, sharing Daniel's ambiguity about the "end."
8. Modem dispensationalism, which takes the time periods literally, boldly asserts that
the three-and-one-half-year period does not begin until just before Christ's return ; it
belongs in its entirety to the future.
9. H. G rattan G uinness, The Approaching End of the Age Viewed in the Light of
History, Prophecy, and Science (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1878). After a
"thirteenth edition" in 1897, it was reissued in 1918, when a "New Edition" appeared,
edited and revised by Rev. E . H. Home, MA. (London: Morgan & Scott Ltd.). In the
meantime, Light for the Last Days had appeared, (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1886), subtitled, "A Study Historic and Prophetic" and authored by both Mr. and Mrs.
Gui nness (who are said on the title page to be "authors of The Approaching End of the
Age, Etc."), which was also eventually reissued, in an edition by Rev. E. Cachemaille
(London: Morgan & Scott, 1917).
10. See the section in End titled "Prophetic Chronology," especially pp. 309-329.
Guinness acknowledges dependence on Thomas Birks's First Elements of Sacred
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Prophecy (London: W. E. Painter, 1943), but some such system of equivalence goes
back at least to the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 97b), attributed to Rabbi Qattina
(ca. 300), and was explicitly used by Saadia Gaon (882-946) in The Book of Beliefs and
Opinions (Samuel Roscnbaltt, trans., Yale Judaica Series I [New Haven, 1948), p. 296298); Rabbi Aqiba (ca. 40-134) was later said to have held such an opinion, see William
G. Braude, The Midrash on Psalms, (Yale Judaica Series 13 (New Haven, 1959), p. 9798). I thank Rev. Michael Farris for the rabbinic information, drawn from his thesis on
Daniel 9:24-27 (University of Toronto, in progress).

11. It could, of course, be a century, or even a decade. But such an equivalence would
yield numbers so large that the end would be impossibly remote. Interpreters seem to
prefer an end near enough to motivate intense religious devotion. This is probably
also the reason that no one ever sought to apply the year-day principle to the 490-year
period of Daniel 9; it is the only time period in Daniel to be spared. For to do so
would yield 178,850 years ( 490 x 365). The selective and subjective character of
calendaric interpretation is already apparent.
12. By rights, the Ezekiel passage should have led interpreters to reduce the 490-year
period back to 490 days (seventy weeks).
13. This is not a strong argument, as the Hebrew reads literally "seventy heptads of
years," i.e., seven years for each year. The word "week" enters English translations
because the most frequent heptad in the Bible is of days, but there is nothing in the
word itself which implies "seven days."
14. The first two maj or parts of End are devoted to " Progressive Revelation" and
"Progressive Interpretation," respectively, comprising a total of 139 pages. The plea
that God did not intend earlier generations fully to understand the biblical prophecies
was commonplace in nineteenth-century prophetic interpretation.
15. The actual number 1,260 does not occur in Daniel, but Revelation refers to the
three-and-one-half-year time period as 1,260 days, and this numeral was always
transported back into the interpretation of Daniel. Guinness did so on the grounds
that "earlier and more elementary predictions" must be understood in light of
Revelat ion, much as the "latest and fullest edition" of a book throws light on "an
earlier and less explicit one" (p. 54).
16. Th is is made clear by the text itself; see Walters, "The End (of What?)," p . 33-34.
17. This is already attested in Revelation's reuse of the animal symbolism of Daniel 7the four animals are rolled together into one (chap 13)-and in the Eagle Vision of the
Apocalypse of Ezra 12.
18. Thus the French Revolution became involved. Sometimes Napoleon was the
antichrist, but in other writers he was celebrated as the one who broke the political
power of the Roman Catholic Church in France.
19. E. B. Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae, vol. 3, 5th ed, (London: Seeley, Jackson &
Halliday, 1862), pp. 328-454. Elliott's explanations are:
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First bowl (Rev 16:1), foul sores = social and moral evil in the wake of the French
Revolution.
Second bowl (v 3), sea becomes blood = naval wars of 1793-1815.
Third bowl (vs 4-7), rivers become blood = wars on the Danube, Rhine and Po, 17921805.
Fourth bowl (vs 8-9), scorching heat = Napoleonic wars of 1809-1812.
Fifth bowl (vs 10-11), beast's kingdom into darkness = waning of papal political power.
Sixth bowl (vs 12-16), drying up of Euphrates = decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1820s
and 1830s.
20. Futurism emerged in the 1830s with the work of John Nelson Darby, and with the
Oxford Movement's rejection of a papal antichrist. O n Darby, see, inter alia Ernest
Sandeen, Th e Roots of Fundmnentalism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.
59-80; fo r the Oxford M ovement, consider as an example [E. B. Pusey?], "The Times
of Antichrist," an Advent sermon preached in 1838, Tracts for the Tim es, Vol. 5, No. 83
(London: Rivington, 1840).
21. "This is infen-ed from Scripture rather than distinct ly stated in it; but the inference
is so weU grounded as to be of almost equal weight with a distinct declaration" (p. 352,
emphasis his).
22. T he word "times" is not in the Hebrew, although ellipsis of pe'iim fm (" times") may
be assumed. But this word does not mea n "time periods," but "occurrences," and is
not the same as the words used in Dan 7:25 (Ara maic, 'iddan) and 12:7 (Hebrew,
m 6'ed).
In giving th e Levit icus passage a chronological sense, G uinness
misunderstands it at a basic level.
23. A difficu lty which G uinness's vigorous anti-Catholicism never allowed him to
recognize at all. The villain was, of course, Islam. Hence, the Crusades, to rescue
Jerusalem from the infidel.
24. This is largely an arbitrary choice, to wh ich we retu rn below, p. 13.
25. Followers of William Miller fou nd themselves in the same situation, having used
the same calculations to predict Christ's return in 1844. Their solution has been to
posit a heavenly sanctuary, also ment ioned in Rev 11:19, to which Christ ca me in 1844
and wh ich he is now in the process of cleansi ng. See Desmond Ford, Daniel
(NashviUe: Southern Publishing Associat ion, 1978), p. 189.
26. Pp. 430-436. The Turkish Sultan Abdul M ej id had promulgated sweeping reforms,
including religious tolerance for non-Muslims, in November 1839. This is the obvious
candidate for a crucial religious event in the Levant, but it is too early to fit Guinness's
calculations. G uinness has in mind, as a long footnote shows, a letter of March 21,
1844, fro m the Sultan to Sir Stratford Canning agreeing to give up the death penalty
fo r Muslims who apostasize to Christianity. (His date is correct; see E . C. Blech in
Cambn"dge Modem His101y, vol. 11 [1909], p. 275.) This was a significant move, but
does not really qualify for G uinness's description; the "decree granting rel igious
toleration" had been made five years earlier.
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27. Of course, Guinness wrote before World War I, when the Ottoman empire came to
an end. But he believed that its decline, which had long been noted in Europe, was
predicted in the book of Revelation. His anti-Muslim bias was probably typical of his
own time and place, and in popular apocalyptic writings, Islam had long shared the
stage with the pope as the diabolical oppressor.
28. "As with all the other periods we have considered, this 2,300 years seems to have a
double commencement and conclusion" (p. 430).
29. Guinness erred in his calculation here (see note 36), and the correct terminus
should be 1920. Jn later editions he gives it as "1919-20," tacitly acknowledging his
error but still holding on to 1919 (e.g., End, fifth ed., p. 440).
30. On the 490 years, see below p. 13.
31. Already in 1880, Guinness had changed these dates to "1844-48" and "1919-23,"
and had replaced the clause "whether ou r data are accurate" with the words, "whether
these are the final dates." This is in the "Fifth Edition," but I do not have access to
editions between the first and the fifth.
32. In the revision of End which appeared in 1918 (see note 9), virtually all of
Guinness's scientific material was omitted.
33. Guinness gives the dates only in their Anno Mundi form, which prevents the reader
from knowing their equivalent in the Julian calendar (seep. 300).
34. This chart faces p. 229, but the dates are given only in their A.M. form (see
preceding note). The 606 B.C. date also appears on the chart facing p. 380.
35. See note 26.
36. They had first fixed 1843 as the date, and expected Christ's return then; but, when
He didn't come, they reexamined their calculations and discovered that they had made
an error of one year, and that the 2,300 years actually ended in 1844. The error is
noteworthy in itself; since there are two years "l," when you subtract B.C.-year numbers
from a total number of years, you must add in an extra year. (You collect one when
you pass "Go.")
37. Contemporary dispensationalists, using a starting point in 444 B.C. instead of 457,
end the 69th week on the very day of Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem, see
Harold W. Hoehner, "Chronological Aspects of the Life of Christ, VI: Daniel's
Seventy Weeks and New Testament Chronology," Bibliotheca Sacra (1975):47-65. For
a brief critique, see Walters, "The End (Of What?)," p. 45.
38. Including the conversion of the Gentiles and the destruction of the Temple, p. 287;
it is "the period of the Advent, the atoning death, and the world redeeming work of
the Son of God," p. 415.
39. This explains his mistake of one year, see note 29 above.
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40. Although, surely, this has nothing to do with the numbers revealed in Scriptu re!
41. I find the same extraordinary latitude in the Schofield Bible, where the annotator
says, "Prophetic time is invariably so near as to give full warning, so indeterminate as
to give no satisfaction to mere curiosity" (p. 915, note 2).
42. For example, the date is 553 on p. 425, 552 on p. 400; 677 on p. 430, 676 on p. 360;
606 on p. 411, 605 on p. 315. I have tried to verify many of his calcu lations involving
solar years, lu nar years, and the epacts between them, some successfully, some without
success.
43. Guinness's primary astronomical source, de C heseaux, discovered this, and then
realized that the biblical 1,260 was four times 360. But the discrepancy is four times as
large, too.

44. Oswald J. Smith, Is the Antichrist at Hand? (foronto, Tabernacle Publishers:
1926), p. 17. Guinness wrote End before the return of the Jews to Palestine-the
linchpin of twentieth-century popular apocalyptic-became important. It features
somewhat more largely in Light f or the Last Days.
45. I owe this observation to my colleague in the Toronto School of Theology, Prof.
Thomas Mcintire, as I do also references to Steven J . Gould, Time's Atr0w, Time 's
Cycle (Harvard: 1987) and to David Landes, Revolution in Time (Harvard: 1983).
46. See note 37.
47. S. D . Walters, " Hal Lindsey: Recalculating the Second Coming," The Christian
Century 96 (1979): 839-840.

Pannenberg's Quest for the
Proleptic Jesus
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MODE RN APPROACH ES TO THE RELATIONSHIP
OF FAITH AND HISTORY
The nineteenth century "Quest for the Historical J esus" (Schweitzer)
attempted to get behind the dogma of the Church to discover who Jesus really
was. The efforts of the old liberal quest yielded a picture of the historical
Jesus that was stripped of all kerygmatic accretion. Such de-husked
presentations revealed a kernel that often made the Jesus of history the
reflection of modern historiographical and theological constructs.
Martin Kahler, in responding to the rise of quest theology, wrote The Socalled Jesus of History and the Biblical, Historic Christ (1896). Jn this work he
distinguished between the J esus of historical research and the biblically
revealed, historic Christ. Basic to Kahler's critique of the Lives of Jesus
school was his suspicion of a hidde n Ebionitism at work in their dedogmatization. Kahler, as the father of kerygma theology, sought to safeguard
the Jesus of biblical revelation from the whims of historical research. Jn doing
so, he chose to differentiate between historical facts and historic events,
between outer and inner history. Such bifurcation was the natural result of a
neo-Kantian dichotomy between fact and value which found its roots in
Lessing and Kierkegaard.
Although holding to historical rootage for the kerygma in Jesus Christ,
Kahler emphasized the message of Christ to be ultimately decisive. What was
a tenuous relationship in Kahler became dissolved into the preaching of Christ
in the teaching of the foremost kerygma theologian--Rudolph Bultmann.
H istorical bases for his demythologized kerygma were negligible at best. The
past became subsumed by the present, just as the future became the vehicle by
which the individual was confronted with the eschatological decision of the
present.
Bultmann not only signalled the end of the quest but also served as the
catalyst fo r the new quest in the mid-twentieth century. Ernst Kasemann
(1953) was the first of Bultmann's students to recognize the fallacy of
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removing the kerygma from its historical bearings in J esus. In 1956, G unther
Bornkamm, another Bultmannian, wrote a book on this very subject: Jesus of
Nazareth. He was to be followed by others, but stands out as the only figure in
the Bultmannian school who wrote a full length treatise on the relationship of
the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith .
Jesus of Nazareth reveals Bornkamm's desire to find history in the
kerygma and kerygma in that history. He views the Jesus of history and the
Christ of faith as inseparable, although the former is cautiously approached by
way of form-critical methodology. As an attempt in doing "Christology from
below," this work fails to overcome the hiatus between the Jesus of history
and the Christ of faith, by failing to take the resurrection of Jesus Christ
seriously as a historical event. It is difficult to understand how it is possible to
bridge the gulf between fact and value if the interpretive key is not given equal
access to both sides of the dichoto my.

PANNENBERG'S "SOLUTION"
Fact-Value Dichotomy
A reaction to the kerygma theology of the Bultmannian school is
evidenced in the writings of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Redemptive histo ry
contains both the fact of God's revelation and the meaning of the event.
Pannenberg sym pathizes with the attempts of Kahler lo safeguard the gospel
from historicism, but vehemently disagrees with the total separatio n of the
historical Jesus from the Christ of faith evident in later kerygma theology. 1
For him, historical verification is not a crutch, but the integrating fea ture of
his theology as a whole.
Pannenberg rejects the subject-object antithesis as presented by Kant and
views the bifurcation of fact and value as a false dichotomy.
The distinction ... between the facts of J esus' histo ry and their meaning
as revelation, which allegedly o nly faith can find in them, is
widespread .. .. Under the influence of positivism a nd of neoKantianism, scholars have come to distinguish more sharply between
the facts on the one hand and their evaluation or significance on the
other hand. Most radically of all, Rudolph Bultmann carries out this
distinction by relegating the early Christian Easter message totally lo
the significance side ....Such a splitting up of historical consciousness
into a detection of facts and an evaluation of them is intolerable to
Christian faith, not only because the message of the resurrectio n of
Jesus and of God's revelatio n in him necessarily becomes merely
subjective interpretation, but also because it is the reflection of an
outm oded and questio nable historical method. It is based o n the
futile aim of the positivist historians to ascertain bare facts without
meaning in history.2
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H e insists on holding togethe r fa..:t and value. There is unity between facts

and their meaning. "Every event, if not artificially taken out of context, brings
its own meaning for each pa rticula r inquire r, brings it with its context, which
o f course is always a context o f tradition."3
Pa nne nbe rg decries the bifurcation of fact a nd meaning inherent in the
positivistic understanding of the historical method. Fact and meaning, history
and ke rygma are integrally related. The ke rygma must be rooted in the
historical J esus, for the kc rygma expresses the meaning inhe re nt in the events
o f his life, death and resurrection. "All meaning has its criterion in the fact in
which it inheres."4 H e reacts to the theology of th e Word (Barth a nd
Bultma nn), believing that it has allowed the histo rical-critical metho d to b e
ta ke n hostage by positivism. Revelat ion is not g iven in or th rough history, but
as histo ry. Events a nd inte rpretatio ns, facts a nd mea nings must be viewed
togethe r in their original histo rical context.
The whole problem is already cont ai ned in this distinction. Is not the
" revelatory value" related to the "fact" as some thing added from the
outside? Does not this argum e nt accept all too un critically the neoKantian distinction between being and value? Docs not th e meaning
of an event belong to the eve nt itself insofa r as it is to be unde rstood
o nly within its own historical cont ext [Gesche11he11sz11samme11ha11g]?5
The " historical docctism" inhe re nt in both existe nti al theology (Gogartcn
a nd Bultmann) a nd the tradi tio n o f redemptive history--Heilsgescl1ichte
( Ka hler a nd Barth), is rejected by Pa nnc nbc rg. Both of these schools
de preciate real history.
Their common sta rting point is to be seen in the fact that criticalhisto rical invest igation as the scientific ve rifica tion of events did not
seem to leave a ny more room for rede mptive events. Therefore the
theology of red emptive history fled into a ha rbo r supposedly safe
from the critical-historical llc od tide, the ha rbo r o f a supra history--or
with Barth, of pre- history. For the same reason the theology of
existe nce withdrew from the mea ningless a nd godless course of
"objective" history to the expe rie nce of the sign ifica nce o f history in
the " historicity" of the individual.6
But neithe r is the historical-critical method without its problems. Pannenbcrg
de ni es that anyone e ngaged in histo rical resea rch is free o f presuppositions.
Propone nts of the historical-critical method a rc far less objective than they
think, being governed by positivistic presupposi tions.7 In contrast to both
kerygma theology and historicism, he stresses the histo ri cal character o f
redemptive events, believing th at " histo ry is the most comprehe nsive h orizon
of C hristi an theology." 8
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Revelation as History
Pannenberg seeks to overcome the distinction between Historie and
Geschichte by way of universal history. Borrowing the construct from Dilthey
and its modifications in Heidegger, Pannenberg seeks to show that all of
history is an indirect revelation of God. Together with modern theology, he
agrees that revelation is not the communication of supernatural truths about
God. Rather, it is the self-disclosure of God himself. In response to the
Enlightenment's attack on revelation as the inspired words and doctrines of
Scripture, German idealism had redefined revelation as the self-revelation of
God. Pannenberg does not disagree with the understanding of revelation as
the self-disclosure of God. What he does object to is the notion of a direct
self-communication of God. Revelation is an indirect self-revelation of God
reflected in history. The historical activity of God is the means of his selfdisclosure.
For Pannenberg, only the totality of history is the self-manifestation of
God. The notion of universal history as the indirect self-revelation of God is
nothing new, being found in the thought of Schleiermacher, Schelling and
Hegel. The problem with the concept of universal history, however, is the lack
of significance the Christ event has for those who view all of history as
revelatory. What is new in Pannenberg's understanding of universal history is
that it avoids relativizing the Christ event by emphasizing the eschatological
role of Jesus as the proleptic9 presence of the end of history.
It is precisely this understanding of history as something whose
totality is given by the fact that its end has become accessible in a
provisional and anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from the
history of Jesus in its relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition.
Hegel was unable to see this because the eschatological character of
the message of Jesus remained hidden to him .... 10

If the totality of history is the self-revelation of God, then the end of history
alone reveals the meaning of the whole. For Pannenberg, Jesus is the
anticipation of the final end of universal history. 11
Pannenberg holds that particular events cannot be understood apart from
the universal scope of history. "It is the horizon of world history which first
makes it possible to appreciate the full significance of an individual event." 12
It is the particularity of the event of Jesus that through it for the fust
time the totality of reality was constituted as a whole, whereas all
other occurrences have a relation to the whole of reality only through
their relation to this unique occurrence ....For history receives its
wholeness for the first time precisely by the fact that the end of
history--which had occurred in an anticipatory form in the claim and
fate of Jesus--comes into view.13
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Thus God reveals himself in the history of Jesus. But more than this,
Pannenberg maintains that "the God who constitutes history has himself fully
entered the process of history in his revelation." 14
Historical Probabilities
Pannenberg reacts to the self-authenticating Word in dialectical theology,
emphasizing instead the historical bases of revelation. The revelatory
meaning of the activity of God in history is not understood only by faith, but is
inherent in the activity itself. "The events in which God demo nstrates his
deity ar e self-evident as they stand within the framework of their own
history." 15 Thus, he rejects the dichotomy between event and interpretation.
The results achieved by the use of historical evidence are, at most,
probabilities. Probable knowledge, however, is the basis of all human
decisions and commitments.

We must see that this difficulty--the difficulty of building final
convictio ns on chance historical facts and of basing eterna l
blessedness on a history which can at best o nly be ascertained with
some degree of probability--is a basic problem of the Christian faith.
It is impossible to evade it in any way at all without losing sight of
Christianity's fundamental connection with the historical figure of
Jesus. 16
What can be known of the historical Jesus? Pannenberg believes that
"certai n important events and facts can be determined with sufficient
probability [lo] be viewed as historical." Included in these are Jesus' death
and resurrectio n.17 R eligious faith is based on probabilities, not certainties. 18
Faith is risk-taking on the basis of reasonable probabilities. Provisionality19 is
the basis of Pannenberg's Christology from below. In fact, his view of reality
is m arked by an awareness of provisionality, an openness to the future. Even
though existence is tentative, it must be embraced as the only existence
possible.20
Faith and Reason
What is essential for Pannenberg's conception of faith is its future
orientation. The past and present are the do mains of reason; the future
belongs to faith. Faith is defined in terms of truth in the revelation of God in
universal history, that is, in the future which has been revealed in the events of
J esus' destiny. R eason provides the basis for such faith. The self-revelation of
God in Christ can be comprehended by reason and responded to by faith.
Jn fact, fo r
Revelation is not separated from the historical process.
Pannenberg there is one histo rical reality, the self-revelation of G od to man.
The meaning of this universal histo ry is o nly known at the end of history.
Since the end gives meaning to the historical process, o ne must remain open
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to the future. In Jesus' resurrection, this future end is manifest in the present,
thus giving meaning to the present historical process and calling forth hope in
the future consummation of universal history.21
Pannenberg argues against an either/or relationship of faith and
knowledge. They are "co-essential dimensions of the act of a total person."
Both are necessary for recognizing God's revelation in Christ, although the
emphasis is clearly on the role of reason.
One cannot really know of God's revelation in Jesus Christ without
believing. But faith does not take the place of knowledge. On the
contrary, it has its basis in an event which is a matter for knowing and
which becomes known to us only by more or less adequate
information. To be able to have Christian faith one must at least
presuppose that the message about Jesus Christ is true ....The
knowledge of Jesus' history, including his resurrection from the dead,

is the basis of faith .... Knowledge is not a stage beyond faith, but leads
into f aith ....22
Such an emphasis o n the rationality of faith leaves little room fo r myste ry. 23
Pannenberg, however, is concerned to define faith as something more than a
subjective way of knowing. Christian faith is not to be equated with a "pious
subjectivity'' that makes up for historical uncertainty co ncerning the life of
Jesus.
Faith is not something like a compensation of subjective conviction to
make up for defective knowledge .... But faith is actually trust in God's
promise, and this trust is not rendered superfluous by knowledge of
this promise; on the contrary, it is made possible for the first time.24
Pannenberg thus reacts to the attempt to drive revelatio n from the experience
of faith rather than from reason's knowledge of histo ry.
But the act of faith o r trust presupposes a knowledge of the
trustworthiness of the partner. Without such well-founded knowledge
faith would be blind gullibility, credulity, or even superstition. For
much too long a time faith has been misund erstood to be
subjectivity's fortress into which Christianity could retreat from the
attacks of scientific knowledge.25
Pannenberg's position on the objective, historical content of revelation
must be viewed as a reaction to the loss of history in kerygma theology and the
escape to suprahistory in Heilsgeschichte theology.
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We see that Christian faith builds its hope on the truth of an event
which occurred in the far-distant past. Therefore everything naturally
depends on our having a knowledge, an exact and reliable knowledge,
of these events. Faith cannot replace that knowledge. It would have
to be reckless and desperate faith which attempted to guarantee the
reality of its ground from its own resourccs.26
This over-reaction reduces the apprehension of revelation to historical reason
and historico-scientific methodology, failing to realize the importance and
place of personal faith and the Holy Spirit in the mediation and reception of
divine revelation.27
Reason alone is needed for perceiving historical facts. Thus, revelation, as
God's activity in history, does not require special illumination. Neither faith
nor the Holy Spirit enhance the revelatory content of the historical facts. He
is convinced that the doctrine of the Spirit has been misused as " a fig leaf to
protect the nakedness of the Christian tradition from the questionings of
modern critical thinking." 28 Neither does faith lead to understanding, but
rather, rational knowledge is the presupposition of faith . Panncnberg avoids
positivistic historicism by insisting on keeping historical facts in the context of
their tradition ( Oberliefenmgsgeschichte).29
What then is the role of faith? For Pannenberg, faith is trust or
confidence (jiducia) in the knowledge of Jesus' history, including his
resurrection from the dead ...." Faith not only involves presupposing that
certain historical events took place as the New Testament records them, but it
also involves hope, that is, trust in the promise of God and his future. 30
Knowledge of God's revelation in history is future-oriented, since it can only
be ascerta ined in the light of the anticipation of the end of history. Faith does
not add to the knowledge of revelation, but it is still important for
Pannenberg.
The fact that the demonstration of the deity of the God of Israel in
the life-history of J esus is a matter of insight and knowledge, does not
render faith superfluous. People do of course say that what they
know for a fact, they do not need to believe any more. But
statements of that kind arc superficial in this matter. For faith
involves the participation of the believer himself in the reality in
which he believes, and this cannot be replaced by any knowledge.
Moreover, faith always has to do with the future. The believer
attaches his own future to what he has come lo recognize. Precisely
for that reason faith cannot be its own basis. Faith as pure risk would
be blind credulity. Trustful belief needs a ground on which to build. 31
For Pannenberg reason provides the objective certainty necessary for faith. It
is obvious that reason is necessary to perceive historical facts, but Pannenberg
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fails to see the role of faith or the Spirit as necessary in the hermeneutical
process.
The crux of the issue of the relationship of faith and knowledge in
Pannenberg's thought has to do with the mediation of faith. Is faith mediated
through historical events, or is it mediated in the crisis of personal decision?
Pannenberg has opted for the former, against the tide of much of modern
theology, by refusing to allow faith to add anything to the certainty of the truth
of revelatory history.32 This is most clearly evident in Pannenberg's view of
Jesus' resurrection. If the resurrection cannot be spoken of as a historical
event that can be investigated by historical methodology, it ceases to be
relevant and takes on a mythological character. Pannenberg firmly upholds
the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, not from a confessional stance, but based
on the historical evidence. Against those who seek to find existential meaning
in the resurrection outside of his tory, he believes that the relevance of the
resurrection is based solely on the historical reality of the event itself.

Trust in the promised resurrection to life is certainly opposed to what
we human beings experience in ourselves (cf. Rom 4:19 ff.), but that
trust is not a frivolously accepted risk or a blind readiness to believe
authority in view of the witness of the apostles, but is grounded on
Jesus' resurrection which has already occurred.33
Christology From Below

Pannenberg rejects Christology "from above," with its emphasis on the
divinity of Jesus and the centrality of the incarnation, as expressed in
traditional Christian theology and powerfully reasserted by Karl Barth.
Rather, Pannenberg advocates a Christology " from below," being more
interested in how Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ than in how Christ is Jesus of
Nazareth.34 Christology from above presupposes the doctrine of the Trinity,
and thus, the divinity of Jesus. He rejects the methodology of doing
Christology from above, for one would have to stand in the position of God
himself in order to follow the way of God's Son into the world.
Christology must begin with the man Jesus, its first question has to be
about his relationship to God. Every statement about Jesus taken
independently from his relationship to God could result only in a
crass distortion of reality. The modernistic presentation of Jesus at
the height of the quest of the historical Jesus offers enough examples
of this ....The specific element in the Christological question about
Jesus is that it does not begin with some preliminary aspect of his
deeds and words or of his effect on men, but with his relation to God
as it is expressed in the whole of his activity on earth.35
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In seeking to present the deity of Christ without violating his true
humanity, Pannenberg attempts to formulate his Ch.ristology in terms arising
from the historical situation of Jesus mission.36 Thus, instead of starting with
the incarnation and divinity of Christ, the historical Jesus is the basis of his
Christology.37 More specifically, Pannenberg views the resurrection of Jesus
as the main focus of Christology, and seeks to approach it as a historical event
within the matrix of the historical process ("from below"). The historical
facticity of the resurrection is the only proper basis for Christian faith.38
By emphasizing the revelation of God through the Jesus of history,
Pannenberg employs the Hebraic concept of understanding the revelation of
God through the activity of the divine in the historical process. Rather than
starting with philosophical presuppositions about God, he maintains that God
can only be known through his historical activity with people.39 The
incarnation, according to Pannenberg, is an emphasis that was a result of
Hellenistic cultural influence upon Christianity. He sees a shift away from a
"from below'' to a "from above" approach in the early church; away from an
emphasis on eschatology, to that of epiphany.40

Resu"ection
Most attempts to do Christology from below try to substantiate Jesus'
unity with God by his pre-Easter claim to authority, not by his resurrection. In
contrast, Pannenberg finds a "proleptic element in Jesus' claim to authority."41
The resurrection of Christ is viewed as the "eschatological self-revelation of
God."
Now the history of the whole is only visible when one stands at its
end. Until then, the future always remains as something beyond
calculation. And, only in the sense that the perfection of history has
already been inaugurated in Jesus Christ is God finally and fully
revealed in the fate of Jesus. With the resurrection of Jesus, the end
of history has already occurred ....the end of the world will be on a
cosmic scale what has already happened in Jesus.42
Thus, the resurrection of Jesus not only reveals God, but serves as the telos of
history. "In Jesus' history, the God whom Jesus revealed is the infinite God.
However, this revelation does not happen as the annihilation of the finite but
as its effusive fulfillment.' 143 God's revelation in Jesus is open to the future,
but at the same time, this event is final. "The history of Jesus, precisely in the
form of mere anticipation, is the final revelation of God."44
Jesus' importance is measured by his proleptic eschatology. He revealed
the coming Kingdom of God in his life, death and resurrection. "Jesus is the
final revelation of God to the extent that his ministry and his history have
eschatological character."45 The expectation of the fulfillment of God's
Kingdom on earth is the focal point of the revelation in Jesus. This revelation

60

Rightmire

is not without a background and context. Jesus shared with Judaism a
common religious heritage and hope. His authority grows out of a message
that had its roots in the history of Israel. In Jesus' proclamation, however, the
revelation of the one true God was not only complete, but also was made
available to the Gentile world.
The presupposed Jewish knowledge of God was recast by the
appearance of Jesus. Only then for the first time was the God of the
Jews revealing himself as the God he really is. And the Greeks' quest
for God was revised and corrected when it found its answer in
Christianity.
Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the End of
history appeared in him. It did so both in his eschatological message
and in his resurrection from the dead. H owever, he can be
understood to be God's final revelation only in connection with the
whole of history as mediated by the history of Israel. He is God's
revelation in the fact that all history receives its due light from him.46
The significance of Jesus' resurrection is set forth by Pannenberg m a
series of propositions:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

If Jesus has been raised, then the end of the world has begun.
If Jesus has been raised, this for a Jew can only mean that God
himself has confirmed the pre-Easter activity of Jesus.
Through his resurrection from the dead, Jesus moved so close to
the Son of Man that the insight became obvious: the Son of Man
is none other than the man Jesus who will com e again.
If J esus, having been raised from the dead, is ascended to God
and if thereby the end of the world has begun, then G od is
ultimately revealed in Jesus.
The transition to the Gentile mission is motivated by the
eschatological resurrection of the crucified One.
What the early Christian tradition transmitted as the wo rds of the
risen Jesus is to be understood in terms of its content as the
explication of the significance inherent in the resurrection itself.47

Thus, for Pannenberg, the resurrection of Jesus is "absolu tely decisive fo r any
Christian proclamatio n and for the Christian faith itself." 48
What docs Panncnberg mean by the term " resurrection"? H e prefers to
understand it metaphorically. "To speak about the resurrection of the dead is
not comparable to speaking about any random circumstance that can be
identified empirically at anytime. Here we are dealing with a mctaphor."49
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Evide ntly something had happe ned to the witnesses of the
appearances of the Risen O ne for which their language had no other
word than that used to characterize the eschatological expectation,
i.e., resurrectio n from the dead. This expression is a metaphor. It
suggests the idea of being awakened and arising from sleep. H ence
Jewish traditions often join mention of the future resurrection of the
dead with the metapho rical description of death as sleep. It is
important to notice this metaphorical meaning of our talk abo ut the
resurrectio n, tho ug h of course not of the thing itself.... T he most we
can really know is whether or not Easter witnesses were confronted
by a reality which we too can comprehend only in terms of that
parabolic word of eschatological expectation: resurrection fro m the
dead.50
T his metaphorical understanding is found in Judeo-Christian hope and no t in
G reek speculat ion. Pannenberg discusses the two concepts of life beyond
death in our western culture: the G reek idea of the immortality of the soul and
the Jewish-Christian hope of a resurrection of the dead. He finds problems,
however, with the G reek concept.
Here a person cannot talk about hope in the genuine sense. The
person who believes in the immortality of the soul docs not look for
something new in the future, but thinks he is able lo preserve a kernel
of his present human existence as something that canno t pcrish.51
The G reek idea of immortality is based o n a distinction between body and
soul. Pannenberg maintains that modern anthropology has abolished this
distinction between body and soul as two completely diffe rent realms of
reality.52
Although grounded in Jewish apocalyptic hope,53 the resurrection of Jesus
opens the future in a radically new way. His rising fro m the dead has universal
implications.
J esus' new reality, which appeared to the disciples at Easter, remains
incomprehensible for us, as it was fo r them. We also are able to
describe it o nly by the metaphor with which Jesus' disciples spoke
about it: it is like rising from sleep, but now to a new life. Yet, by
knowing o urselves lo be bound lo Jesus, we can already be certain
that someday we will also participate in this new reality, which has
appeared in him.54
Pannenbcrg is qu ick lo recognize the fact, however, that the universal
im plications of J esus' r esurrection are subject t o certain histo rical
presuppositions:
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If one assumes that the dead cannot rise, that any event of this type
can never happen, the result will be such a strong prejudice against
the truth of the early Christian message of Jesus' resurrection, that
the more precise quality of the particular testimonies will not be
taken into consideration in forming a general judgment. O nly if the
expectation of the future general resurrection of all men from death,
whether for life or for judgment, makes sense in itself, o nly if it also
expresses the truth for us, will it then be meaningful to put the
question of J esus' r esurrection as a question of histor ical
importance.55
The historical resurrection of Jesus is foundational to P annenberg's
Christology. "Jesus' resurrection is the basis for the perceptio n of his
divinity."56 This stands in contrast to much Christology from below, in that it
presumes the historicity of the resurrection, leading to Easter fai th.
The possibility of the historicity of Jesus' resurrection has been
opposed o n th e grounds tha t the resurr e ction of a de ad
person...violates the laws of nature. Therefore, resurrection as a
histo rical event is impossible.57
Who is to say that the only things that can happen are the things
which are by nature already fully and completely comprehensible? Is
not even our everyday reality more complex than a pictu re of reality
so empty of mystery would like to admit? One often hears the
objection that a historian who reckoned with possibilities of this kind
would come into conflict with natural sciences. Curiously enough this
objection is seldo m raised by scientists nowadays, and least of all by
physicists; it is most often heard on the lips of theologians, or even
historians. In these quarters a dogmatic view of the natural sciences
is evidently still widespread which is no longer held by the sciences
themselves. 58
Why does Pannenberg take such a stro ng stance fo r the historical resurrectio n
of Jesus? A major impetus comes fro m his desire to safeguard the objective
basis of Christian faith.
If no arguments could be marshalled in its favor which would allow it
to seem credible, then the assertion that Jesus is risen would be the
expression of irresponsible subjectivism o r blind faith in authority.
But the cause of the Christian faith does not rest o n such shaky
ground. On the contrary, the historical claim, which is already
contained in the assertion that Jesus is risen, is a tenable one on
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objective examination, even in the context of our present experience
of reality. The distance of the present world from the eschatological
future of God does not exclude the real appearance of that future in
our present world. And it is on this that the Christian faith has always
insisted throughout history.59
For Pannenberg, it is inappropriate to find a fact/value dichotomy in the
resurrection of Jesus. Meaning inheres in the historical facticity of the Easter
event.
Only when the original unity of event and meaning is grasped may the
question of the historicity of Jesus resurrection be properly raised
again. For the event here in question can only be expressed in the
language of apocalyptic expectation by the metaphorical phrase,
resurrection from the dead, but nevertheless it was experienced as a
concrete occurrence from without, not simply as a subjective
experience. Therefore, even modern historians must at least examine
it as eternal occurrence ....The early Christian proclamation only
unfolded the inherent meaning of Jesus' history in the language and
the conceptualization of the time and the particular hearer.
Sometimes it succeeded very welJ in expressing it, sometimes not.
But it did not invent a meaning that was not already there.60
In addition to his critique of the distinction between Geschicltte and Historie,
Pannenberg calls into question the basic historiographical distinction between
fact and value, event and meaning. God, as Lord of history, cannot be
restricted lo some special sphere of history (i.e., Heilsgeschichte). This
critique is most evident in his handling of the resurrection of Jesus.
Pannenberg insists that certainty about the resurrection does not come from
the decision of faith. Faith is based on the certainty, which must come from
outside faith. Just because first-hand proof is no longer attainable, at least
eyewitness historical proof is available to us. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus
does not emerge in a historical vacuum.
Three elements make the
resurrection of Jesus an historical event:
1. A context in Jewish apocalypticism,
2. An ontological analysis of natural human.Jonging, and
3. An adequate metaphorical expression of the reality of the
resurrection.61
The historicity of the resurrection is not affected by its metaphorical
character.
Please understand me correctly: Only the name we give lo this event

is symbolic, metaphorical, but not the reality of the event itself. The
latter is so absolutely unique that we have no other name for this than

64

Rightmire

the metaphorical expression of the apocalyptical expectation. In this
sense, the resurrectio n of Jesus is an historical event, an event that
really happened at that time.62
In fact, the Easter event provides the herm eneutical key for Pannenberg's
Christology. "Thus, Jesus is the final revelation of God and, therefore, he
himself is God. This doctrine adds nothing essential to the events of the
resurrection of Jesus; it only makes clear the inner meaning of that event. 63
In refutation of positivism,64 with its closed system of natural causes and
effects, Pannenberg argues for the historicity of J esus' resurrection. The
evidence points beyond reasonable doubt to the historical reality of the Easter
event. P annenberg believes that the rise of historical criticism and modern
canons of historicity have been innuential in displacing the resurrection of
Jesus from its central position in Christian teaching and proclamatio n. The
Easter event cannot be torn from the fabric of Christian history without

destroying that history itsclf.65
There are many scholars today who think that the resurrection of
J esus cannot be an historical fact. There are all too few analogies to
an event of this kind; it is all too unusual for the historian to be able
to assume it as a fact. Only faith, it is claimed, can venture to take
such an unusual fact into consideration. But...faith cannot guarantee
the certainty of past events. These happenings must be assumed and
in fact assumed as historically certain. Christian faith would be in a
bad state if the resurrectio n of Jesus were not really an historical
fact.. ..There is no sort of knowledge [e.g. "super-history" or salvation
history] of past events which by-passes historical knowledge. Only
because J esus' resurrection is an historical fact has faith in the God
who raised him a stable foundation. 66
Fundamental to Pan nenberg's understanding of the historical significance
of J esus' resurrection is the concept of proleptic eschatology. " With the
resurrection of Jesus, what for all other men is still to come has been
Viewing the resurrection as proleptic event, Pannenberg
realized. 67
underscores the o ntological priority of the future. The future does not stand
in opposition to the past and present. There is continuity between past,
present and future, in that through the release of past events by the future, the
future can be anticipated. History has purpose, and continuity is given to past
and present by the future. The coming Kingdo m is that future reality that
interprets the past and present proleptically.68 The proclamation of the
Kingdom and its confirmation in Jesus' resurrection are events of the past that
proleptically point to the future. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus from the
dead is the paradigmatic proleptic event of the past that serves as a promise of
the future.69
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Pannenberg perceives Jesus' proclamation of the imminent Kingdom of
God as the key to Christian theology. In stressing the present impact of the
imminent future, Pannenberg differs with Bultmann, Dodd and others, who
exaggerate the difference to the degree of dismissing the futurity of the
Kingdom of God in Jesus' message. "Jesus indeed spoke of the presence of
the Kingdom of God, but always in terms of the presence of God's coming
Kingdom. Futurity is fundamental for Jesus' message." The "now" of the
Kingdom is informed by the "not yet." Thus, the present is viewed as an effect
of the future, rather than viewing the past and present as the cause of the
future. 70
Key lo this view of proleptic eschatology is Jesus' role as the proclaimer of
the Kingdom.
Jesus summoned his hearers to turn, heart and soul, toward God's
near future, toward his near reign. He made the final salvation of
each man depend upon accepting or refusing that appeaL ..Jesus did
not make this appeal for decision unveiledly for himself, but only
indirectly. He made it primarily for his eschatological message of
God's near reign.71
The message of Jesus announces the "proleptic reality" of God's future
Kingdom, partially realized in the present.
Thus the future and the presence of the reign are intertwined in the
ministry of Jesus. But the future remains future. There is no
"realized eschatology," as if the future had faded out. The presence
of God's reign in Jesus was founded ... only in the exclusiveness in
Jesus' pointing to the future of God ....The present reality of the reign
of God, thus mediated by the exclusiveness of Jesus' eschatological
message, is to be considered a proleptic reality.72
Thus, in the resurrection of Jesus, the end of history has been realized in
the present. "The resurrection of Jesus was to be spoken of in close
connection at least with the destiny of all mankind. The general human
destiny has occurred in Jesus .... " The eschatological resurrection of the dead
is previewed in the Easter event. The presence of this "ultimate reality" is
evidence of the nearness of God's salvation, and the fulfillment of the "general
eschatological hope." As the " final revelation of God," the resurrection of
Jesus is decisive for all history, especially in its openness to the future. 73
Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the End of
history appeared in him. It did so both in his eschatological message
and in his resurrection from the dead. However, he can be
understood to be God's final revelation only in connection with the
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whole of history as mediated by the history of Israel. He is God's
revelation in the fact that all history receives its due light from him.74
Pannenberg's conception of history is marked by " pure openness" to the
future based on the "historical uniqueness of the saving event" in Jesus.
Human beings are "caught up in that movement of concrete histo ry...[which]
runs from the first Adam to the new Adam." 75 Pannenberg's " biblicalapocalyptic conception of history'' is grounded upo n an anthropological
assumption that belies his attempt to do Christology from below.
Does not the biblical conception of uni\·ersal history...presuppose the
apocalyptic expectation of a general future resurrectio n of the dead?
We have seen that this expectation forms the sole background against
the resurrection of Jesus can be seen in its full significance as
the irruption of the consummation of all history. But is not an
expectation of this kind--which must be counted amo ng the
anthropological presuppositio ns of Christian faith--too much to
demand of 20th century man? I think that modern research into
human nature has made it easier to see how reasonable the truth of
that expectation is. M an's openness to the world, can be understood
today only in terms of the expectation of a resurrection of the
dead ....Then the resurrection of Jesus ceases to appear as an
unintelligible, although historically attested miracle. It then becomes
intelligible again as the irruption of the consummation of history,
which for us is still to come but in Jesus has already happened. 76
Thus, Pannenberg views the Easter event in the light of a general
anthropological obse rvation th at human existe nce cannot be totally
comprehended within finite
dimensions. Man is a being who is open to
the future and who hopes for a future fulfillment beyond death. Openness to
an apocaiyptic view of reality is not only essential to an understanding of
C hristi an faith, 77 but shares in co mmo n with mode rn th oug ht a
phenomenology of hope.78 Therefore, belief in the possibility of a future
resurrection requires an openness to a view of reality that does not exclude
such an event. 79
" Revelatio n is not completely comprehended in the beginning, but at the
end of the revealing history." 80 Only at the end of history is there a final selfrevelation of God. In the life, death and resurrectio n of Jesus, however, the
eschatological consummation is already proleptically present. This claim is
based o n Pannenberg's reading of the teaching and fate of Jesus in their
Jewish apocalyptic milieu. Jesus' resurrection, however, is ultimately decisive
for Pannenberg, fo r in this event, the anticipated revelation of God is made
manifest within the histo rical process. The resurrection of Jesus is the
interpretive key to the meaning of history.
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What it means that in the person of Jesus the end of history is already
anticipated can itself be understood only within the apocalyptic
concept of history. Thus the historical framework remains intact.
History is by no means abolished. On the contrary, an understanding
of history as a whole is made possible for the first time because the
end of history is already present.81
In line with the historical consciousness of Israel, Pannenberg maintains
that history results from the dynamic tension between promise and fulfillment.
Within the reality characterized by the constantly creative work of
God, history arises because God makes promises and fulfills these
promises. History is event so suspended in tension between promise
and fulfillment that through the promise it is irreversibly pointed
toward the goal of future fulfillment.82
The Old and New Testaments are connected by the historical consciousness
that binds the eschatological community of Jesus Christ to ancient Israel
through the concept of promise and fulfillment. In fact, Panncnberg claims
that " historical experience of reality is preserved only in the biblical
understanding of history, in the biblical faith in the promise." 83
CONCLUSION
Pannenberg's theology of history seeks to overcome the Christological
fact/value dichotomy by emphasizing the historical Jesus as the basis for the
Christ of faith. History and faith must be viewed as interpenetrating realities,
for what is true theologically cannot, at the same time, be historically false.
Pannenbcrg's conviction that it is reasonable to believe in the resurrection as a
real, bodily event is grounded in the recognition of the importance of the late
Jewish apocalyptic understanding of man as future oriented, and the primacy
of history as the fundamental category for revelation. It is thus appropriate to
sec his understanding of history as centering on a theology of the resurrection
of Jesus Christ.
Pannenbcrg takes seriously the historical character of the resurrection,
and his views of faith, history and the theology of history all flow from his
interpretation of the resurrection. He argues for historical foundations for
Easter faith, calling for an openness to a provisional, yet reliable knowledge as
the basis for faith in Jesus' resurrection. The essence of faith is not risk, but
trust in historical probabilities. In the case of the Easter event, the historical
proofs are not irrefutable; however, neither is the historical actuality of Jesus'
resurrection without reliable evidence.84
Pannenberg's Christology is based on a view of the retroactive power of
the resurrection (riickwirkende Kraft).85 This means that Jesus is essentially
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one with God on the basis of t!le resurrection event, and that his earthly
existence is united to God by this event. The resurrection is both the
ontological and epistemological basis for Pannenberg's Cbristology. God is in
history, and historical method can make him known. Thus, revelation is
reformulated to mean that God can be discovered in history if the right
historical method is employed. In this regard, Pannenberg betrays a
subjectivism that is not based on experience but on historical method.86
T he core of Pannenberg's theological method is found in his stress o n the
universal character of revelation. On this basis, be believes he has overcome
the Historie-Geschichte distinction of the Bultmannian and post-Bultmannian
positions.
This has often been represc,nted as a shift from Kantian
transcendentalism to a Hegelian objectivism based on a reflection on the
whole of reality as history. Pannenberg, however, attempts to maintain the
im portance of particularity within the universality of God's revelation, as well
as the ontological priority of the future.87
In insisting, however, that historical knowledge of God's revelation in
J esus must pr ecede fa ith a nd therefore does not presuppose faith ,
Pannenbcrg's epistemology is suspect. Does not his appeal to man's openness
to the future involve fai th in and knowledge of the God of the fu ture? Is it not
faith's ho pe that creates this openness? Perhaps one should ask whether
Pannenberg's anthropological presuppositio n is as self-evident as he thinks it
is. Even if we concede that it is, what is the basis for accepting the JewishChristian apocalyptic construct as the appropriate paradigm fo r understanding
such future hope? 88
T he Chr ist event in the historical J esus provides all of histo ry with its
interpretive key. 89 All of reality must be viewed in relation to this one unique
occurrence in history. The histo rical resurrectio n of Jesus Christ provides the
anticipation of the end, in that the end of history has come into the midst of
history. T his em phasis on the significance of Jesus for universal history,
however, fails to do justice to his works and teachings. Pannenberg's Hegelian
idealism moves from the particular to the universal without examining the
meaning of the particular. His proleptic eschatology leaves little room fo r
dealing with the significance of the historical Jesus for the present. What is
significant for Pannenberg's Christology from below is the historical
resurrectio n of Jesus, viewed as proleptic reality.90
Pannenberg is committed to a "theology of reason" defined as an
"eschatologically oriented ontology."91 God has revealed the structure of all
reality in his self-revelation through Jesus Christ. In him is the anticipated
end by which all reality hangs together. Reality is fo und in Jesus. The value
of Pannenberg's theology of history can be discerned in its development of the
insights of two influential thinkers. First, he is indebted to Karl Barth for the
perception that theology is a functio n of revelation, and that it must be
Christocentric. He, however, disagrees with Barth's understanding that the
cognitive aspect of revelation always remains with God. Pannenberg asserts
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that the cognitive aspect of revelation lies with man. Second, he is indebted to

Hegel (et al.) for the concept of universal history as the self-disclosure of God.
History is the self-revelation of God. In history God makes himself known. In
Hegel's thinking, however, it is not clear whether Jesus Christ is unique or
final, or only one other event in the historical process. In contrast,
Pannenberg insists on the centrality of the history of Jesus for universal
history.
Pannenberg emphasizes objective history over against the perceived
devaluation of such in both the kerygmatic and Heilsgeschichte interpretations
of history. Barth's emphasis on suprahistory or prehistory, and Bultmann's
stress on the inwardness of existential historicity, both locate the event of
revelation in the Word rather than in history. By contrast, Pannenberg seeks
to verify the redemptive events by historical science, finding the locus of
revelation in the works of God in history. 92 What is crucial in Pannenberg's
understanding of the end of history anticipated in the person of Jesus, is the
dialectic between the apocalyptic expectation of resurrection and the proleptic
occurrence of the finality of history in the resurrection of Jesus. Jewish
apocalypticism should not be dehistoricized or demythologized, but must be
viewed as essential to an understanding of the eschatological significance of
the Christ event.93 In emphasizing the coming Kingdom of God as the overarching truth about reality, Pannenberg rightly seeks to reckon with the role of
apocalyptic in Jesus' teaching. Christology, therefore, must be viewed in the
context of the coming Kingdom of God. 94
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Calvin's Contribution to
Universal Education
IVAN L. ZABILKA

John Calvin's contribution to the development of common schools and
universal education has been neglected by secular historians of education. He
used religious motivations to bring about the civil promotion of education, yet
scholars have been distracted from his significance. His theological system,
role in promoting French literary style, and contribution to the relation of
church and state have drawn attention away from his educational system.
Another cause of neglect is that Luther was a more prolific writer upon
educational topics, implying to some investigators a greater concern than
Calvin's, but such is not the case. Luther was active in defending education
against radical reformers who wanted to destroy all education to rid
themselves of the supposed blight of Catholic education, while Calvin invested
himself in developing a functioning educational system in Geneva. This
concern was carried forward in the emerging educational centers of the
Reformed Church in Germany, particularly al Heidelberg and Herborn,
where educational programs were fashioned with reference to the irenic,
evangelical rubrics provided by the Heidelberg Catechism (1563) .1 Finally, the
achievements in education of the French, Dutch, Scottish and English
reformers caused attention to be directed away from Calvin and the Genevan
schools, even though the leaders of these movements were often trained in
Geneva. Thus, at every point Calvin's contribution has been eclipsed.
Calvin's attitudes toward education are not presented in philosophical
essays like those of Luther, but in working civil documents. I will survey these
Genevan records, describe the schools founded under Calvin's guidance and
evaluate his influence upon education in other countries, especially during his
own era.
EDUCATION FOR LEADERSHIP
Calvin's educational intentions are discerned in the first edition of the
Institutes of the Christian Religion, the catechisms, the formal organization of
schools, and were influenced by Johann Sturm and Calvin's own education.
The first edition of the Institutes, consisting of six brief chapters, appeared
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in 1536. Calvin's intent for the first edition was a simple introduction to the
Christian faith that could serve to instruct anyone who wished to learn.2 In
subsequent editions the work gradually lost its teaching intent and became the
comprehensive summary of his theology that resulted by 1560. The final form
of the Institutes did contain his discussion of the teaching attitude of the
minister.3 Teachers, in Calvin's opinion, should exhibit kindness, prudence
and skill in giving advice. Advice-giving imparted informatio n and supported
the authority of church and state. He indicated that arrogance could not be a
part of instruction, and harshness reduced its value.4 Calvin emphasized that
teachers must be honest, sincere and an example to their students, both as
scholar and spiritual leader. Wit and reason were presumed helpful. False
teachers were a curse from God upon the authorities who failed to select
well.5 Even though these characteristics marked the minister as teacher, one
may assume that such attitudes did apply to those who were directly involved
in teaching activity. The emphasis upon kindness, while in contrast wit h
Calvin's popular image, was consistently present in his attitudes toward
children as learners.
While the Institutes provides some understanding of his view of teachers,
the catechisms are more helpful with his methodology. The people of Geneva
requested guidance in correct theology through the formation of a catechism,
having seen the effectiveness of Luther's use of it. In February 1537, prior to
his and Guillaume Farel's expulsion in April 1538 following their first efforts
al reform, Calvin presented a long and tedious catechism to the city officials
for use in the instruction of children and citizens. This initial effort serves
primarily to illustrate Calvin's misapprehension of the amo unt that children or
adults could masler.6 During his exile from Geneva, Calvin came under the
influence of Johann Sturm in Strassbourg, who had begun the most effective
gymnasium of the day. H e invited Calvin to deliver theological lectures.
While engaged, Calvin apparently learned from Sturm's example and from the
limitations of his students. When he later presented a revised catechism in
1541, it was simplified and shortened. It still ran to more than fift y modern
book sized pages, but the questions and answers were short, and the student
had fifty-five weeks in which to master it. 7 Clearly, the child or citizen had to
be able to read the vernacular in order to master the expected theology, thus,
elementary schools were necessary.
Calvin's progress in producing better catechisms points to the importance
of brevity, clarity and simplicity in educational methods, a perspective that
appeared in his other writings as well. In a letter lo Simon Grynaeus he stated
that the successful interpreter of the Scriptures, a m ajor objective of
education, must be clear and brief.8 The interest in brevity and simplicity
extended to any teaching tool, including writing, and consequently Calvin
accused other commentators upo n the Scriptures of being " much too clever." 9
Calvin's intent is refreshing, although his standard of brevity and simplicity is
removed from that of the current century.
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Several histories of education assume that Calvin was the originator of the
Genevan schools, since he formed the "College" and the "Academy." The
honor of founding the vernacular schools, however, must go to the reformers
and city fathers responsible for leading Geneva from Catholicism prior to
Calvin's arrival. The Registres du Consei/ indicate that by unanimous action on
May 21, 1536, provision was made for the education of all children, with the
girls in separate schools, under the leadership of Antoine Saunier. 10 All
parents were obligated to send their children, with instruction provided free to
the poor. Calvin did not alter the plan of the vernacular schools and sought to
aid in the selection of teachers. He was able late in life to aid in reorganizing
them more efficiently, as will be seen.
An even more pressing concern to Calvin was the instruction of the
people of Geneva in "correct" theology. The content of such "correct"
theology was defined by Calvin in terms of a pious, reverential "knowledge of
God and man," that had been disrupted by the fall into sin. Hence, the
didactic character of theology was integral to all genuine Christian faith. 11 In
Calvin's Geneva, education was subordinated to and motivated by this spiritual
concern, a concern which appeared in the "Articles concerning the
Organization of the Church and of Worship," presented on January 16, 1537.u
In these Calvin claimed that preservation of pure doctrine necessitated that
" .. .infants of tender age be so instructed that they be able to give reason for
the faith .... " Such instruction was to be from "hand to hand" and "father to
son," based upon a prepared catechism. At this time Calvin was emphasizing
individual learning and the role of the family in instruction, but it was not
working, for he also criticized parents who failed to do it, and recommended
that a catechism be adopted and regular teaching instituted, events which
transpired by 1541.
The Ecclesiastical Ordinances of September and October of 1541 provide
direct evidence of Calvin's influence.13 In the "four orders of office" for the
government of the church, the second listed is "doctors" or teachers. The
salary of these officials was to be provided by the state. Their role was clearly
defined, so that they did not replace the teaching function of the " ministers"
entirely, for the latter were responsible for the mid-Sunday instruction of
young children in the catechism. Parents were required to bring their children
to the classes.
The principal function of the teachers was the instruction of the faithful in
true doctrine, not for citizenship or the Renaissance man. For this purpose
lecturers in theology were appointed, one for each testament. Since profit
from the lectures would result only from proper instruction in the languages
and the humanities, a "college" for the preparation of ministers and civil
officials was necessary. The form this took was a middle school, above the
vernacular schools and eventually preparatory to the "academy" or University

of Geneva. Calvin further recommended the payment of the vernacular
school teachers from civil funds again, and the continued separations of girls
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from boys. The teachers were to be subject to the same discipline as the
ministers. 14
This brief presentation of the schools in 1541 does not give a full picture
of their nature and development, but it does demonstrate that Calvin was
active in promoting them at an early date. While all children attended the
vernacular schools, it is apparent that a more select group was educated in the
College for the ministry and leadership of state. There is no mention of girls,
which is expected since they could not hold the positions for which the schools
prepared. Even at this early date the potential developed for training more
than just local leadership.
In 1547 Calvin returned to the problem of instruction in the catechism,
when adjustments had to be made for the differing situation in the country
churches around Geneva. The "Ordinances of the Supervision of Churches in
the Country," which appeared on February 3, 1547, made provision for
instruction in the catechism every other week in each church since the
ministers had two churches. 15 Additionally, fathers were liable for their
children's penalties for failure to appear at catechism.
As noted, the College was authorized in 1541, and opened shortly after.
The next notice of activities related to the College appeared on the fifth of
June, 1559, in the "Ordre du College de Geneva," a document which made
formal the methods developed over the years. The final paragraphs discussed
education beyond the seven levels of the college, and gave formal date to the
founding of the University of Geneva. Combination of the schools in this
document has caused some confusion of the two among educational
historians.
A summary of the contents of this document does much to clarif)' the
nature of Calvin's educational theory for the middle and upper levels. The
basic classicism of the content of the instruction will be apparent.
The Ordre stipulated that the teachers would elect the rector who would
then be approved by the ministers and the Council. (Geneva had three
councils: The Little Council, The Sixty and The Two Hundred. Which was
intended is not clear.) The teachers were also approved by the ministers and
the Council.
Students were to be present unless properly excused,
circumspect in behavior, and diligent in the pursuit of learning.
Rebelliousness and indifference led to punishment. Disputes were referred to
the ministers and the Bible. Jn the treatment of students, teachers were
expected to avoid crassness, rudeness, abruptness, and were alternatively to
set a good example. They were to listen attentively to their students, and to
remonstrate with their errors without losing control of the class.
Scholars were divided into four groups according to the section of the city
in which they lived. They were also separated into seven graded levels.
Lessons began at six in the morning in Summer and seven in Winter.
Placements in the classes were determined by skill and not age. The hours for
study, recitation, meals and psalm singing were prescribed, including a 4:00
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p.m. public session for the chastisement of those who failed assignments or
broke rules. While the public reprimanding of disciplinary problems is poor
from a modern perspective, the moderation of such methods from the usual
corporal punishment of the day is apparent. Following this, the students
recited the Lord's Prayer (in French), the Confession of Faith and the Ten
Commandments. On Wednesday they attended morning sermon and followed
it with a question and answer session over the content. The Saturday schedule
also varied with a special hour for student declamations, and a three-hour
study of the catechism in the afternoon.
The curriculum was broadly defined for each year, with the seventh or
lowest class expected to know the French and Latin alphabets and to be able
to pronounce Latin and read French fluently. If the students were old enough
at this level they also began to write.
The first half of the sixth class was spent on Latin declensions and
conjugations. During the second half of the year they studied oratory and
declamation, comparing French with Latin forms. Students were expected to
begin speaking Latin among themselves.
The fifth class studied declamation and syntax using Virgil's Bucolics.
Exercises in writing continued with simple original compositions expected by
the end of the year.
The fourth class was expected to continue the study of syntax until it was
mastered, using Cicero's L etters and various writings of Ovid. The study of
Greek declensions and conjugations was begun.
On the third level emphasis was placed upon Greek grammar in a
comparative approach to Latin, with attention to style. Materials used were
Cicero's Letters, Virgil's Aeneid, Caesar's Commentaries, the Parenthetic
Orations of Isocrates and other less-known works.
The second class studied history through the Latin works of Livy and the
Greek works of Xenophon, Polybius and Herodian. Propositional
argumentation was studied through the Paradoxes and Smaller Orations of
Cicero. The biblical book of Luke was read in the Greek.
The first class studied dialectics and rhetoric using Cicero's Orations and
Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and Philippics. Special attention was paid to style
and the Pauline Epistles were read in Greek. The objective of this curriculum
was the thorough preparation of ministers to proclaim the "Word," in the best
classical tradition.
The headmaster was responsible for maintaining the diligence of the
faculty, and resolving minor quarrels. He was responsible for obedience to
civil law, and the adherence to the articles of faith by the teachers. His term
of office was for two years, and although not stated, it was renewable.
Further regulations governing students included an annual vacation of
three weeks at the wine harvest, in addition to the first Friday of every month.
The procedures for the promotion of students to the next level began three
weeks before the first of May, when one of the academy professors proposed a
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theme in French for all students. The students had five hours to write upo n
the theme in Latin without the aid of books. The professors o n the next level
of the college evaluated the themes, and submitted them to the rector who
made final judgments o n the basis of the professor's recommendations. Prio r
to the ftrst day of May, a conference was held with each student at which a
vote was taken among the professors as to advancement. On May first, all the
students and professors assembled at the Church of Saint Pierre, along with a
councilman, the ministers and the regents of the school. The rector gave a
lecture, after which the councilm an congratulated those being advanced. The
recto r then offered words of encouragement to the students and they were
dismissed fo r the day.
The next level upward was the " public lectures," which were the
beginning of the academy. The ones giving these lectures were professors of
G reek, Hebrew and theology, whose obligations were discussed in the Ordre.
They were expected to use Aristo tle, Plato, Plutarch and Christean
philosophers. Students at this level were exposed to oratory, histo ry, physics
and rhetoric. They had to register with the rector and confess their faith.16
From this summ ary, the importance of classical Greek and Latin authors
is readily apparent. The role of declamation, debate and rhetoric in the
preparatio n of Calvin's ministers is also difficult to miss. The curriculum is
similar to Sturm's at Strassbourg, for he also emphasized classical languages
and literature, rhetoric, grammar, logic and history. Sturm had less place for
the sciences, and seems to have influenced Calvin, although Calvin did include
the " physics of space." 17
Calvin's own experience may have promoted the moderate discipline in
the Genevan schools. He left his home in Noyon, France, in 1523 to enter the
College de la Marche, at the age of fourteen. Classes began at live in the
morning and continued with intermissio ns until eight in the evening. Calvin
moderated these hours in Geneva. School started later and ended earl ier with
fewe r intermissio ns. In addition to the more humane hours for young bodies,
Calvi n also worked in a more compact community where children lived with
their parents, rather than in boarding schools, leaving the eveni ng hours to the
fa mily. Albert Hyma indicated that "Corporal punishments were frequently
inflicted [at the College de la Marche], even when the students were not guilty
of serious offenses.... " 18 The exception to this pattern was Mathurin Cordier,
or Corderius, who was a priest, humanist and educator who taught Latin to
the lowest level. He had o riginally taught at the upper levels, but he was so
disappointed with the skills of those coming to him that he chose to inspire the
beginners. He combined kindness with good teaching, avoiding corporal
punishment. Cordier's edu cational principles involved grouping by age,
gradual development and emphasis upon the fundamentals.19 All of these
marked Cordier as a bit different from others, and although Calvin studied
with him for perhaps no more that three months,2 Cordier made such an
impression that Calvin later secured him for Geneva, a further evidence of
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Calvin's satisfaction with moderation in the treatment of children. The only
apparent difference is that Calvin grouped by skill where Cordier preferred
age.
Following his brief time at the College de la Marche, Calvin moved on to
the College de Montaigu, where he successfully studied the liberal arts and
logic. He remained there approximately four years until 1527. He nominally
studied for the priesthood by taking scholastic theology from Noel Beda. He
also came under the influence of the reformers Nicholas Cop and Pierre
Robert Olivetan, a distant relative.21 Meanwhile, Calvin's father developed
trouble with the Bishop of Noyon, to whom he was secretary. After
completion of his initial studies his father told him to withdraw from Paris and
study law, which Calvin obediently did. He moved to Orleans, where he
studied law under Peter de l'Etoile, a successful case lawyer and logician, and
under Melchoir Wolmar, another reformer. Upon completion of his studies,
the university conferred upon him the doctor's degree. From Orleans, Calvin
went to Bourges where he studied with Andrew Alciati, a well known
Milanese lawyer.22 He returned then to Paris for further humanistic studies at
the Royal College.23 The humanism of his early and late education appeared
in his love of the classics. The legal aspect of his education undoubtedly
appeared in his love of order, completeness of organization and in the
Institutes in many indirect ways that are beyond the scope of this study.
Throughout this discussion of Calvin's writings upon education, they have
been presented as his alone. In actuality he always presented them to the city
fathers as the work of the ministers, but Calvin was clearly the moving spirit.
He may well have held first place in Geneva as far as influence goes, but he
never sought public office, nor did he hold positions of superiority to the other
ministers. Even in the schools, he placed others as rector and never held
position save as professor of theology. He may have been the leader in
forming opinion, but he seldom left the others completely behind. He
emphasized the dangers of wealth and office, especially the generation of
pride, which he associated with false teaching.24
This survey of Calvin's educational writing demonstrates that he wrote
little upon the philosophy of education, save as it related to the formation of
specific schools in Geneva. He was an organizer, with theory present only
when the purpose of the schools was considered. He was primarily concerned
with a method of organizing schools to accomplish the goal of training a Bible
reading laity and an effective clergy.
THE SCHOOLS IN GENEVA
Having considered Calvin's perspective upon the education of children for
leadership, it is appropriate to turn to the actual schools developed in Geneva
and what they were able to accomplish. After a survey of the schools formed
and the students who came to study, consideration will be given to the crucial
issue for modern educators, that of ideological control. This issue will provide
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furlher insight concerning why Calvin has been neglected.
The development of the schools cannot be clearly understood witho ut at
least a preliminary glance at the relationship between the churches and the
government in Geneva. Some difficulties in interpreting the significance of
the schools are the result of a misunderstanding of the government of Geneva
and Calvin's role in it. The ministers and a large segment of the po pulation
came to view Geneva as a theocracy where both the church and the state were
responsible lo God. Even though a majority view, the interpretation of the
implications remained a chronic ground for differences of opinion that were
often expressed actively and even violently. The ruling church body was the
" Consistory," which included the company ;)f the ministers and a dozen lay
members selected from The Little Council or The Two Hundred.25 T he
Consistory was the primary source of co ntact with the civil government, and
there is no denying the influence that Calvin was able lo wield in this body.

However, political control always resided in the civil councils, that of The
Little Council, The Sixty or Senate, and The Two Hundred, elected
representatives of the people. The dominance of the ministers and Calvin
among the members of these groups fluctuated with every election. Early
efforts by the ministers met with stiff resistance, and Calvin was expelled for
three years. After returning he was only o nce in that specific danger, but he
did not always achieve his objectives. An example is the modification of who
had final control over the selection of teachers. The Council of the Sixty
changed the proposal of 1541 so that they had the final determination.26
Other proposals were similarly revised and occasionally defeated. Calvin has
been called the " undisputed" dictator of Geneva.27 Any consideration of the
activities of the Councils is sufficient to show that this is certainly an
exaggeratio n, for Calvin was even reprimanded upon occasion. While he did
seek to eliminate opposition, usually through persuasion, the effort was
directed toward accomplishing what the most learned citizens of the city
deemed best. While the number of citizens burned and expelled is appalling,
it is necessary to keep in view that the civil authorities tried and executed such
acts.
Similarly, Calvin did not exercise exclusive control over the schools, but
The state's
responsibility was divided between church and state. 28
responsibility was control and provision of support, while the educatio n was
definitely for the benefit of the church and only indirectly for the slate.
As a result of this system of relatio ns, the first schools established were
the vernacular schools which were scattered about the city under the direction
of Saunier, as previously noted. In these schools the children were taught to
read and write French, and the rudiments of arithmetic necessary for daily
transactions. After Calvin clearly understood that family teaching of the
catechism was not effective, the schools also taught it.29 The pasto rs
recognized that success in developing a strong church was difficult with an
uneducated laity.30 This was the core of the contribution of Calvin and
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Geneva to education: the responsibility of the state to promote literacy by
providing schools.
Calvin soon recognized the advantages of more advanced instruction for
the pastors. H e circulated a prospectus in 1537 for a higher school.31
Following his expulsion and stay in Strassbourg, the proposal was revised in
the light of his experiences with Sturm and presented in 1541, as previously
noted. U nder this regulation Sebastian Castellio revived the College de la
Rive between 1542 and 1544.32 The document of 1559 was a formalization or
revision of the school system, including the reduction of the vernacular schools
to four, and the founding of the Academy.
William Boyd indicated that the early progress of the College did not
satisfy Calvin, so in 1556 he returned to Strassbourg to evaluate Sturm's school
again with an eye to improving his own.33 Calvin did not slavishly follow
Sturm, fo r there were only seven classes instead of ten, and Calvin used the
vernacular in the four lower classes, where Sturm had pressed for the
exclusive use of Latin. The difference in number of classes may be explained
by the fact that Sturm had no antecedent vernacular schools as Calvin did.
While Cicero was still prominent at Geneva, Calvin placed less emphasis upon
his works than did Sturm . During Sturm's lifetime his school overshadowed
Calvin's efforts, but Calvin was able to achieve more lasting results. 34
In 1558, the Council approved a plot of ground for a permanent location
for the college and academy. Calvin solicited gifts and effectively encouraged
the inclusion of the schools in wills. The partially completed building was
dedicated and put into use under the forms of the 1559 Ordres, although it was
not finished until 1563.35 The academy was not divided into classes as the
college was. There were no promotions and no degrees. Students were given
attendance certificates and character references. Gifts and government fu nds
allowed the instruction to be free. Arts and theology faculties existed in
Calvin's day, and law and medicine were added after his death.36 Before he
died, Calvin was able to place the academy upon firm foundations.
The three levels of schools, the three separate fou nding dates, and
different leaders such as Saunier, Castellio and Theodore de Beza have caused
confusion among educational historians. Other problems appear as well, fo r
example, Frederick Mayer, in a standard history of education, listed the
courses taught in the academy and included mathematics, although this was
not mentioned in the Ordre, as was the rest of his list. 37 This may have
resulted from Calvin's having a well-known mathematician on the faculty, even
though he was teaching philosophy. Similarly, Calvin has often been gently
chided for being deductive, even though Francis Bacon was four years old
when Calvin died. Cordier has often been cited as rector of Geneva's schools,
although there is no evidence that he ever had the position of leadership.38
Discipline has been called severe in the schools, and it was, compared to the
permissive classroom, but compared to the sixteenth century, it was mild.39
One of the most significant contributions that Calvin made to the schools
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was the recruiting of good teachers. Since the essential purpose of education
in Geneva was the religious preparation of the people for service to the church
and the city, the Ordinances of 1541 included the teachers under the same
discipline as the ministers. They had not only to be adequate pedagogues, but
theologically learned and orthodox as well. While this seems restrictive to the
present age, it was not unusual then. In addition to Saunier and Cordier,
another significant addition was Castellio, who served as headmaster of the
college, but whose quarrelsomeness led to difficulties. He resigned because of
an inadequate salary, and sought a pastorate. He was found to have a mildly
heretical view of the Song of Solomon and the creed, and was denied the
pastorate.40 H e developed a deep resentment toward Calvin, whom he felt
was responsible for his problems, and in May 1544 he accused the ministers of
being guzzlers and licentious, charges he could not prove. For this he was
expelled form Geneva and his resentment turned to hate, leading to attacks
from distance over the following years.41 Calvin exercised some moderation
here, for the usual result of heresy was death. Fewer problems resulted from
Calvin's efforts to staff the academy in the late 1550s. After failing to secure
some outstanding French scholars he wished, growing problems at Lausanne
led Beza to move to Geneva. A short time later Calvin gained several faculty
from the academy at Lausanne who had resigned over Bern's assumption of
secular authority over spiritual discipline.42 These men were Calvinists and
gave the academy an instant faculty of repute.
Opinion varies widely among historians regarding the number of students
enrolled in the College and Academy in 1559. The uniformly agreed upon
number from the rector's book is 162, but whether this is both schools or the
academy alone is not clear. Four years later there were 300 enrolled in the
academy and 1200 in the college. From these figures, some scholars have
assumed extremely rapid growth. Alternatively, Paul T. Fuhrm an claims that
the 162 refers to the academy, and that there were approximately 800 enrolled
in the combined schools.43 William Monter supports this, indicating that there
were 280 in the first class of the college, and Emanuel Stickelberger said there
were 900 in the combined schools.44 If these figures are correct, it would
present a more realistic view of growth, doubling over a four year period, and
wo uld also make provision for the fact that the college was functioning prior
to 1559.
Prior to the reorganization, students were primarily from Geneva and
France.45 Following 1559, students began to come from all over Europe.
Many of them were excellent scholars who contributed to the intellectual
ferment in Geneva, and then returned to influence their native lands. Among
the most illustrious were John Knox, the reformer from Scotland; the tutor of
King H enry IV of France; Thomas Bodley, later of Oxford University; Caspar
Olivianus, co-author of the Heidelberg Catechism (with Zacharius Ursinus);
and Marnix of Saint-Aldegonde, a leader of the Dutch revolt against Spain.46
Indirect evidence of the penetration of Calvinistic thought through Geneva's
schools appeared in a 1625 list of eminent men of Louvain, Belgium, one-
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fourth of whom studied in Geneva.47
The value of the schools has been variously assessed. J. G. Compayre has
suggested that the CoUege was little more than a school for the study of
Latin.48 Another has suggested that the primary function was to " ...safeguard
and advance the interest of his particular church .... '"'9 This last statement
distorts the breadth of Calvin's views, but is at least technically correct. Such
expressions, and the claim that Calvin's standards of doctrine " ...naturaUy
limited and crippled the education given ...,"50 raise the question of the
significance of Calvin's progress toward free and useful education, and the
issue of freedom of thought. John T. McNeill, one of the most prolific
modern writers about Calvin, made a fine distinction, suggesting that while
Calvin was not egalitarian he was not necessarily thereby anti-democratic. As
a consequence, at the lower levels, the young had equal educational
opportunity regardless of birth or wealth.51 At the upper levels, since the
education was for church and community leadership, women were not
admitted, and the wealthy or distinguished had an advantage.
Another aspect of the freedom of thought is the assumed Protestant
emphasis upon the right of the individual to interpret the Bible without the
intermediation of the church. Such a manner of stating the problem is not
quite accurate from Calvin's pe rspective. He emphasized the right of
" understanding" more that the right of " interpretation," and the necessity of
correct belief more than freedom of belief. Subordination did not disappear
from Calvin's system; it was directed to correct belief and true spiritual
teachers rather than to Rome. In the light of this, Calvin wrote little about
education to "interpret the Bible," but he did emphasize the necessity of
education so that the Bible could be studied and true interpretation
recognized and understood.
The use of the catechism made clear that, for the majority of citizens, the
learning of specific answers to specific questions was thought the most
effective method of teaching the material needed for the defense of the faith.
Luther had so ably demonstrated the e ffectiveness of the catechism, that both
Calvinists and Catholics adopted the method with little comment.52 The
catechism, the Institutes, expulsions and persecution make clear that there
were definite bounds to freedom of thought in Geneva.
Still another element in the limitation of freedom resulted from Calvin's
view of man. From classical sources the Humanists had adopted the view that
man could raise his estate through education. While Calvin had Humanist
influences in his own educational background, he apparently reacted against
them in a considerable measure, moving beyond the Catholic view that man
could be raised by grace administered through the Church, to a position where
grace administered solely by the will of God was the only hope. For Calvin,
education was not a panacea for solving the ills of the race, but it was still
necessary to educate children concerning their evil state and their obligations
to God. Since Calvin did not regard children as partakers of grace until able
to comorehend it. thev could be esoeciallv evil.
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Because of Calvin's "failure" to understand education in a modern secular
light, some have claimed that he did comparatively little to furt her education,
and that he produced no "new education" independent of the clergy and its
authority.53 This supposedly resulted from a failure to fully grasp the meaning
of private judgment, and thus Calvin failed to apply Protestant principles and
was not fully Protestant.54 This is one of the most glaringly anti-historical
perspectives in modern educational writing, completely missing the theological
consistency of Calvin, and implying that one is not Protestant if the concept of
freedom does not coincide with that based upon four hundred years of
additional thought about the problem.
Nicholas Hans made an apparent error on the opposite extreme; that is,
too favorable to Calvin. He claimed that, while the Calvinist tradition was
"essentially progressive," the appearance of rote use of catechisms in Scotland
was evidence of degeneration " ... into narrow and intolerant dogmatism." 55
This view ignored Calvin's and Luther's use and promotion of catechisms.
A final aspect of the issue of freedom of thought is the different
interpretations of Calvin's willingness to allow the study of science. As
previously noted, physics was present in the curriculum of the college, but
science in the form of medicine did not enter the curriculum of the academy
until after Calvin's death. Calvin opposed astrology and palmistry as inimical
to seeking God's will by more o rthodox means, but, while against some forms
of superstition, he did not necessarily endorse science.56 Some scholars have
asserted that there was implicit in Calvinism an impulse toward free inquiry,
not necessarily obvious in Calvin, but that found fruition in his followers,
leading to the dominance of science by Calvinists as suggested by Robert K.
Merton.57 This is the natural result of the Calvinistic view of natural
revelation combined with the right of the student to freely examine and prove
Calvin did have the
all things, an idea that grew among Calvinists.
mathematician Tagaut as a faculty member shortly after the founding o f the
academy, although he taught philosophy. Copernicus was ignored and John
H olywood (Sacro Bosco) was the thirteenth-century astronomical authority at
Geneva.58 Calvin was more pre-Copernican than anti-Copernican in scientific
matters. Science did not develop am ong the Calvinists until the sense of
professio nalism could be combined with the Calvinist sense of call in the
following century.
The rejection of Calvin's views on method and freedom contributed to the
neglect of his more important co ntribution to the practical provision of the
means to enlist civil support for education.
A SPREADING INFLUENCE
Whatever the limitations of Calvin and his thought, he firmly believed in
spreading the gospel by educating learned and zealous pastors. This was the
goal of Genevan education. The pastors were further taught, at least by
example, that an educated laity was essential to the strong church. As the
Calvinistic influence expanded, the growth of schools was not far behind. The
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Genevan pattern of educating citizen and minister together until the university
level became the normal pattern wherever Calvinistic thought permeated.
While Calvinism is narrow by modern standards, it was based on the new
learning of the time (save the sciences), and thus appeared dynamic and
progressive.
France was the first objective of the Calvinists. Calvin never forgot his
homeland, becoming a Genevan citizen only late in life. His first love outside
Geneva was the French Reformed Church. The majority of early enrollees in
Geneva's schools were French. These students returned to France to
strengthen the growing Huguenot movement. Between 1555 and 1566 a
minimum of 161 pastors returned to France from Geneva. The flood reached
the point that Charles IX asked the magistrates to stop the supply, which
request was refused.59 By 1559, when Calvin wrote the Gallic Confession for
the use of the French Church, the French protestants numbered over
400,000.60 By 1561 there were 2,150 churches.61 When Calvin died in 1564, a
religious war was in progress and persecution growing. Huguenots were
numerous, powerful and in a position to dispute the kingdom with the
Catholics. The Geneva-trained did not seem to advocate subversion, but
persuasively argued the Reformed cause.
The high point of the penetration of Calvinism came with the Edict of
Nantes of 1598. The Huguenots had religious freedom and control of some
two hundred towns where they were able to develop the schools on the lowest
levcls.62 Later they developed thirty-two colleges and eventually eight
Huguenot universities, including the best known at Nimes, Montauba, and
Saumur. The Geneva standards were observed: the poor and the laity were
educated, synods made liberal appropriations for the universities, supervision
of both faculty and students was present, and use was made of the Bible and
the vernacular. 63 Following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the schools
were suppressed and the Huguenots began to flee France. Education in
France among the Protestants never became compulsory, as it had been in
Geneva, on any basis other than a local one. Power was never concentrated
enough for that. The impact upon France was great, but only temporary, and
the longer lasting influences of Calvinistic education came from other
countries.
Calvinism entered to a limited extent into Italy, Austria, Poland, Hungary
and Bohemia, but there is little available evide nce that any lasting
achievements were made in education. Slightly better results were obtained in
the Palatinate, as has been noted, and some of the other German states. The
Palatinate became significant primarily through the universities of Heidelberg
and Marburg, the former the most significant Calvinist university other than
Geneva. It excelled Geneva in law, medicine and philosophy.64 Frederick III,
especially, promoted Calvinism at the university and was responsible for the
authorizing of the Heidelberg Catechism in 1563,65 as well as establishing the
lower schools in each village. In some of the western German states, schools
were established under the German Reformed Church, especially in such
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locations as Strassbourg, Nassau, Bremen, Hesse, Baden and Anhalt.66 These
efforts were modest, and they were eventually absorbed into Lutheranism. An
exception would be the academy at Herborn in Nassau, that attained the
status of a university. Several precursors of modern "no n-scholastic"
educational theory taught there, including the Christian encyclopedist, Johann
Alsted, and John Annos Comenius, the seventeenth-century intellectual leader
of the Czech Brethren, who were the catalysts for igniting the national spirit of
that land. Under the impact of Pietism, this school also became the center of
the foreign missionary efforts of the German Reformed Church in the
eighteenth century, especially through the ministry of Philip Wilhelm
Otterbein. 67
The major development of school systems came in H olland and Scotland,
where compulsory educatio n was adopted on a nationwide scale. In Holland,
where some schools were in existence before the Calvinists came to power, the
Dutch merely adapted these schools to their needs and expanded them to
make them universal. 68 Freeman Butts, the educatio nal historian, indicated:
The Synod of the Hague in 1586 provided for the establishment of
schools in the cities, and the Synod of Dort in 1618 provided for the
establishment in all villages of schools under control of the civil
magistrates, to give free instruction to the poor.69
The salaries of schoolmasters were paid with civil funds.
The middle class had assumed the leadership role in the struggle against
Spain, and Calvinism was found to fit very well with their design o n both
political and religious freedom from Spain. As in Geneva, parents were called
upon to read the Bible and teach the catechism to their ch ildren. The schools
extended religious instructio n as well as the mo re secular elements of
education. Only Reformed Church members could instruct in the schools.70
Pastors were made the superintendents of the schools and were required to
inspect them regularly. Some of the provinces passed school taxes based on
the number of eligible children, and not those actually attending. Eventually
some pastors were designated as truant officers to make sure the children
were in school. 70 Such were some of the familiar innovatio ns that are now
regarded as commonplace. They were developed in response to the needs of
accomplishing the typical Calvinist objectives of educating the citizenry to
carry out their task.
The Calvinist innuence naturally reached the U niversity, as Geneva
became the example for the University of Leiden. Holland became the prime
example of that wedding of Calvinism and middle class mercantilism that
reached fruition in New England. Comenius's views on raising sunken
humanity through education found especially fertile soil in Holland as well.71
Leiden was founded in 1575 and was quickly followed by Franeker,
G roningen, Utrecht and Harderwijk. All were Calvi nistic centers and began
to attract foreign students in the fashion of Geneva, especially as zeal declined
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in Geneva and the center of Calvinism shifted northward. Holland became
the major center for the exporting of Calvinism.73
A national system of education also developed in Scotland. There the
system was more under the influence of one man, John Knox, as had been the
case in Geneva under Calvin. Consequently, education in Scotland seems
more narrow then that in Holland, and more subject to the limitations of
Knox's influence. The Scottish schools were not unnoticed or failing of
influence, but Scotland never became as great a center as Holland in
propagating the faith. Part of this may also be that they were less a sea-faring
and trading people than the Dutch.
As in Holland, the Scottish schools did not have to be started. In the
fifteenth century James I decreed the maintenance of public schools, but little
had been accomplished. The catalyst for Scotland was time John Knox spent
with Calvin in Geneva around 1556.74 Knox observed the relation between
Church and State and the power of the school system capped by the academy.
Such a system, he believed, would promote the reformation in his homeland as
well. Knox advocated educating girls in the same schools, and the right of
every child of talent to any level in the system.75 In 1560 the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church recommended to the Scottish
Parliament that primary schools be established in connection with each
church, and middle schools in every town of importance. Many years passed
before this was realized, but in 1616, 1633 and 1646, laws were passed which
provided for schools in each parish.76 Knox had hoped to finance the schools
from the old church and monastic foundations, but the nobles also had designs
upon that income, and Knox was unsuccessful. Some schools were begun on
the local level during his lifetime; he died in 1572, but the fruition came after
his death. In 1567, Parliament caused the Presbyterian Church to appoint
visitors or superintendents for the existing schools, and when the church was
established in 1592, these visitors became responsible for licensing teachers.n
Presbyteries received the right to tax for the schools in 1640, but exercised the
right in only a limited fashion. In 1646 the erection of schools became
mandatory, a law that was poorly observed.
The influence of Geneva was also apparent in the founding of the
University of Edinburgh. Unlike the medieval autonomy of the faculty and
nations of the medieval university, Edinburgh was placed under the civil
administration and the ministers of the city. This meant much more control of
the curriculum and faculty. The university was intended to serve the Church. 78
The success of the Scottish schools was much longer in coming than in
Holland, and failed to have as much impact subsequently, but it is notable that
the schools that were in existence were nearly as available to the poor as the
rich. There was an egalitarianism that is not quite so apparent in any other
European country.
England was not without the Puritan influence stemming from the
writings of Calvin. The academy was again the pattern for Emmanuel College
....
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adoption of Calvinistic ideas by Thomas Cranmer, and the subsequent
influencing of the Church of England by Calvinism, culminating in the mild
Calvinism of the Thirty Nine Articles. The effects of Calvinism in England
upon education of the very young were less spectacular than Holland and
Scotland. England had much greater difficulty breaking away from the idea
that education was for the wealthy. Religious strife also prevented the
development of a comprehensive system at an early date.
While a survey of the influence of Calvinism upon American schools is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it is necessary to note that the founding
of schools in every parish in New England is a direct influence of the
Calvinism of the early settlers, as were schools in the Carolinas where
Huguenots were settling, and the schools of the Scotch Presbyterians in the
central colonies. These early American colonists were influenced by what they
had seen in Switzerland, Holland and Scotland. The Dutch influenced the
formation of the same kinds of schools in New Netherlands. The strongest
schools, and those broadest based, tended to be in the colonies with the
greatest Calvinist influence. The expansion of education clearly shows the
remarkable influence of one man and the schools he promoted in Geneva.
CONCLUSION
Calvin was extremely influential in developing concepts of Church and
State that provided the means of promoting universal elementary education.
There is a correlation between the presence of Calvinism and the development
of state-supported schools. Calvin wrote little on education, but provided an
example of a working system that spread his theological ideas very effectively.
His contribution appears to have been neglected or ignored because of the
narrowness of his views and the unpopularity in more enlightened ages of the
rigorous pursuit of theological and moral error in Geneva.
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Kaiser, Walter C., Jr. 171e Uses of the Old Testament in the New. Chicago:
Moody Press, 1985. xvi, 270 pp. $12.95, hardback. ISBN 0-8024-9085-9.
Kaiser has written this book essentially in an attempt to demonstrate that
the New Testament's use of the Old Testament is one of objective integrity,
sound and reasonable exegesis, and revelation by the Holy Spirit. As such, his
aim is clearly apologetic--a defense of the infallible and inerrant nature of
Scripture, a position that cannot be maintained, in Kaiser's judgment, by an
interpretation of the New Testament's use of the Old Testament other than by
the one he offers.
Two quotes from the preface illustrate the author's legitimate concerns.
First, Kaiser asks (pp. x-xi): "In their attempt to show that the Messiah and
many of the events in the first century had indeed been anticipated by the Old
T estament writers, have the New Testament writers cited the Old Testament
quotations according to their real truth-intention and original writer's
meaning?" On p. xii, Kaiser presents the alternative: "Or did they so massage
the Old Testament text that it suddenly printed out new meanings previously
unattested, but in the contemporary tradition of rabbinic midrash or Qumran
peslier?" Of course, by framing the options in such a black-and-white
relationship, and by using such patently rhetorical questions, lo say nothing of
emotive phrases like " massage" or "suddenly printed out," Kaiser clearly
indicates his position. Kaiser attempts to buttress his position by identifying
five different types of uses of the Old Testament in the New, including the
apologetic, prophetic, typological, theological and practical uses.
To be faithful lo his hypothesis, there are also certain terms which Kaiser
eschews, some of which are "double meanings" or " multiple meanings" or
se11sus plenior. Conversely, there are other terms with which Kaiser is
enamored. I tried to keep count, but lost track of how many times he uses the
word "single."
While I am deeply appreciative of the author's work, his obvious
homework, and his concern to preserve the integrity of Scripture, I have some
reservations about his effort. In the first place, his handling of 1 Peter 1:10-12
(pp. 18-21) is not convincing. Has not Peter attributed a greater "ceiling" to
the prophet's knowledge about the future other than chronological ignorance?
Second, it is not certain that all of Kaiser's illustrations are correctly
categorized. Why, for example, is Matthew's use of Hosea 11:1 cited as an
illustration of the "apologetic" use of the Old Testament, when it fits the
" typological" category much better? Again, could not Old T estament " rest"
themes be as much "typological" as " theological?" Finally, Kaiser could have
engaged other pertinent matters, such as Paul's reading of the creation story
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and the question of whether Paul added a dimension of interpretation to his
reading of the creation narrative that is at best implicit, but certainly not
explicit. Or again, consideration needs to be given to the three distinctive uses
made by New Testament writers of the Abraham narrative (Paul, James, the
author of Hebrews), and to the question of whether or not such matters were
known to the author of Genesis.
Some words have been left out of a quote on p. 26, and incorrect Hebrew
words appear on p. 82.
The main contribution of Kaiser's book will be to stimulate further
discussion of the New Testament hermeneutic applied to the text of the Old
Testament, and for that we need to thank hir.1.
VICTOR P. HAMILTON
Professor of Religion
Asbury College

Wilmore, Kentucky

Theissen, Gerd. The Shadow of the Galilean: The Quest of the Historical Jesus
in Nan-alive Fann Philadelphia: Forcress, 1987. 212 pp. $9.95, paper.
ISBN 0-8006-2057-7.
The Shadow of the Galilean is an intriguing conjunction of three significant
currents in contemporary New Testament scholarship. First, it brings together
and communicates, in an illuminating and readily accessible way, the fruit of
the application of sociological analysis to the first-century world of Jesus. This
kind of study has already helped us see what it was like to "walk and talk" in
the first century, and this new book draws on those labors in very helpful ways.
Second, it exploits the recent interest in, and itself contributes to, current
efforts at " narrative exegesis." In the author's own words, "the basic structure
of narrative exegesis consists of historical reconstructions of pallerns of
behavior, connicts and tensions, and its superstructure consists of fictitious
events in which historical source material is worked over in a poetic way" (p.
19). Finally, this is a creative contribution to the quest of the historical Jesus.
Methodological discussions related to this " narrative" approach to the quest
appear regularly, though without disrupting the now of the narrative.
What Theissen offers the reader is a story whose main character is an
educated, relatively wealthy, Jewish merchant--one Andreas, son of John.
Through misfortune, Andreas is arrested by the Romans in Jerusalem, then
released on the condition that he serve as a spy for Pilate. As the narrative
un folds, we sec ancient Palestine--its religious, economic, political and social
realitics--through the eyes of a Jew struggling to make sense of his faith in the
face of the ambiguities resulting from centuries of Hellenistic influence and,
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more recently, from Roman occupation. Through his experiences, we are
introduced to a gang of freedom fighters, Sadducees, Essenes, John the
Baptist, and others, including Jesus, each with their options for faithful living
in a strained world.
As the title suggests, we never quite meet Jesus face-to-face in Theissen's
story: our information is always second-hand. Nevertheless, we are enabled to
see something of the way " real people" in the early part of the first century
A.D. might have responded to Jesus. Thus, we are brought face-to-face with
the promise of Jesus, and the problem of Jesus, for peo ple of his own time.
These windows into the impact of Jesus are fascinating, and themselves make
this book well worth reading.
In this context, it is notable how optimistic Theissen seems to be with what
we can know of Jesus of Nazareth. He appears to believe that already during
Jesus' own ministry people of many walks of life knew his message; they
recited his parables and teachings and told stories of his miracles to one
another. At the same time, however, Theissen is able to show how, even from
early o n, certain aspects of J esus' ministry were being interpreted differently
or developed alo ng surprising lines.
It is true that at times the story suffers from the appearance of artificiality,
with Theissen's characters too obviously being used to communicate
Theissen's lecture notes. And we might wo nder at some points whether
Theissen has left us too much in the dark about the contours of Jesus' life and
message. Nevertheless, this is an important book precisely for the way it
paints the background of J esus' world and shows how o rdinary people of
ancient Palestine, whether poor or rich, would have received J esus' message.
Thfa is a book that deserves a wide readership, including discussion by small
groups.
JOEL B. GREEN
Acting Dean and Assistant Professor of New Testament
New College for Advanced Christian Studies
Berkeley, California

Kugel, James L. and Rowan A. Greer. Early Biblical Interpretation. Library of
E arly Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986. 214 pp. Select
Bibliography (Kugel) and Notes (Greer). Scripture Index.
ISBN 0-6642-1907-1.
The third volume in the Library of Early Christianity series, edited by
Wayne M eeks of Yale University, actually unites two self-contained
monographic studies under one cover. James L. Kugel, who has written not
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o nly as a biblical scholar b ut also as an historian of Jewish biblical
inlerprelalio n, analyzes J ewish biblical inlerprelalion fro m the exilic period lo
the turn of the era, while Rowa n Greer, a distinguished scho lar of early
Christianity, takes the measure of patristic exegesis. Though each essay could
stand on its own, they nevertheless converge on so many points that they
provide a coherent and concise account of early biblical interpretation which
would be useful mainly to seminarians and ministers, tho ugh biblical scholars
ignorant of how t he Bible was read prior to the nineteenth century (and they
are many!) will find here an excellent introduction.
Kugel's essay argues fo r the essential continuity between early and late
for ms of Jewish interpretation, and rightly lo..:ates the birth of interpretation in
the emergence of texts, as opposed lo events or oral t radition, as the locus of
religious authority. A stable collection of sacred literature generates the
necessity of interpretation out of its increasing distance from the reading
community. Kugel outl ines how the need for interpretatio n arose and the
fo rms il look, concl uding with an insightful study of how selected J ewish
exegetes approached certain texts. This last section is worth the entire study.
Kugel demonstrates convincingly that, however strange early exegesis appears
to moderns, it nevertheless constitutes a close hearing of the biblical text
worthy of scru tiny. A selecl bibliography concludes Kugel's contribution.
Greer's essay, like Kugel's, recognizes the consolidatio n o f a stable, if nol
absolutely closed, collection of sacred writings as the key to the birth of an
exegetical traditio n, and so offers a theological analysis o f the appearance of
th e "Christian Bible," referring not merely to the New Testament canon, but
to th e peculiar shape of the Christian Script ure as a two-testament unity. This
Bible, he argues, "is the product o f the for mative period o f early C hristianity"
and is a "central feature of [ea rly ecu meni cal] unity" (p. 111 ). The central
questio n faced by early Christian theologians was how the Jewish Scriptures
(OT) might serve as a witness to Ch rist. It was, therefore, an explicitly
theological undertaking, as o pposed to the primarily histo rical and/ or literaryacsthetic concerns of modern interpretation. G reer then outlines how the
predecesso rs of Irenaeus used the H ebrew Bible to art iculate the Christian
message. It was in the writings of lrcnacus, though, th at a clea r fram ework of
interpretatio n developed, namely, the " Rule of Faith." Greer is at his best
here, demolishing the idea that th e Rule of Faith was an ideo logical grid
forced onto an unwill ing text, and demonstrating its positive fun ction of
preserving, on the o ne hand, the particul arity and pastness of the H ebrew
Scriptures, wh ile asserting, o n th e other hand, the Christi an claim that th e
story of Israel (the OT) comes to completio n in the sto ry o f Jesus. Finally,
Greer points o ut th at the e ntire enterprise of interpretation arises precisely
because the Rule o f Faith only establishes a general theological framework
without dictating the methods or conclusions on any given text. The Rule thus
warrants, indeed demands, interpretation of the Bible fo r its own sake.
Both of these essays arc well writlen, and despite their being interm ediate
introd uctory works, they advance distin ctive lines of argum en t and o ffer fresh
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readings of important primary texts. No person concerned about the role of

biblical interpretation in Christian theology should overlook this important
book.
LAWSON G. STONE
Assistant Professor of O ld Testament
Asbury Theological Seminary

Stambaugh, John E., and Balch, David L. The New Testament in its Social
Environment. Library of Earliest Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster,
1986. 194 pp., maps. ISBN 0-664-25012-2
The Library of Earliest Christianity, of which this volume is a part,
attempts to "take down fences" by allowing scholars from various academic
disciplines to bring their distinctive expertise to bear upon the histo ry of firstcentury Christianity. Accordingly, the present work is co-authored by two
men who come to the task from divergent backgrounds. David Balch is a New
T estament scholar, who has written widely in the areas of New Testament
ethics, and the philosophical and rhetorical background of the New
Testament. John Stambaugh is a historian whose work has focused upon the
ancient city and the Roman Empire.
These two scholars direct their significant talents to the production of a
"social history'' of primitive Christianity. They attempt to explore the New
Testament Church from the perspective of sociological studies, along the li nes
of works produced by Gerd Thcissen, Wayne Meeks, and Abraham Malherbe.
The aim of the present volume is descriptive, and ideologically neutral: the
autho rs wish only to " understand" the early Christian communities, no t to
"explain them by supposedly universal laws of social behavior." Consequently,
the writers present straightforward discussions of the historical background of
the period, the relationship between first-century mobility and the Christian
missio n, economic history, society in Palestine, first-century city life, rounded
off with a chapter that attempts to tie all of this together under the rubric of
"Christianity in the Cities of the Roman Empire."
There is much to commend this volume. The sociological study of firstcentury Christianity holds great promise for enhancing our understanding of
the New Testament and of the Christian faith in general. The present volume
directs this study to the whole of primitive Christianity, not just to specific
communities or particular dimensions of first-century Christian life (such a
restricted focus characterizes most works on the socio logical background of
primitive Christianity). Mo reover, the writers present technical information
and complex issues in a remarkably clear and easy-to-read fashion. And the
annotated "suggestio ns for further reading" at the back of the book are
extremely helpful.
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In spite of these positive considerations, the book is generally a
disappointment. For one thing, there is a lack of integration and cohesiveness.
The individual chapters stand virtually independent of o ne another; and the
final chapter falls far short o f providing the kind of synthesis the writers
promise fo r it. One wonders if this is not a result of dual aut horship (although
certai nly a result which could have been avoided). The reader can identify with
virtual certainty those portions written by Balch and those by Stambaugh, but
the reader will have difficulty discerning the connections between these
portions.
Furthermore, there is too much rehearsing of the well-known history of
the period. Almost all o f this info rmation can be found in histories of the New
T estament or works on New Testament background. Indeed, so much
historical recounting is included that it r aises doubts regarding the need for
this volume. Although there are certain sociological emphases in this book,
there is little included here that does not appear in major works dealing with
the history of the period.

A more substantive criticism involves the issue of meaning. In their
attempt lo remain "descriptive" and neutral, the authors fail to explo re the
meani ng o f this background for the understanding of the first-century church
or the interpretation of the New Testament. The reader must be satisfied with
occasional indicatio ns as to the way in which a custom o r social form illumines
an iso lated New Testament passage. Unfortunately, in the process the writers
tend lo engage in questionable exegesis in order to show relevance for New
Testament passages.
When all is considered, this volume can be recommended only with great
reservations.
DA VlD R. BAUER
Associate Professor o f English Bible
Asbury Theological Seminary

Applebee, Denis. When I Tread th e Verge of Jordan. Marion, Indian a: World
Gospel Mission, 1988. 78 pp. ISBN 0-9620406-2-2.
This book contains live lectures given in 1988 at Wesley Biblical Seminary
for the Ray W. and Marianne E. Chamberlain Holiness Lectures. The author
is a well known and highly respected pastor, evangelist and educator among
the more conservative Wesleyan holiness churches in Great Britain and the
U nited States. H e recently taught at Wesley Biblical Seminary as an adjun ct
professor and previously taught at Emmanuel College in England. He is
presently the international pastor of the World Gospel Mission wh ose
headquarters are in Marion, Indiana.
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These lectures are a really fine devotional study of the Christian life.
Their intent is to present the Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification as a
crisis experience in a more intelligible and biblical way than has often been
done by Wesleyan writers who allegedly often ignore the context of Scripture
in treating the biblical texts on holiness. The author recognizes that his
approach will be controversial because he departs from his holiness-Wesleyan
tradition at some very crucial points, but he is willing to do this because it is
obviously better lo be biblical than " orthodox." Consequently, he admits that
his perceptions are not intended to be representative of the seminary where he
delivered these lectures.
This reviewer found these lectures to be warm, personal and inspiring.
They fit into the category of literature which is now being called spiritual
formation. The author's approach is to take both an Old Testament and a
New Testament passage, to view them contextually within the history of
salvation, and then to relate them to the believer's spiritual life in practical
terms. The author's style of writing and emphases re nect his pastoral
concerns and experience. His grasp of the theological issues also renects his
experience as an educator and teacher.
I was especially impressed with the basic soundness of his approach which
describes the New Testament understanding of sanctification in the light of
the Old T estament language of Canaan La nd.
His reasoning a nd
interpretation of key biblical passages were solid and insightful.
H owever, I felt disappointed at some rather key points in his
reinterpretation of the Wesleyan view of entire sanctification. First, I must
confess that I felt a bit suspicious when he placed "orthodox" Wesleyan
thinking against his new interpretation of the doctrine of holiness. Theology is
an always-developing discipline because of the need to restate the message in
terms understandable to every new generation; but the author is suggesting
that not only is there a need for restating the doctrine of holiness for today,
but also that there has been a serious deficiency in the way that it was
traditionally understood. Being a teacher of Wesleyan theology myself, I
naturally read with keen interest to see just how the Wesleyan tradition had
been incorrect in one of its key doctrines.
I believe the author failed to make his case at some very crucial points.
First and fo remost is his own misunderstanding of the doctrine of sin. H e
obviously once labored with a misconception which implied that sin was a
physical-like thing which occupied one's personhood and which was eradicated
when one was filled with the Holy Spirit. Seeing the difficulties of this
interpretation which he erroneously allributes to the Wesleyan tradition, the
author repudiates any such notion that sin is something which is " cleansed"
during the crisis experience of entire sanctification. In fact, he reinterprets a
Pauline passage which has reference to "the body of sin" as if Paul is talking
about the physical body (pp. 44-45) . The tone of his arguments is to downplay
the " cleansing" element and to stress instead the element of separation unto
r.n<f. This is r.snr.ri;i llv nnlirr.:1hlr. in his <lisrnc;c;inn nf ri rrnmric:inn n f h P,.rt
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He denies that the rite of circum cision was al all associated with the meaning
of cleansing. This is a most remarkable position and clearly deviates fro m the
universal consensus of biblical scholarship. And it clearly stands over against
the theology of John Wesley in whose traditio n the author supposedly stands.
Clearly " uncleanness" and an uncircumcised heart are used interchangeably in
Scripture. That is why the prophets called upon Israel " to circumcize the
fo reskins of your heart" (Jer 4:4). That is why Moses told the Israelites that
not until the Lo rd had circum cised their hearts wo uld they be enabled to love
Him perfectly (Deut 30:6). The association of circumcision with cleanness is
unmistakable (see Isa 52:1 and Lev 19:23). Just as the " flesh" which was
excised in circumcision symbolized an inherited im purity, so the New
Testament particularly uses the imagery of " flesh" to speak of sin. That is why
Paul talks about the new circumcision as liberating the believer from the
"flesh" (Col 2:11). The " flesh" does no t refer to the physical body in these
instances, but it is a metaphorical way of speaking of sin and is derived from
the ancient practice of the physical circumcision of the inherited " flesh" which
symbolized impurity.
The author's misinterpretation of sin comes dangerously close to
embracing a modernized form of Pelagianism on the one hand, whereas his
emphasis u pon "separatio n unto God" as constituting the essence of the
sanctified life places him mo re within the Keswick movement than the
Wesleyan tradition. Indeed the author g ives the Baptist preacher and author,
J . Sidlow Baxter, much credit for his way of reinterpretating the Wesleyan
doctrine of holiness. I have pe rsonally read with great interest the writings of
Baxter and have fou nd them, in many ways, parallel to the Wesleyan
perspective. T his reviewer, however, finds Baxter's interpretation of the
theology of John Wesley quite defective and inaccurate in many instances,
even th ough Baxter's emphasis on ho liness is otherwise helpful at many points.
Wesley, like Augustine, Luther and Calvin, interpreted the essence of
original sin to be pride. This is a real condition in which everyone is born and
only by God's grace can it be remedied. When Wesley talked about a
cleansing from the being of sin, he was sim ply using the pictorial and concrete
language of Scripture which mctapb orically describes original sin as a " root"
(H eb 12:15) or a "dwelling-in-me" entity which P aul cried out to be liberated
fro m (R om 7:20).
Classical theo logy described sin as " not-being" because "being" was
ident ified with what is true, good and beautiful. So if one wished to speak
q ui te literally about sin, it is " not-being" in the sense that sin is distorted anc!
depraved being, and not-true being. But the language of Scripture does not
use such phi losophically precise categories; rather, it describes experience in
concrete and fu nctional language, such as picturing sin as if it were a root or
someth ing that dwells in us which needs to be cleansed.
The author is quite right in rejecting th e view that sin is literally a thing
which could be ext racted like a decayed tooth, but he confuses the issue when
he suggests that Wesleyan theology holds to such a view. It m ay be that many
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have thought of it in these terms, but this is surely not the representative
position of W esleyan theology.
As a consequence of a serious
misunderstanding of a Wesleyan view of sin, the author misinterprets the
meaning of cleansing as it relates to Wesley's doctrine of entire sanctification.
An ironic situation emerges as the author finds himself trying to steer a course
between the Pelagian trap of downplaying the nature of original sin on the one
hand, and embracing a Keswick emphasis on "separation" as opposed to
cleansing from sin on the other hand.
Inasmuch as the author opts for an emphasis o n separation instead of
cleansing, be has embraced Baxter's emphasis on entire sanctification as
meaning separation to God. Baxter frequently uses the terms "entire
sanctification," but he defines it as denoting primarily loving God with all the
heart by living a separated and committed life, but he rejects Wesley's
emphasis o n cleaning from sin. How someone can love God with all their
heart while retaining the original sin of pride in their heart at the same time is
not explained by Baxter.
This author's apparent acceptance of Baxter's view of sanctification is a
rather surprising development considering the fact that the autho r is obviously
representing the World Gospel Mission, an international missionary society,
which is committed confessionally to " the spread of Scriptural holiness over
the lands" in good Wesleyan fashion. I would imagine that the author does
not really see himself as differing from the theological confession of the World
Gospel Missio n, but rather as trying to restate the doctrine of holiness in ways
If so, this is indeed
which will better communicate the message.
commendable. But to do this effectively, a more adequate understanding of
the meaning of cleansing from sin as understood from within the Wesleyan
tradition needs to be forthcoming.
Despite these critical remarks, I pe rsonally e njoyed reading this
thoughtful and helpful devotional treatise on the meaning of the holy life. IL is
an important contribution to the growing body of recent literature in spiritual
formatio n.
LAURENCE W. WOOD
The Frank Paul Morris Professor of Christian Doctrine
Asbury Theological Seminary

Butler, Trent, C. Word Biblical Commentary: Joshua. Waco, Texas: Word
Books, 1983. xiii, 304 pp. $22.95. ISBN 0-8499-0206-1.
Over a decade ago, Brevard C hilds complained that m odern
commenta ri es of Joshua have concentrated o n the histo rical and
archaeological issues of the book while largely ignoring its theological
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dimension (Old Testament Books for Pastor and Teacher [Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1977], pp. 44-45). The appearance of Trent Butler's
commentary represents a significant correction to that tendency. H e has
written a scholarly work which, while alert to historical questions, primarily
focuses upon the meaning of Joshua as God's word in its contemporary
setting. He believes the book of Joshua to be a key toward unlocking a host of
literary and theological problems in Old Testament studies.
His attention to literary criticism and theology are doubtless the result of
his educatio nal background, which includes a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt
U niversity and post-doctoral study at the U niversities of Heidelberg and
Z urich.
Influenced by Martin Noth, Butler adopts the position that Joshua is part
of the Deuterono mistic historical work comprising Deuteronomy, Joshua,
Judges, Samuel and Kings. This work utilized earlier material and traditions,
but reached its final shape during the exile. As such, it bears the theological
stamp of that period. Methodologically, Butler employs th e tools of literary
criticism (form, tradition and redaction criticism) to recover both these earlier
traditions and the various stages in their compilat io n. The result is an
interpretation which endeavors to understand the traditions in their original
setting and as the final product of Deuterono mistic redaction. In its canonical
form Butler understands the boo k as a message to the exiles in Babylo n.
Published in the Word Biblical Commentary series, this book follows its
distinctive fo rmat. The exegesis of each textual unit consists of an initial
bibliography, original translatio n of the text, textual notes, form-critical and
literary analysis, verse by verse commentary and, finally, an explanation of the
overall significance of the unit. Though sometimes cumbersome and prone to
produce repetitio n, this for mat allows the commentary to be read on several
levels. The translatio n, comments and explanation will be accessible to the
student or pastor, whereas scholars will appreciate the full range of material
presented. The bibliographics arc especially comprehensive, including works
in all scholarly languages.
The introduction is concise, yet presents a useful review of recent
scholarship on Joshua. Butler's survey of literary critical wo rk sets the
commentary in the context of the Alt-Noth school. R ather than the traditional
rubric "Theology," another introductory section is entitled, "The Meaning of
the Material." Here Butler o utlines what he views as the four major
theo logical concerns in Joshua: Land, Leadership, Law and Lord. These fo ur
themes, especially the first two, recur throughout the commentary, a nd arc
understood as a message of hope to the landless exiles in Babylon looking for
new leadership aft er the model of Joshua; someone who will reestablish them
as the people of God's covenant. Other introductory essays include the
form ation of the book, the concept of an Israelite amphictyony and the
relation of archeology to the book.
There is a legitimate question which should be asked of Butler's
commentary: In what sense is it evangelical? According lo the edito rs of the
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series, "The broad stance of our contributors can rightly be called evangelical,
and this term is to be understood in its positive, historic sense of a
commitment to scripture as divine revelation, and to the truth and power of
the Christian gospel" (p. ix). Butler does adopt somewhat conservative
positions on certain issues, but broadly speaking his commentary is much
more in line with J. A. Soggin's commentary (Joshua. OTL. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1972.) than the decidedly conservative volume of M. H.
Woudstra (171e B ook of Joshua. NICOT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981.),
who argues that Joshua was composed soon after the events by a single hand.
Because there is no established tradition regarding the composition of J oshua,
as is the case with the Pentateuch, Butler fe.els free to break out of the
hermeneutical constraints imposed by some conservative circles. Yet at the
same time, throughout the book he reveals explicitly and implicitly his
commitment to the divine origin and authority of Scripture. He does not find
literary criticism and its results incompatible with a high view of inspiration.
He expresses this when discussing Deuteronomistic editing of the book: "The
criteria for authority and canonicity in the OT is not that of having been an
eyewitness of the events. Rather, it is that of having been inspired by God to
use the traditions of the nation to interpret the identity of the nation for the
fu ture" (p. 117).
Although some within the circle of Evangelicalism may disagree with
Butler's approach and methodology, there is no doubt that he has produced a
commentary which reflects extensive research and reflection. It does not
always break new ground, but what it may lack in originality is compensated
fo r by its breadth of scholarship and depth of interpretation. It is a welcome
addition to the literature and will serve a wide audience for many years as an
example of thorough commentary writing and careful, theological exegesis of
the book of Joshua.
OWEN DICKENS
Assistant Professor of Religion
Asbury College
Wilmore, Kentucky

Croatto, J. Severino Biblical Henneneutics: Toward a Theory of R eading as
the Production of Meaning. Translated by Robert R. Barr. Maryknoll,
New York: Orbis, 1987. x+ 94 pp. ISBN 0-88344-583-2 (original),
0-88344-582-4 (paper).
The last two decades have marked a perceivable shift in the ways the
he rmeneutical task is conceived and pursued, with new literary-critical
methods moving into the spotlight. In this process, older, more traditional
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approaches (e.g., form and redaction criticism) have often been questioned,
sometimes marginalized or even discarded. After briefly surveying the major
phases of philosophical hermeneutics and outlining interpretive optio ns
championed among modern interpreters, Croatto develops a biblical
hermeneutic clearly at home with these newer, reader-oriented approaches.
The book's orientation to the pastor and student is manifest in its clearly
elabo rated use of " in-house" language and its helpful glossary.
In the view of Croatto, the discipline of hermeneutics must embrace three
related phenomena--the primacy of the text, the preunderstanding of the
reader and the enlargement of the text through reading and re-reading.
H ence, the interpreter is not so much concerned with the backgr ound of a
text, or the intentions of the author, but, first, with the text as text. He argues
that because we read a text, not an author, the text is open to a plurality of
meanings. The real focal shift, however, is to the "forward" of the text--i.e.,
what it suggests as a pertinent message for the one who receives it. In this
rereading, the plurality of possible meanings is narrowed; a closure of

meaning occurs whereby the text speaks in the present as God's word.
Crucial to this herm eneutical understanding, therefore, is the notion of
process; both the process by which biblical texts have come to us in the canon
(which provides its own closure of meaning), but also the process whereby the
reader engages the text in a fertile rereading. The hermeneutical process
itself, the production of meaning, is a part of the biblical message. The
legitimacy of this approach is worked out with reference both to philosophical
hermeneutics and to the ways in which the Bible interprets itself. T raditional
ideas of inspiration and cano n also come in for discussion, and in helpful ways.
The one major proviso I would mention upon refl ectio n on Croatto's
approach has to do with his constan t emphasis on the plurality of meanings of
a text. He himself is cognizant of the potential "anything-goes-ism" in his
model, and, at one point, insists on the urgency of sit uating the text in its
proper context by means of historical-critical methods. But this stands as little
mo re than a foot note in the development of his model, and we are left
wondering about the place of these traditional models (or even newer
sociological approaches) in the herm eneutical process he envisages.
Clearly, Croatto is interested in a more creative and relevant reading of
the Bible. And this little book should be of help to those who share this
interest.

JOEL B. GREEN
Acting Dean and Assistant Professor of New T estament
New College for Advanced Christian Studies
Berkeley, California
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Spirit and Intellect: Thomas Upham 's Holiness Theology,

Studies in Evangelicalism, vol. 7, Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow, 1986.
278 pp. $27.50. ISBN 0-8108-1899-X.
Darius L. Salter's study of Thomas Cogswell Upham (1799-1872),
refreshingly avoids hagiographic tendencies of religious biography and reveals
a man thoroughly immersed in the thought-patterns of mid-nineteenth-century
America. Salter, professor of pasto ral theology al Western Theological
Seminary and former executive director of the Christian Holiness Associatio n,
does not regard U pham's philosophy to be novel. He traces the background
of Upham's ideas to Locke and to Scottish common-sense philosophers.
U pharn's psychology, also eclectic, came about through temperam ental quirks
th at led him to seek spir itu al answers in mysticism a nd Wesleyan
perfectionism. Not "ahead of his time," Upham was, like many of his
contemporaries, a "systematizer" of ideas. Chrono logically, he furnished a
half-way house between Jonathan Edwards's speculative philosophy and
William James's empirical investigations.
Salter argues that Thomas Upham 's unique contribution to Ame rican
psychology and philosophy was his argument for freedom of the will which
provided the theologica l turn whi ch helpe d him mo ve fr o m hi s
Congr egatio nalist training in New England theology to Phoebe Palmer's
Wesleyan perfectionism. Yet it was not Upham so much as it was his era that
created his tho ught patterns. U pham, who lived at the confluence of
transcendentalism, romanticism and unitarianism, represents a spiritual
proto type of his age. As well as anyone he merged holiness theology and
transcendental ro manticism. " Free will, impartation, accent on God's
benevolence, the antebellum era's increasing romantic naivete" met in
U pham's perfectio nism. This era also produced ecclesiastical democratization
as the laity took over the altar fro m the clergy.
Salter is at his best as he sets the stage for U pham's intellectual-spiritual
shift by presenting the historical background of the American idea of a
benevolent God as the basis fo r a mid-nineteenth-century benevolent empire
of social reform. Timothy Smith called this arrangement "a ho ly happiness, a
happy ho liness." According to Upham, "G od's happiness is the contemplation
of the holiness and happiness of his creatures." In Scottish common-sense
philosophy, Upham found a philosophical machine: "Where there is perfect
liberty... there is perfect harmo ny, but there cannot be perfect harm ony, nor
harm ony in any degree without law." Upham's God circumscribed himself by
the mo ral laws of his own creation.
Where Upham deviated from orthodox eighteenth-century W esleyanism,
Salter accredits the departure to a "naturalistic optimism that Wesley's more
definite concept of depravity did not allow hi m to share." Or was it, to stay
with Salter's earlier analysis, Wesley's less optimistic age that innuenced the
fo und er of Method ism in th e directio n of depravity?
Upham saw
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sanctification more as a positive aspect of union with God than as a cleansing.
In chapter five, on "Mysticism," Salter provides another discussio n of
Upham's deviance from orthodoxy, and in footnote no. 87 he quotes Timothy
Smith's superb explanatio n that Upham joined Wesleyanism to mysticism in
order to bridge the gap between Christian piety and transcendentalism in his
own era.
The effect of the Holiness Movement was to elevate nineteenth-century
Christian social ethics. (Salter shares Donald Dayton's argument that early
twentieth-century campmeeting proliferation reflected an escapist mentality
among Wesleyans.) In both ethics and psychology, Upham was an optim ist, a
proponent of national and individual progress.
Sanctificatio n, a n
instantaneous act of grace, freed man from conscious sin and, over time, co uld
purge him of acquired habits.
In his final chapter, Salter outlines Benjamin B. Warfield's (1851-1921)
objections to Upham's dtysticism, Arminianism and perfectionism. The
purpose is to contrast these two common-sense philosophers of adjoining eras.
Also, Warfield wrote the lo ngest critique of Upham, published in 1931. But
this chapter detracts from Salter's emphasis on Upham as a product of his
time. If Upham's theology was temporally based, then criticism by Warfield,
who was hardly a contemporary, is only slightly useful. To keep from
detracting from his thesis that Upham (and by association, Wesleyan
perfectionism) was a product of mid-nineteenth-ce ntu ry inte llectua l
movements, Salter should have placed this Warfield material in some other
place than his concluding chapter.
This first definitive monograph on Upham is part of the Stud ies in
Evangelicalism series edited by Kenneth E. Rowe and Donald W. Dayton, a
series which represents new confidence among Holiness Movement scho lars.
T he book is the child of a 1983 Drew University dissertation on "Thomas
Upham and Nineteenth Century Holiness Theology." If the book has stylistic
weaknesses, they are the note-to-note dissertation mode and the assumptio n
that its audience recognizes the name of Upham's Wesleyan mentor, Phoebe
Palmer, without benefit of a biogr aphical note. Its endnotes are a gift to
Upham students and the diction is improved by an occasional sprightly phrase,
such as: " Newtonian physics had taken some of the transcendence out of God,
or at least, put the upstairs office within commuting distance." This is an
important contribution to an understanding of the mid-ninetee nth-century
evangelical mind.
NORMAN M URDOCH
Associate Professor of History
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, O hio
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Kittel, Gerhard and Gerhard Friedrich, eds. Theological Dictionary of the New

Testament. Abridged ed. Bromiley, Geoffrey, tr. from German. Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1985. xxxvi, 1356 pp.
Paper, ISBN 0-8028-2402-9; Hardback, ISBN 0-8028-2402-9.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley has produced a long-awaited, one-volume edition
of " Kittel." This abridgement is handier and more affordable and manageable
than the original multi-volume set. The strength of Bromiley's desk-top copy,
however, is that the serious scholar can use it as a handy reference work, or as
an index to the voluminous unabridged set. For example, whereas the threeparagraph treatment of eudia (fragrance) may lead scholars to the multivolume set, the eighteen-page treatment of /ego (to speak) would probably
suffice.
Fo r many acade micians, de nominational leaders and clergy this
abridgement will supplant the popular unabridged " Vine's." Comparatively
speaking, Bromiley's textual arrangement presents a less-congestive reference
work which orchestrates spacious subheading, full-sentence explanations and
tangential derivations. He wisely buttresses his theological etymologies with
descriptions of classical prototypes and contemporary secular parallels.
Nonetheless, the publisher's assertion that Bromiley presents "a convenient
and portable reference tool" is perhaps a mild overstatement: convenient and
resourceful, yes, put a portable " Liddell and Scott" it is not.
The publication of Bromiley's abridgement could not have been more
timely. A myriad of scholars from various types of institutions have shown a
renewed interest in American southern religion, thereby magnifying the role
of good reference works. The public exchange between Eugene D. Genovese
and Southcrnists illustrates this point well (Miami University's Symposium on
Southern History, 1988). The Marxist Southernist vividly and convincingly
relayed the importance of proslavery antebellum sermons as primary
resources (see The Mind of the Master Class. fo rthcoming, Norton).
However, Genovese's use of doulos (slave), as used by nineteenth-century
clergy, was hermeneutically in question. The doulos of the American South
had a much bleaker existence than his Greco-Roman counterpart. Bromiley's
succinct four-page representation of doulos clarifies the issue. Incidentally,
" Vine's" does not even represent doulos, listing only soma under the rubric
"slave" ! The latter represents an unfortunate reliance on English translations,
an error poignantly noted by Edwin Yamauchi ("Slaves of God," Bulletin of
the Evangelical 111eological Society, 9.1 [1966):43).
Whereas theological dictionaries are found primarily in the offices of
theologians and clergy, the renewed interest in century-old sermons will
necessitate their usage by a plethora of Southernists as well. A perusal of the
foo tnotes in Anne C. Loveland's Southern E vangelicals and the Social Order,
1800-1860 (LSU Press, 1980) will verify this assertion.
Members of the religious orders and history departments alike will
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benefit from Bromiley's well-organized abridgement. Recently, one of
Bromiley's longtime colleagues told me that Bromiley was "omni-competent."
Although this is a flallering overstatement, the new abridgement does
represent a strong commitment to excellent scholarship.

J. ALAN PATIENGALE
Assistant Professor of History
Azusa Pacific University
Azusa, California

Pelikan, Jaroslav. Jesus Through tlze Centuries: His Place in the History of
Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, xi + 270 pp. $22.50

cloth, $8.95 paper. ISBN 0-06-097080-4
Jaroslav Pelikan, Sterling Professor of History al Yale University, studies
the images of Jesus preserved by successive ages, starting from the rabbi of
the first century to the liberator of the twentieth century. Based on the
William Clyde De Vane lectures, Jesus Through the Centuries discerns in each
age an image of Jesus that has been celebrated and received, and reveals how
these images have both shaped and been shaped by culture. Rather than
examining the development of theological doctrine, which he has done in his
771e Christian Tradition , Pelikan presents in rough chro nological order,
eighteen cultural " portraits" of Jesus from the history of humankind, both
Christian and non-Christian. The author studies the poetry and prose, the
painting and sculpture, the mosaic images and rhetorical pictures of Jesus by
which people have expressed his meaning for them in their own time.
Based on the premise that Jesus is the most influential figure in Western
culture, Pelikan presents the images of Jesus as they have appeared
historically. The author believes that the best conceptual fram ework for the
range of images is the classical triad of the Good, the True and the Beautiful,
although there is no consistent application of this framework through the
book. Pelikan contends that in discussing the perception of J esus in the
history of culture, "each successive epoch found its own thoughts in Jesus"
(Schweitzer).
T he earliest Christian communities sought to understand Jesus in relation
to his background in Judaism. From a treatment of Jesus as "Rabbi," the
author turns to the significance of Christ for human history. As "The Turning
Point of History," the Christ-event provided a new interpretation of history, as
the early church adapted the Heilsgeschichte of the OT to the redemption of
humanity accomplished through the death and resurrection of Jesus. Jesus
Christ, as the "Light of the Gentiles," is presented as the common hope for
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the world by second and third century apologists, who perceived him as
anticipated in pagan thought.
Jesus as Lord, in opposition to the lordship of Caesar in the second and
third centuries, is the theme of the chapter entitled " King of Kings." Fourthce ntury metaphysics identified the " Cosmic Christ" as the historical Jesus.
Pelikan astutely notes that theological anthropology was a response to
soteriological and Christological developments. Jesus, portrayed as the "Son
of Man," is not only the image of divinity, but also the image of humanity as it
was originally intended to be.
Against the docetic tendencies of the iconoclasts, Byzantine art and
architecture sought to take seriously the incarnation of Christ--the "True
Image." The author views Medieval art and literature as centered on the
theme of "Christ Crucified." The culture of the Middle Ages was impacted by
the symbol of the Cross as both the "power" and "wisdom" of God. Pelikan
interprets the Medieval monastic movement as maintaining the ideal of the
conquest of the world by Christ through the denial of the world for Christ
("The Monk Who Rules the World"). Jesus as the "Bridegroom of the Soul,"
becomes the object of mystical experience. Francis of Assisi is presented by
the author as the figure who was the apex of the development of Christmysticism and was at the same time the fountainhead for a new appreciation
of the historical Jesus ("The Divine and Human Model").
Pelikan insists that the new concept of humanity that arose in the
Renaissance was not in opposition to the Christian religion, but it was an
understanding of Christian rebirth (renascentia) as .the restoration of human
nature to the original goodness of its creation, and of Jesus as the " Universal
Man." The Reformation is interpreted as an appeal to the authority of the
historical Jesus, and a reaction to the authority of the institutional church.
J esus as the " Mirror of the Eternal," was the revelation of the True, the
Beautiful and the Good. " Prince of Peace" is a chapter devoted to reflection
on the three-fold typology of theories about Jesus and war in the sixteenth
century: just war, crusade and pacifism. J ustification for each of these
positions was sought in the person of J esus.
Jesus was viewed by Rationalists/Deists du ring the Enlightenment of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the "Teacher of Common Sense."
The essence of the gospel was equated with reason and natural religion.
Effort was made to penetrate beneath the Christ of faith to the J es us of
history and the ethic of his teaching. Pelikan interprets nineteenth-century
R omanticism as an attempt to go beyond the quest for the historical Jesus to a
Jesus who could be called the " Poet of the Spirit."
Alongside the conventional portraits of Jesus as the pillar of the status
quo in state and church, the author presents the tradition of those who
perceived him as the " Liberator." Radical confo rmity to the life and death of
J esus, as well as revolutionary obedience to his imperatives, were trademarks
of a tradition that interpreted the teaching of Jesus as a "Christology of
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revolutionary praxis." The expansion of Christian missions in the last two
centuries involved the communication of the person of Christ cross-culturally,
as "The Man Who Belongs to the World." The stress on the universality of
his person and message is seen by some as supplanting the particularity of
Jesus and the absoluteness of his message.
Jesus 111rough the Centuries attempts to acquaint the no nspecialist with
the im port ance of Jesus in the general history of culture, by taking the reader
o n a "quest fo r the symbolic Jesus" as perceived by generations of the
previous two mille nnia. Altho ugh P elika n views culture in broadly
anthropological terms, the images he selects are governed by his theological
priorities. The generalizations and omission.; that are discernible in Pelikan's
selective presentation are to be expected in the writing of such a work. Ample

footnotes provide the reader with a wealth of bibliogr aphic

information for
delving deeper into each subject. Pelikan's lucid and unpretentious style
makes Jesus 171rough the Cenh1ries an invaluable resource for understanding
the place of Jesus in the histo ry of culture. A number of color plates add to
the richness of this volume. Beyond the literary quality and esthetics of this
work, however, the reader is challenged to come to grips with the religio us
images of Christ at work in cult ure.
R . DAVID RIG HTMIRE
Assistant Professor of Religion
Asbury College
Wilmo re, Kentucky

Peck, M. Scott, M.D. 17ze Different Dn1111. New York: Simo n and Schuster,
1987. 334 pp. ISBN 0-671-60192-X.
In this heavily anecdotal record of Dr. Peck's own pilgrim age, we arc
helplessly d rawn into examining our own relationships. Peck divides the book
into three canons: The Foundation, The Bridge and The Solution.
Definitions of community are illustrated generously th roughout the first
section. Many are compelling and convicting, since few of us have taken our
past " communities" as seriously as Peck does, at least in reflection. High
conviction catches all of us as we examine the probabilities that we often settle
for "pseudocommun ity" instead of integrity in relatio nships.
Excellent development work appears in The Bridge segment of the book,
and helpful reflective patterns are offered and modeled for examining
experiences of em ptiness, vulnerability, integration and integrity.
Peck's "Solution" is focused almost entirely on the necessity of nuclear
disarmament. He offers a pattern fo r examining the American church and the
r' c
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compassionate and not strident.
This is the second Peck book I have used as a catalyst for an annual
marathon meeting of a continuing support group. We worked through People
of the Lie two years earlier. Both books served us well by providing mirrors
into which to gaze to examine our own integrity in the face of enormous
pressures to conform to compromising values and behaviors.
Those of us who know that our survival with sanity and wholeness is
directly contingent on maintaining a support community of significant peers
will likely profit most from The Different Drum . Most clergy live in splendid
isolation, as do most theological academics. These are likely to find the book
mildly discomforting and might be better served to read something else unless
their loneliness is getting them down.
DONALD M. JOY, Professor of Human Development
Ray and Mary Jo West Professor of Christian Education
Asbury Theological Seminary

Wangerin, Walter, Jr. As for Me and My House. Nashville: Thomas Nelson,
1987. 252pp. ISBN 0-8407-5475-2.
Walter Wangerin, story-teller laureate of contemporary Christendom, has
given us the "Thanne and Walter Love Story." Everyone, I suspect, regardless
of marital state, will see their own story here, revisit their own failures and be
edified.
"Early Marriage Work," heavily laced with Thanne and Walter anecdotal
material, traces love, dat ing, motivation, marriage and the adaptation of two
very different people to each other.
"Forgiveness," part two, works through a theology of marriage and of the
sin of manipulation fo r selfish purposes which plagues a marriage. But
Wangerin's eloquence in enveloping us in patterns and strategies of
forgive ness, and covenant maki ng and keeping is easily the peak of the whole
book.
A final segment, " Marriage Work--The Continuing Tasks," plays a set of
strings on the keyboard of continuing the lifelong marital work. The section is
open enough to range from how to nurture effective communication to
spotting early signals of potential adultery, as well as how to deal with abuse in
a marriage.
I have assigned the book now twice in classes dealing with "discipleship
development in the fa mily." This means that I have also read critiques and
responses to As For Me and My House, perhaps a hundred times. In my
eighteen years of leaching, students have not been more positive in their
rati ngs of a book, especially in terms of its transforming impact on their

116

Book Reviews

willingness to be vulnerable and to make changes in their own relationships
and marriages.
Appearing as the book did, virtually at the same mo ment as our Lovers:
What Ever Happened to Eden ? (Dallas: Word Books, 1987), which is in many
ways parallel in scope and equally anecdotal, Robbie and I had the feeling that
we were "twins" to Walter and Thanne Wangerin. Our story, tracing our
"three marriages, all to each other" examines biblical foundations for
husband-wife and male-female relationships in a different but highly
congruent way.
Theological and pasto ral libraries will, of course, likely regard As For Me
and My House as a necessary resource. I predict that it will extend Wangerin's
fame into a new circle. The book easily vies with The Orph ean Passages for
the spot at the top am ong those of us who rank-order Wangerin's proliferating
and helpful works.
DONALD M. JOY, Professor of Human Development
Ray and Mary Jo West Professor of Christian Education
Asbury Theological Seminary

Marrow, Stanley B. Paul, His Letters and His 171eology: An Introduction to
Paul's Epistles. New York: Paulist Press, 1986. iii-viii, 1-278 pp. $9.95,
paper. ISBN 0-8091-2744-X.
Stanley B. M arrow, S.J., is professor of New Testament at Weston School
of Theology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he has taught since 1971. He
obtained his licentiate in Scripture from the Pontifical Biblical Institute in
Rome in 1964 and his doctorate in theology from The G regorian U niversity in
1966. Before coming to Weston he taught at the Biblical Institute in Ro me.
He serves as associate edito r of New Testament Abstracts and the Catholic
Biblical Quarterly . His previous books include: Basic Tools of Biblical
Exegesis (1976), The Words of Jesus in Our Gospels (1979) and Speaking the
Word Fearlessly (1982).
Marrow is aware that a vast am ount of literature on Paul already exists,
but, in his perception, the literature tends to be one of two types. O n the one
hand, numerous treatments of Paul's writings are rather sim plistic devotional
studies, concerned to further personal piety and edification. On the other
hand, the fascinatio n with the apostle has also given rise to no small amount of
forbidding works of scho larship which are much too technical for the average
reader. A further factor which complicates access to the apost le is that his
tho ught has often been distorted by self-appointed reformers and outright
heretics. The result has been that the Pauline corpus in the New Testament
has continued to be a closed book to many Christians down to the present.
This book is directed toward the perceived literary void which exists
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between the uncritical devotional and the arcane scholarly treatments of Paul.
The intended audience is those "educated laity who, in today's vortex of ideas,
find their knowledge of Paul inadequate, and that inadequacy no longer
tolerable" (p. 3).
The sheer bulk of material relevant to Paul in the New Testament has
also given rise to books which are either historical-biographical or exegeticaltheological. Marrow feels that this bifurcation has the potential of further
distorting Paul's thought by producing histories which do not do justice to the
theological basis of Paul's mission and travels, or theologies which treat Paul's
thought in abstraction and in isolation from the historical circumstances out of
which it arose. His concern is to "take up Paul's life in conjunction with his
theology, attempting to illumine and interpret one by the other" (p. 2).
This in turn determines the organization and content of the book. The
first three chapters are largely historical and biographical in character,
introducing the reader to the basic facts of Paul's background, his life both
before and after his Christian conversion, the historical sequence of his
epistles and the chronology of his missionary career (pp. 5-58). A chronology
of Paul's life and letters (p. 18), as well as maps of the Roman world (p. 6)
and the missionary journeys (pp. 46, 60, 113, 208), aid the reader in placing
Paul in time and space.
The greater part of the book is then given to a discussion of the major
theological themes found in Paul's epistles (pp. 59-256) . The author regards
only six of the thirteen books which claim Paul as their author in the body of
the text as being authentically written by Paul (pp. 51 ff.). These include, in
historical order, 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians,
Philippians and Romans. This historical ordering provides the sequence for
chapters four through nine.
The primary sources for the first three chapters are scattered historical
and biographical references in the Pauline epistles, supplemented by the Book
of Acts. Marrow attempts a via media between a complete rejection of the
historical reliability of Acts and an uncritical acceptance of its historical
content at face value. Throughout this section he relies heavily on Ernst
Haenchen's study of the Book of Acts and reflects much of the same
skepticism about the historical reliability of the book that Haenchen does, as
well as a like skepticism which is found in the mid-twentieth century
Bultmannian school of New Testament Theology.
Haenchen's treatment of the Book of Acts spawned a generation of New
Testament scholars who, among other things, have spent no little amount of
time, space and energy ferreting out alleged discrepancies and contradictions
between the theological premises and historical record found in the (late first
century) author of the Book of Acts and that found in the Pauline writings.
Marrow has followed Haenchen's precedents at numerous points here, most
notably in connection with his lengthy (pp. 20-44) discussion of the meaning of
Paul's conversion, which he regards as a primary datum for understanding
Paul's thought (p. 2).
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The usual method for o rgamzmg the discussion of Paul's theology
proceeds on a thematic basis. A rather standard set of themes is selected and
then the separate epistles are drawn upon to develop that theme. T his
procedure always runs the risk of obscuring the histo rical development of
Paul's thought and blurring nuances which arose out of different historical
settings. It also most often gives special prominence to Romans and 1
Corinthians, leaving the content of the remaining epistles standing in their
shadows. Marrow's historical organization--treating the epistles in their
historical sequence--has the advantage of bringing some of the shorter epistles
to the foreground and preserving the various slants of emphasis which the
apostle gave these themes.
The autho r gives one chapter to each of the six epistles which he regards
as being authentically Pauline. He then isolates the major theme or themes
resident in each book and carries out a contextual interpretation. Since,
however, several of these are not exclusive lo one epistle, but often recur in
subsequent epistles, the discussion of a given theme in o ne book is then
supplemented by insights on the same theme from other books. T his
preserves a unity for the author while it permits him to avoid repetitiveness as
he moves from book to book.
The major themes isolated for discussion include Paul's sense of mission
and the uniqueness of his gospel (1 Thessalo nians), eschato logy (1
Thessalo nians, 1 Corinthians), law and freedom (Galatians, 1 Corinthians),
sexual and marital ethics, the eucharist, spiritual gifts (1 Corinthians),
apostolic authority (2 Corinthians), christology, pneum atology (Philippians,
Ro mans), soteriology, anthropology and ecclesiology (Romans) .
T he book closes with a helpful bibliography of scho larly works for further
reading, an index of terms and names fo und in the boo k, and an index of
Scripture references.
Marrow is obviously well read and informed in contem porary New
Testament history and criticism, as well as in Pauline theology. He does quite
well with what he sets out to do. The book was not intended to be exhaustive
in its treatment of Paul's thought, but to serve as an introduction to the
apostle and his writings (pp. 1 ff.). Neither the graduate student in theological
studies nor readers who are more informed in the Pauline literature will find
anyt hing new or innovative here. The book represents a distillation of midtwentieth century Pauline scholarship for the interested lay person. Readers
shaped by a more conservative scholarship will find his assignment of all of the
New Testament books except six epistles of Paul to pseudonymous autho rship
discomfo rting, and his insistence that this makes no difference so far as the
divine inspiration and canonical authority of those scriptures is concerned (pp.
53 ff.) unconvincing.
FRED D. LAYMAN
Butler-Valade P rofessor of Biblical Theology
Asbury Theological Seminary

